Theorizing Agency by Carle, Susan
American University Law Review




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Agency Commons, Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, Legal History,
Theory and Process Commons, and the Politics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carle, Susan. “Theorizing Agency.” American University Law Review 55, no.2 (December 2005): 307-387.
Theorizing Agency
Abstract
Progressive legal scholars today exhibit contrasting views on the scope of legal actors' agency in making
"choices" about how to lead their lives. Feminist legal scholar Joan C. Williams, for example, challenges claims
that women who leave the paid workforce to stay home with children have made a voluntary choice to take
this path. Critical race scholar Ian Haney López, on the other hand, argues that the social construction of
racial identity occurs precisely through the many voluntary choices members of both subordinated and
dominant racial groups make about matters that implicate racial meanings. Williams contests the idea of
voluntary choice; Haney López embraces it.
These different viewpoints highlight the need for further work in legal theory on how to theorize human
agency  that is, the power of persons, at the individual or collective levels, to develop and achieve creative
goals and to act effectively or bring about change within their the social environments in light of those goals.
As a number of progressive legal scholars have point out, neither of two leading paradigms  which I will
term liberal individualism and post-structuralism  are fully adequate to this task of theorizing agency within
social constraints.
I argue that the reason that neither classical liberalism nor post-modernism will fully do stems from the
inadequacies inherent in both paradigms' strongly divergent theories of the self. Strong forms of liberal
individualism see the self as existing prior to its social surroundings and thus as capable of robust agency in
making choices about life goals and how to achieve them, but this perspective arguably does not sufficiently
account for the thoroughly socially constructed nature of human values and aspirations. Strong forms of post-
structuralism, on the other hand, view the individual as a mere fictiona construction embedded in the
structure of language that masks the thoroughly constitutive priority of the social. But this approach, many
critics argue, comes close to denying the capacity for human agency altogether.
Many scholars are today at work on new ways of theorizing agency that avoid the pitfalls of liberal
individualist and post-structuralist approaches. These scholars include Haney López, as we have just seen,
argues that social constructs such as race, having been created by human action, are subject to reconstruction
through purposive human action; Devon Carboda and Mitu Gulati, who examine the agency of members of
outsider identity groups in combating employment discrimination; feminist theorist Kathryn Abrams, who
investigates new ways of theorizing "partial agency" in a revised liberal tradition; and post-structuralist queer
theorist Judith Butler, who has written about the importance of preserving space for individual and collective
agency in theorizing about the social construction of gender identity.
In this Article, I seek to make a modest but important intervention in this discourse about how to theorize
agency within a social constructivist framework. I do so by hailing the classical pragmatists' theory of the self
as an important but currently overlooked theoretical resource for this work. As revised for use in an early
twenty-first century context, classical pragmatism can enrich the discourse on agency within the legal
academy because it both acknowledges the thoroughly socially constructed nature of the self yet also
recognizes a robust capacity for human agency at the individual and collective levels. The classical pragmatists'
theory of the self does not depend on implausible notions that actors possess the ability to "choose" their
identities or destinies; it instead embraces the social constructivist insight that actors in a legal system are
thoroughly constituted, in their identities, values, desires and goals, by their social context. At the same time,
the classical pragmatist conception of social identity construction differs from the subject formation theories
of the post-structuralists because, to the classical pragmatists, selves in interaction with each other constantly
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reconstruct the social environment, just as this social environment, itself composed of selves in interaction,
constantly constructs, or gives social identity to, these selves.
Classical pragmatism, in other words, conceives of the relationship between selves and the social environment
as an interaction with multiple directions, whereas liberal individualists and post-structuralists both tend to
overemphasize a single directionality in what we should envision as a more complicated process.
Individualists can too greatly emphasize the individual's priority in relation to his or her social surroundings;
post-structuralists, revealing their origins in classic structuralism, can overemphasize the overwhelming force
of the social on the subject. Classical pragmatism offers a greater emphasis on the multidimensional nature of
the interaction among organism and environment, as well as among internalized, often inconsistent,
dispositions of the organism and conflicting dimensions of the environment. The self is a multitude of
interactions, not a static inside substance (mind) or a location in an external context (structure).
I develop my argument as follows: In Part I, I sketch the contrast between liberal individualist and post-
structuralist approaches to the self, drawing for purposes of my brief overview on a several diverse scholars
who have received wide attention among American legal academics. In Part II, I present my reading of the
interactionist theory of the self the classical pragmatists developed, focusing especially on the work of John
Dewey and George Herbert Mead. I show briefly how contemporary scholars in a number of disciplines--
though not yet law, surprisingly--have drawn on Dewey and Mead to develop new theories of an agenic self
responsive to the challenges of early twenty-first century social theory. These scholars have also begun to trace
parallels between Dewey's concept of habit as the flexible mediating link between individuals and their social
surroundings and Bourdieu's concept of habitus, derived from continental phenomenology  a parallel that
deserves greater attention in legal theory today. In Part III, I make the case that the classical pragmatists'
theory of the self offers an important intervention in the current discourse among progressive legal scholars
about the scope of legal actors' agency. In Part III-A, I summarize key points of comparison between classical
pragmatism and post-structuralism. I argue in Part III-B that the classical pragmatists' emphasis on the
creativity of human agency offers an important feature missing from post-structuralism. In turn, classical
pragmatism can be updated for use in an early twenty-first century context by incorporating into its basic
framework the greater contemporary awareness of the pull of the unconscious and entrenched force fields of
power, all without negating its emphasis on the potential efficaciousness of deliberative action. In Part III-C, I
suggest some of the ways in which a classical pragmatist orientation to theorizing the self solves the difficulties
of liberal individualist and post-structuralist approaches and outline some of the tenets of a classical
pragmatist approach to the self and human agency as so revised. Finally, in Part III-D, I explore several
examples drawn from recent historical debates among legal scholars that demonstrate more concretely the
potential applications of such an updated classical pragmatist approach.
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INTRODUCTION 
Feminists need only deny that family roles account for part of women’s 
economic disadvantage if they adhere to the traditional view that 
women’s “choice” disproves the existence of gender discrimination.  But 
it does not.  Say, in a segregated country, there are two drinking 
fountains, one for whites only.  If a person of color walks up to the other, 
that is a choice.  But that choice does not negate the existence of 
discrimination.  Similarly, if employers define the ideal worker as 
someone who takes no time off for childbearing or childrearing, they are 
framing their ideal worker as someone with the body and traditional life 
patterns of a man.  Regardless of mothers’ choices, that is sex 
discrimination.1 
*  *  * 
Racial choices occur both on mundane and on epic levels.  Perhaps the 
most graphic illustration of choice in the construction of racial identities 
comes in the context of “passing.”  The ability of some individuals to 
change race at will powerfully indicates the chosen nature of race.  The 
majority of racial decisions, however, are of a much more mundane 
nature.  Because race in our society infuses almost all aspects of life, 
many daily decisions take on racial meanings.  For example, seemingly 
inconsequential acts like listening to country and western music or 
moving to the suburbs constitute means of racial (dis-)affiliation.  So too 
                                                          
 1. Joan C. Williams, “It’s Snowing down South”:  How to Help Mothers and Avoid 
Recycling the Sameness/Difference Debate, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 812, 827-28 (2002) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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do a myriad of other actions taken every day by every person, almost 
always without conscious regard for the racial significance of their 
choices.  It is here, in deciding what to eat, how to dress, whom to 
befriend, and where to vacation, rather than in the dramatic decision to 
leap races, that most racial choices are rendered . . . . 
Drawing upon this conception of choice, the challenge for Whites 
committed to dismantling Whiteness can be broken down into three 
steps.  First, Whites must overcome the omnipresent effects of 
transparency and of the naturalization of race in order to recognize the 
many racial aspects of their identity, paying particular attention to the 
daily acts that draw upon and in turn confirm their Whiteness.  Second, 
they must recognize and accept the personal and social consequences of 
breaking out of a White identity.  Third, they must embark on a daily 
process of choosing against Whiteness.2 
 
*  *  * 
 
The above quotes reflect contrasting views among progressive legal 
scholars on the scope of legal actors’ agency in making “choices” about 
how to conduct their lives.  The first quote, from feminist legal scholar 
Joan C. Williams, challenges the import of claims that women who leave 
the paid workforce to stay home with children have made a voluntary 
choice to take this path.  The second quote, from critical race scholar Ian 
Haney López, argues that the social construction of racial identity occurs 
precisely through the many voluntary choices members of both 
subordinated and dominant racial groups make about matters that implicate 
racial meanings.  Williams contests the idea of voluntary choice; Haney 
López embraces it. 
These quotes highlight the need for further work in legal theory on how 
to theorize human agency—that is, the power of persons, at the individual 
or collective levels, to develop and achieve creative goals, including social 
and political change, within their social environment.  As a number of 
progressive legal scholars have pointed out, neither of the two leading 
paradigms—which I term liberal individualism and post-structuralism—
are fully adequate to this task.  Angela Harris, for example, argues that a 
“reconstructive jurisprudence” suitable for emancipatory activism must 
draw both from what she calls modernism, which emphasizes “free choice” 
and “enlightenment” from “false consciousness,” and from post-
modernism, distinguished by “a mood of profound doubt and skepticism.”3  
                                                          
 2. IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:  THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 192-93 
(1996). 
 3. Angela P. Harris, Foreword:  The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 
741, 743-58 (1994).  Critical race feminists have made a similar point about the need to 
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The reason that neither paradigm will fully do for this project of theorizing 
agency for purposes of emancipatory activism, as I will demonstrate further 
below, stems from the contrasting inadequacies of both paradigms’ 
divergent views of the self.  Strong forms of liberal individualism see the 
self as existing prior to its social surroundings and thus as capable of robust 
agency in making choices about life goals and how to achieve them, but 
this perspective arguably does not account for the thoroughly socially 
constructed nature of human values and aspirations.4  Strong forms of post-
structuralism, on the other hand, view the individual as a mere fiction—a 
construction embedded in the structure of language that masks the 
thoroughly constitutive priority of the social.5  But this approach, many 
critics argue, comes close to denying the capacity for human agency 
altogether.6 
Many scholars today are at work on new ways of theorizing agency that 
                                                          
preserve some of liberal individualism’s emphasis on rights and autonomy in such an 
emancipatory jurisprudence, noting that the post-modern enthusiasm about debunking 
“rights talk” can have deleterious consequences for those struggling against oppression.  
See, e.g., Celina Romany, Ain’t I a Feminist?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 23, 30-31 (1991) 
(“Autonomy and subjectivity have a lot of appeal to Third World women.  Feminist scholars 
and feminist legal theories should pay more attention to the work of Third World cultural 
theorists, who expose the intimate connections between political and national history and 
the constitution of the subject . . . .”); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes:  
Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE CUTTING 
EDGE 84, 89 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) (“The argument that rights are disutile, even 
harmful, trivializes [the experience] of any person or group whose genuine vulnerability has 
been protected by that measure of actual entitlement which rights provide.”); see also 
CORNEL WEST, Reassessing the Critical Legal Studies Movement, in KEEPING FAITH:  
PHILOSOPHY AND RACE IN AMERICA 195, 203 (1993) (criticizing critical legal studies for 
ignoring “the creative ways in which oppressed and marginalized persons have forged 
traditions of resistance by appropriating aspects of liberalism for democratic and egalitarian 
ends”). 
Similarly, lawyer-activists committed to progressive political struggles to combat poverty 
and other forms of social oppression have frequently articulated the need to find a middle 
way on the question of human agency.  See, e.g., GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS 
LAWYERING:  ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 41 (1992) 
(emphasizing the importance of developing a theory of lawyering that recognizes that “no 
group is ever absolutely powerless in any relationship” and asserting that even relatively 
powerless people retain “the capacity to resist victimization and subordination and to 
reverse its tendencies”); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral:  The Ethics of 
Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1676 (1991) (examining the 
interaction between theory and practice in clinical education and feminist theory). 
 4. See infra Part I.A (summarizing the liberal individualist approach). 
 5. See infra Part I.B (summarizing the post-structuralist approach). 
 6. For a summary of this debate between liberal individualists and post-structuralists 
on questions of the self, see 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES:  
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 6-11 (1985).  As another critic puts it: 
Methodological individualism in social theory, according to which isolated and 
atomistic individual actions fully account for humans’ societies and histories, will 
not suffice.  But the alternative is not the exclusive ascription of agency to 
impersonal forces, transcendental entities, or anonymous and autonomous 
discourses. 
CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY:  A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM 
225 (1989). 
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avoid the pitfalls of liberal individualist and post-structuralist approaches.  
Haney López argues that social constructs such as race, having been 
created by human action, are subject to reconstruction through purposive 
human action.7  As the quote at the beginning of this Article reflects, Haney 
López’s provocative position is that individuals construct race through 
choices as mundane as deciding what to eat and how to dress, and as major 
as life decisions about whether to “pass” as members of the majority 
group.8  He suggests that such individual and community decisions 
continually alter context:  “[I]ndividual or community actions, when 
aggregated, have the power to rework the social context in which racial 
systems exist.”9 
Another example of creative work on reconceiving agency within a 
social constructivist framework is that of Devon Carboda and Mitu 
Gulati,10 who, in examining the agency of members of outsider identity 
groups in combating employment discrimination, argue that the post-
modern rejection of liberal notions that we can “choose” our identity 
does not imply that we cannot or do not make choices about how we 
want to be gendered.  Certainly, individuals cannot decide whether they 
want to bring gender into being.  But they do have some choices about 
how to bring gender into being. . . . [M]en can take very different actions 
by engaging in very different performances and still be intelligible as 
gendered subjects.  We are mindful that these choices are exercised 
under constraints. . . . Yet . . . [t]here is some agency.  People do 
participate in the social construction of their identities.11 
Many other leading scholars working in the genre of critical race theory 
are pursuing similar questions in other contexts as well.12 
                                                          
 7. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race:  Some 
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27 
(1994) (“Race must be viewed as a social construction.  That is, human interaction rather 
than natural differentiation must be seen as the source and continued basis for racial 
categorization.”). 
 8. LÓPEZ, supra note 2, at 192-93. 
 9. López, supra note 7, at 50. 
 10. See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701 (2001); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Working]; Devon W. 
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103 (2000). 
 11. Carbado & Gulati, Working, supra note 10, at 1265 n.11.  Carbado and Gulati by no 
means paint a rosy picture, however, emphasizing that any such strategy an outsider uses 
will impose concomitant extra burdens.  See id. at 1262 (suggesting that the strategies 
outsider groups use as “coping mechanisms” to counteract “workplace discrimination and 
stereotyping” impose additional burdens on those groups); id. at 1288-91 (describing 
examples of such burdens). 
 12. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?:  Individual 
Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455, 1467-69 (2002) (exploring 
the ways in which racial identity can be a source not only of oppression and subordination, 
but also of affirmative identity and resistance); Kenneth W. Mack, A Social History of 
Everyday Practice:  Sadie T.M. Alexander and the Incorporation of Black Women into the 
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In feminist legal theory, Kathryn Abrams is investigating new ways of 
theorizing “partial agency” in a revised liberal tradition.13  Abrams argues 
that traditional liberal theory, with its focus on individual autonomy, is 
inadequate because it “mutes [] differences in power or social 
circumstances”14 and fails to explain how subordinated groups come to 
define their interests as coinciding with the interests of the powerful.15  She 
seeks to resolve this tension through a theory of partial agency that would 
show that women are “neither wholly empowered nor wholly 
incapacitated.”16 
Abrams examines feminist approaches to sexuality as one illustration of 
the problem of theorizing agency.  As Abrams observes, a “dominance” 
paradigm, which Katherine MacKinnon and others articulate, characterizes 
women’s sexuality as a construct of oppressive forces.17  Under this theory, 
women engage in sex in order to satisfy men’s desires to act out their urges 
to dominate women.18  But this conception leaves no room for women’s 
agency.  If all heterosexual sex merely involves men acting out their 
desires, there is no room for women to say authentically that they enjoy 
having sex with men.  At the same time, to say that sexuality and women’s 
other desires are thoroughly socially constructed is to leave no room for a 
theory of change.  If women’s desires are simply the product of social 
construction, then it is difficult to articulate an understanding of how it is 
that women could come to develop a vision of a positive, self-affirming 
sexuality.19 
Abrams uses sexuality as a paradigmatic example of the tensions 
                                                          
American Legal Profession, 1925-1960, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1405, 1446, 1471-74 (2002) 
(examining the “partial agency” of the first generation of black women lawyers despite the 
discrimination they faced). 
 13. Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux:  Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal 
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 361 (1995) [hereinafter Abrams, Sex Wars Redux]; see also 
Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency:  Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 844 (1999) [hereinafter Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency] 
(arguing for “reconstructing liberal assumptions” so that the legal system would “more 
fully[] acknowledge . . . the social formation of human subjects”). 
Other legal scholars whose work seeks to reconceive liberal theory through feminist 
lenses include Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy:  Sources, Thoughts and 
Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 9-10 (1989) (searching for “a language of self-
determination that avoids the blind literalness of the liberal concept”); Susan H. Williams, A 
Feminist Reassessment of Civil Society, 72 IND. L.J. 417, 417 (1997) (seeking to 
“reconstruct a form of autonomy that is consistent with . . . feminist commitments”).  For 
similar inquiries in feminist philosophy, see, e.g., DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF, SOCIETY, AND 
PERSONAL CHOICE (1989); Diana T. Meyers, Personal Autonomy and the Paradox of 
Feminine Socialization, 84 J. PHIL. 619 (1987). 
 14. Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency, supra note 13, at 807. 
 15. Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 13, at 305-07. 
 16. Id. at 362. 
 17. Id. at 305. 
 18. Id. at 304-05. 
 19. Id. at 305. 
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inherent in liberal theory as applied to the question of theorizing agency 
from a feminist perspective,20 but the same analysis applies to many other 
feminist issues as well.  The question of the extent to which women’s 
stated preferences should be viewed as the expression of the desires of an 
authentic, autonomous self, as liberal individualist theory would have it, 
arises with respect to women’s decisions about balancing work and family, 
styles of professional presentation, and adoption of traditionally “feminine” 
values (caring, connection, and the like).21  This, indeed, is the question 
Williams addresses in the quote with which this Article begins:  are 
women’s decisions to leave the paid workforce to stay home with children 
a manifestation of “choice?”22  All of these and other areas have been the 
subject of contentious debates among feminist legal scholars, as I explore 
further in Part III.D.2 below. 
In queer theory, post-structuralist philosopher Judith Butler has written 
about the importance of preserving space for individual and collective 
agency in theorizing about the social construction of gender identity.  
Although critics have accused Butler of developing a thoroughly non-
agenic theory of the self,23 she clearly articulates the importance of 
recognizing that the social construction of meaning and identity not only 
constrains but also empowers human agency.24  Butler acknowledges that a 
good theory of agency must explain how it is that human striving 
sometimes produces transformative results,25 and must point the way 
toward avenues for effective political and social activism.26 
                                                          
 20. See id. at 305-07.  
 21. For a brief overview of this debate, see discussion infra Part III.D.2. 
 22. Williams, supra note 1, at 827-28. 
 23. See, e.g., SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF 218 (1992) (querying, in response 
to Butler’s proposal that agency on a post-structuralist account could be “located within the 
possibility of a variation” on repetitions of identity performances, “where are the resources 
for that variation derived from?  What . . . enables the self to ‘vary’ the gender codes?  [T]o 
resist hegemonic discourses?  What psychic, intellectual or other sources of creativity and 
resistance must we attribute to subjects for such variation to be possible?”).  See generally 
SEYLA BENHABIB ET AL., FEMINIST CONTENTIONS:  A PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE (1995) 
[hereinafter FEMINIST CONTENTIONS] (reflecting the debate on agency and other topics 
among leading feminist theorists representing various philosophical positions, including 
critical theory, post-structuralism, ethical feminism and neo-pragmatism). 
 24. See JUDITH BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER:  THEORIES IN SUBJECTION 2 
(1997) (“Subjection consists precisely in this fundamental dependency on a discourse we 
never chose but that, paradoxically, initiates and sustains our agency.”); id. at 15 (“[A]gency 
is the assumption of a purpose unintended by power, one that could not have been derived 
logically or historically, that operates in a relation of contingency and reversal to the power 
that makes it possible, to which it nevertheless belongs.”). 
 25. See id. at 29 (“[A] critical analysis of subjection [should show] how agency may 
well consist in opposing and transforming the social terms by which it is spawned.”). 
 26. Butler writes: 
As much as a perspective on the subject requires an evacuation of the first person, a 
suspension of the “I” in the interests of an analysis of subject formation, so a 
reassumption of that first-person perspective is compelled by the question of 
agency.  The analysis of subjection is always double, tracing the conditions of 
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This Article intervenes in this discourse about how to theorize agency 
within a social constructivist framework by hailing the classical 
pragmatists’27 theory of the self as an important but currently overlooked 
theoretical resource for this work.  I argue that classical pragmatism, as 
revised for use in an early twenty-first century context, can enrich the 
project of theorizing agency for purposes of progressive legal theory 
because it acknowledges the thoroughly socially constructed nature of the 
self, yet also recognizes a robust capacity for human agency at the 
individual and collective levels.  The classical pragmatists’ theory of the 
self does not depend on implausible notions that actors possess the ability 
to “choose” their identities or destinies; it instead embraces the social 
constructivist insight that actors in a legal system are thoroughly 
constituted, in their identities, values, desires and goals, by their social 
context.28  At the same time, the classical pragmatist conception of social 
identity construction differs from the subject formation theories of the post-
structuralists because, to the classical pragmatists, selves in interaction with 
each other constantly reconstruct the social environment, just as this social 
environment, itself composed of selves in interaction, constantly constructs, 
or gives social identity to, these selves.29 
Classical pragmatism, in other words, conceives of the relationship 
between selves and the social environment as an interaction with multiple 
directions, whereas liberal individualists and post-structuralists both tend to 
overemphasize a single directionality in what we should envision as a more 
                                                          
subject formation and tracing the turn against those conditions for the subject—and 
its perspective—to emerge. 
A critical evaluation of subject formation may well offer a better comprehension of 
the double binds to which our emancipatory efforts occasionally lead without, in 
consequence, evacuating the political.  Is there a way to affirm complicity as the 
basis of political agency, yet insist that political agency may do more than reiterate 
the conditions of subordination? 
Id. at 29-30; see id. at 18 (seeking the answer to “how we might make . . . a conception of 
the subject work as a notion of political agency in postliberatory times”). 
 27. I use the term classical pragmatism to refer to the American pragmatists of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, as described in more detail in Part II.A infra.  These 
include philosophers William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, John Dewey and George 
Herbert Mead.  They are to be distinguished from the neo-pragmatists of the later twentieth 
century, as I further discuss in Part I.B.2.b.  For a helpful discussion of the differences 
between classical pragmatism and neo-pragmatism, see James T. Kloppenberg, 
Pragmatism:  An Old Name for Some New Ways of Thinking?, in THE REVIVAL OF 
PRAGMATISM:  NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 83 (Morris Dickstein 
ed., 1998) (describing the important differences resulting from the neo-pragmatists’ 
emphasis on language as constitutive of meaning as compared to the classical pragmatists’ 
emphasis on experience); Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism:  Toward a Naturalized 
Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 286-88 (1997) (distinguishing naturalism of classical 
pragmatists from anti-naturalism of contemporary pragmatists such as Richard Rorty). 
 28. See infra Part II.B.1 and notes 215-224 for clarifying discussions of this notion. 
 29. See generally infra Part II (discussing classical pragmatism’s interactionist 
approach). 
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complicated process.  Individualists can too greatly emphasize the 
individual’s priority in relation to his or her social surroundings;30 post-
structuralists, revealing their origins in classic structuralism, can 
overemphasize the overwhelming force of the social environment on the 
subject.31  Classical pragmatism offers a greater emphasis on the 
multidimensional nature of the interaction among organism and 
environment, as well as among internalized, often inconsistent, dispositions 
of the organism and conflicting dimensions of the environment.32  The self 
is a multitude of interactions, not a static inside substance (mind) or a 
location in an external context (structure).33 
Although classical pragmatists can sound surprisingly post-modern in 
their references to socially constructed and fractured selves,34 they part 
company from post-structuralists on a number of key issues.  First, for 
classical pragmatists social change is not the result of “variations” in 
performative acts that are random, accidental, or compelled by 
contradiction, as post-structuralists such as Judith Butler would have it.35  
Instead, such change results from individual or collective deliberative 
processes, which may be more or less conscious, depending on the 
circumstances, but nonetheless can produce purposive, efficacious results.36  
A second key difference between classical pragmatism and post-
structuralism involves a shift in attitude or emphasis concerning the 
unconscious.  For classical pragmatists, the unconscious is the seat of 
largely benign cultural resources; for post-structuralists, for whom Freud’s 
theory of the unconscious is a far more significant influence, the 
unconscious is irrational, untamable and subversive of purposive ends.37 
Similarly, post-structuralists emphasize the operation of ideology and 
entrenched force fields of power38 that bend human efforts away from their 
                                                          
 30. See infra Part I.A (summarizing the liberal individualist approach). 
 31. See infra Part I.B (summarizing the post-structuralist approach); see also TAYLOR, 
supra note 6, at 8 (“[A]n individual is constituted by the language and culture which can 
only be maintained and renewed in the communities he is part of.”). 
 32. For a discussion of this notion, see infra Part III.A.1 and note 339. 
 33. See discussion infra Part III.A.1 and accompanying notes (emphasizing the dynamic 
nature of the self according to classical pragmatism). 
 34. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, Human Nature and Conduct [hereinafter DEWEY, Human 
Nature], in 14 THE MIDDLE WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY 1, 96 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., S. Ill. 
Univ. Press 1988) (1922) [hereinafter DEWEY, MIDDLE WORKS] (“[A]ny self is capable of 
including within itself a number of inconsistent selves, of unharmonized dispositions.”). 
 35. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:  FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF 
IDENTITY 145 (1990) (theorizing that agency is “located within the possibility of variation” 
in repetitions compelled through discourse rules and normative structures); see also Part 
I.B.2.c infra (further discussing Butler’s theory of agency). 
 36. See infra Part II.B.3 (explaining Dewey’s concept of purposive intelligence). 
 37. See infra Part III.A.3 (contrasting classical pragmatism and post-structuralism 
approaches to the unconscious). 
 38. This phrase comes from Michel Foucault.  See MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
POWER/KNOWLEDGE:  SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-1977, at 98 (Colin 
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intended effects, whereas the classical pragmatists, though not naïve on this 
issue,39 have a less developed view.  I suggest that this late twentieth 
century wariness about the way in which forces that act through the 
unconscious and through fields of power can co-opt well intentioned efforts 
at reform need not overwhelm the classical pragmatists’ emphasis on 
deliberative judgment, but can be incorporated into a classical pragmatist 
framework to update it for use in the early twenty-first century. 
The classical pragmatists were not the only group of twentieth century 
theorists to develop interactionist conceptions of the self along the lines 
described above.  As intellectual historians are now beginning to explore in 
an exciting new comparative literature,40 the slightly later continental 
pheonomenologists held strikingly similar conceptions.41  To the extent that 
important contemporary continental social theorists, such as Michael 
Foucault and Pierre Bourdieau, hold interactionist understandings of the 
self—as I will argue they do, despite the way in which they have been 
interpreted by some American post-structuralists42—they derive their 
interactionism from phenomenology, not from classical pragmatism.  I 
nevertheless focus on classical pragmatism rather than phenomenology 
here because of the importance of classical pragmatism to the history of 
American legal thought.43  Classical pragmatism, I suggest, represents a 
“neglected historical moment” in a shared community of tradition.44 
                                                          
Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980) (“Power must be analysed as something which 
circulates . . . . It is never localised here or there . . . never appropriated as a 
commodity . . . .”); see also text accompanying notes 103-108 (further discussing Foucault’s 
concept of force fields of power).  
 39. See Kloppenberg, supra note 27, at 117 (noting that the classical pragmatists had 
“already incorporated the most valuable insights of the linguistic turn and the postmodern 
suspicion of power”). 
 40. See infra notes 312-315 (citing relevant scholarship). 
 41. See infra Part II.C.2 and accompanying notes (explaining similarities between 
phenomenology and classical pragmatism). 
 42. For an example of a French theorist’s view of Anglo-American conceptions of post-
structuralism, see Posting of Guillaume Garreta, garreta@wanadoo.fr, to dewey-
L@Ganges.CSD.SC.EDU (Aug. 28, 2001) (on file with the American University Law 
Review) (arguing that “‘poststructuralism’ is definitely an American invention . . . . [I]n 
France we don’t have this image of a coherent ‘post’-structuralist trend . . .”). 
 43. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:  
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973) (exploring parallel 
developments in a wide range of early twentieth century disciplines); DOROTHY ROSS, THE 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 143-71 (1991) (discussing pragmatists’ influence on 
law and the progressive social sciences); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL 
REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 24-25, 57-58, 68-69 (1995) (tracing the ways in 
which Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy was a centerpiece of early realist consciousness); 
MORTON G. WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA:  THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 
(1949) (exploring links among the thought of Dewey, Holmes, and other early twentieth-
century thinkers). 
 44. In the words of one of classical pragmatism’s most visionary contemporary 
advocates: 
The point is not to lift oneself out of the flux of history—an impossible task—but 
rather to immerse oneself more deeply into history by consciously identifying 
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I develop my argument as follows:  In Part I, I sketch the contrast 
between liberal individualist and post-structuralist approaches to the self, 
drawing for purposes of my brief overview on several diverse scholars who 
have received wide attention among American45 legal academics.  In Part 
II, I present my reading of the interactionist theory of the self the classical 
pragmatists developed, focusing especially on the work of John Dewey and 
George Herbert Mead.  I show briefly how contemporary scholars in a 
number of disciplines—though not yet law, surprisingly—have drawn on 
Dewey and Mead to develop new theories of an agenic self responsive to 
the challenges of early twenty-first century social theory.  These scholars 
have also begun to trace parallels between Dewey’s concept of habit as the 
flexible mediating link between individuals and their social surroundings 
and Bourdieu’s concept of habitus,46 derived from continental 
phenomenology—a parallel that deserves greater attention in legal theory 
today.   
In Part III, I make the case that the classical pragmatists’ theory of the 
self offers an important intervention in the current discourse among 
progressive legal scholars about the scope of legal actors’ agency.  In Part 
III.A, I summarize key points of comparison between classical pragmatism 
and post-structuralism.  I argue in Part III.B that the classical pragmatists’ 
emphasis on the creativity of human agency offers an important feature 
missing from post-structuralism.  In turn, classical pragmatism can be 
updated for use in an early twenty-first century context by incorporating 
into its basic framework the greater contemporary awareness of the pull of 
the unconscious and entrenched force fields of power, all without negating 
its emphasis on the potential efficaciousness of deliberative action.  In Part 
III.C, I suggest some of the ways in which a classical pragmatist orientation 
to theorizing the self solves the difficulties of liberal individualist and post-
structuralist approaches, and outline some of the tenets of a classical 
pragmatist approach to the self and human agency as so revised.  Finally, in 
Part III.D, I explore several examples drawn from recent historical debates 
among legal scholars that demonstrate more concretely the potential 
                                                          
with—and digesting critically the values of—a particular community or tradition. 
For the radical historicist, the task of ethics is not philosophic, it is not to put 
forward irrefutable justifications of particular moral viewpoints.  Rather the task of 
ethics is theoretic:  the task is to discover ways in which to develop a larger 
consensus and community . . . . 
CORNEL WEST, Radical Historicism, in THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF MARXIST THOUGHT 3 
(1991). 
 45. In the interests of manageability, I confine the scope of my investigation to 
literature published in American law reviews.  I use the conventional term “American” 
rather than the somewhat awkward term “U.S.,” but do not mean to convey that I have 
surveyed Canadian or Central and South American legal scholarship. 
 46. For Bourdieu’s definition of habitus, see infra note 319. 
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applications of such an updated classical pragmatist approach. 
I. APPROACHES TO THE SELF IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THEORY 
Today, many legal theorists writing in American law journals adhere to 
one of two competing paradigms on questions of the self and human 
agency.  They signal their theoretical allegiances through the vocabulary 
they employ.  One paradigm involves what I label the liberal individualist 
approach, which asserts the primacy of the individual in social and political 
analysis.  In its political theory form, liberal individualism views the 
individual as the primary possessor of rights.  Individualism also has an 
epistemological aspect, which draws from René Descartes and other 
philosophers in the Western tradition to posit that the individual mind 
exists separate from and prior to its natural and social surroundings.47  
Finally, individualism has a methodological aspect, which seeks to 
understand collective behavior as the outcome of individual choices.  A 
prominent example of methodological individualism is law and economics, 
along with its offspring, the law and social norms movement,48 whose 
proponents’ prolific contributions to leading law reviews49 have helped 
reawaken interest in the relationship between individuals and social 
context. 
A contrasting paradigm involves variations on the approach 
commentators term post-structuralism.  Post-structuralism has many 
connotations; what I will be referring to in using the term is its use of the 
vocabulary of the subject to signal an understanding of the concept of the 
individual as a social construct50 or fiction.  I use the term post-
structuralism rather than post-modernism to signal this approach because of 
post-modernism’s wider umbrella,51 though some of the theorists whose 
                                                          
 47. As one preeminent philosophical scholar on the historical origins of the self puts it:  
“a great shift” took place with Descartes—a “new conception of inwardness, an inwardness 
of self-sufficiency, of autonomous powers of ordering by reason.”  CHARLES TAYLOR, 
SOURCES OF THE SELF 152, 158 (1989).  Descartes thus gave us his famous Cogito 
argument—“I think, therefore I am”—which posits as the starting point for all knowledge a 
detached self, unable to know for sure anything outside its own existence.  Descartes posited 
the senses as deceptive and the world as external to the thinking mind and fundamentally 
unknowable and emphasized many of the fundamental dichotomies, such as the separation 
between mind and body, internal and external, and reason and desire, that both classical 
pragmatists and post-modernists find troublesome.  Id. 
 48. I discuss examples of these approaches further in Part I.A infra. 
 49. See, e.g., Symposium, Law, Economics & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996); 
Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998).   
 50. On the term social construction, see generally PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS 
LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY:  A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
KNOWLEDGE (1966). 
 51. Cf. James Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral Sentiments?  Integrity, Postmodernism, 
and Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 493, 497-99 (1999) (distinguishing between post-modernism, 
which Boyle defines as having as one “central catechism” a belief in “the fractured self,” 
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views I discuss refer to themselves as post-modernists. 
Post-structuralists frequently express resentment at being categorized,52 
but it seems safe to say that one rallying cry of this disparate group is the 
debunking of liberal individualism.  Post-structuralists denounce liberal 
individualism for its untenable notions of the individual as an autonomous 
agent free to shape his or her destiny.53  They further challenge 
metaphysical and epistemological notions of the primacy of the individual, 
arguing that no “self” can exist prior to and autonomous from its social 
context because a self outside a social context is meaningless.54  Just as 
language is fundamentally social, all human knowledge and action is the 
product of socially constructed values and understandings.  In fact, post-
structuralists claim, the very structure of our language—the grammatical 
existence of the subject position—creates the illusion of self-directing 
individuals, thus masking the thoroughly constitutive priority of the 
social.55 
In retort, theorists in the liberal individualist tradition criticize post-
structuralists for what they see as a lack of viable theory of human 
agency.56  In these theorists’ view, to claim that no self exists outside the 
social is to deny the capacity for individual choice at the personal level and 
for purposive change at the collective level.57  Some post-structuralists 
respond to such critiques simply by demurring.58 
                                                          
and “pomo,” a cultural form built on kitsch, irony, juxtaposition and a “flight from 
ponderous sincerity”).  See generally JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION:  THEORY 
AND CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM 19-25 (1982) (discussing the rise of post-structural 
literary theory); Kathryn Abrams, Afterword:  Critical Strategy and the Judicial Evasion of 
Difference, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1426, 1437 n.52 (2000) (addressing similarities and 
differences between post-modernism, defined as “post-rationalism,” and post-structuralism, 
characterized by a “complex, contingent view of subject formation and power 
relations . . . .”). 
 52. See, e.g., Judith Butler, Contingent Foundations:  Feminism and the Question of 
“Postmodernism”, in FEMINIST CONTENTIONS, supra note 23, at 35, 38-42 (complaining 
about the way in which “authorizing power” creates and reifies a position labeled as 
“Butler’s” view). 
 53. See, e.g., James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible:  The Post-modern Subject in Legal 
Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 489, 520-23 (1991) (discussing the post-modern view of the 
subject); Pierre Schlag, The Empty Circles of Liberal Justification, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1, 34 
(1997) [hereinafter Schlag, The Empty Circles] (critiquing the “liberal individual subject”); 
Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp:  The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. L.J. 37, 
51 (1987) (“The relatively autonomous self is (among other things) a language game.”). 
 54. See Schlag, The Empty Circles, supra note 53, at 37-39 (dismissing the notion that 
the individual can “abstract herself from her peculiar circumstances, her particular 
engagements, her specific tastes and preferences”). 
 55. I discuss post-structuralism further in Part I.B, infra. 
 56. See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 6-11 (summarizing the debate between liberal 
individualists and post-structuralists on questions of the self). 
 57. See discussion infra Part I.A (setting out the basic tenets of the liberal individualist 
approach). 
 58. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1739-40 
(1991) (“[I]f the legal subject is no longer operating the levers . . . [w]e may simply be 
rehearsing and reproducing the instrumentalist logic of bureaucratic practices.”). 
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This debate between liberal individualists and post-structuralists has an 
enormously deep history in Western philosophical traditions, to which I 
obviously cannot even begin to give justice in the limited space of this 
Article.  Instead, in Parts A and B below I merely sketch the broad contours 
of the debate between liberal individualists and post-structuralists, in order 
to set up my argument offering a revised version of classical pragmatism as 
a mediating alterative. 
A. Liberal Individualism 
Liberal individualist conceptions of the self infuse many areas of Anglo-
American legal theory.  Conceptions of individual autonomy, agency, and 
moral responsibility underlie many core areas of legal doctrine, including 
torts,59 contracts,60 property,61 criminal,62 and constitutional law.63  Because 
                                                          
 59. See, e.g., Jules Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 
26 (1995) [hereinafter Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice] (arguing that under the 
principle of corrective justice, human agents owe a duty to correct for harms only if they are 
caused by the exercise of their human agency); Jules Coleman, Mental Abnormality, 
Personal Responsibility, and Tort Liability [hereinafter Coleman, Mental Abnormality], in 
MENTAL ILLNESS:  LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 107, 107 (Barach A. Brody & Tristram 
Engelhardt, Jr. eds., 1980) (noting that tort law recognizes mental deficiency as a defense to 
liability “not to deny fault, but to deny that the minimal conditions of agency or action have 
been satisfied”); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 
449, 488-90 (1992) (referring to the emphasis in tort law on outcome-responsibility—i.e., 
that, because we feel as if our actions in the world make a difference, we also believe that 
we should undo harms, even unintended harms, if they are caused by our actions); Ernest 
Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 107, 112 (2001) (arguing for the importance of a party’s 
capacity for purposiveness in theories of corrective justice).  See generally Tony Honoré, 
Responsibility and Luck, 104 L.Q. REV. 530 (1988) (exploring the problem of moral luck, 
under which the law conceives of people as owning the results of their acts despite the large 
element of chance in those results). 
 60. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice:  The Relation Between Classical 
Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 777-84 (1985) (describing 
conceptions of individualism underlying contract theory). 
 61. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, in LAW & THE 
ORDER OF CULTURE 162, 168 (Robert Post ed., 1990) (examining different metaphors of the 
self used in property law and arguing for the development of new metaphors that would 
foster the development of autonomy not through “protection against intrusion” but through 
“constructive relationship”). 
 62. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 959, 961 (1992) (contending that notions of moral responsibility are 
connected to “a conception of the human subject—the self—as possessing some important, 
immutable attributes to which the law responds, of which free will is most prominent”).  
Dan-Cohen concludes that 
[t]he core of criminal law doctrine, centered around the concept of mens rea and 
the variety of criminal excuses, probably comes closer than any other set of social 
practices to [a] . . . conception of the responsible human subject . . . characterized 
exclusively by a rational free will unencumbered by character, temperament, and 
circumstance. 
Id. at 1003; see also Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L. REV. 
319, 319 (1996) (noting the presupposition underlying moral and legal responsibility that 
“any being who is held responsible must be sufficiently rational and autonomous”). 
 63. See, e.g., Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 
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this Article focuses on the theories of the self underlying legal theory rather 
than on particular doctrinal applications, I will not venture into the vast and 
fascinating literature exploring the connections between liberal 
individualism and Anglo-American jurisprudence,64 except to note at the 
outset the enormous importance of liberal individualist theories of the self 
to legal doctrine generally. 
Certain strands of critical and feminist legal theory also take liberal 
individualist assumptions about the self as a starting point, as scholars have 
explored.65  This subjectivist vein in critical theory draws from thinkers 
such as Jean Paul Sartre, Jurgen Habermas, and others, to posit an unfree 
self, who could be liberated by radical changes in the social order.66  Post-
modernists sometimes criticize this strand of critical theory for possessing 
at bottom an individualist theory of the self, in the sense that a self crying 
out for emancipation exists prior to and independent of the social order.67 
Individualism also underlies the methodology of law and economics and 
its relatively young cousin, the law and social norms movement, as already 
noted.68  Traditional law and economics analysis uses an extreme version of 
methodological individualism, pursuing Oliver Wendell Holmes’s “bad 
man” thought exercise69 to explore the insights obtained by thinking of 
legal actors as having no socialization or morality, but instead as being 
motivated solely by rational self interest.  The law and social norms 
                                                          
1664 & n.31, 1666, 1696 (1997) (examining conceptions of agency in liberalism and 
constitutional theory and proposing “a more complex conception of the self” that would take 
into account constraints on women’s agency); JoEllen Lind, Liberty, Community, and the 
Ninth Amendment, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1259, 1261 (1993) (analyzing traditional “dichotomy 
between liberty and community” in constitutional law and exploring how new emerging 
political theories “might converge to provide a reconceptualization of constitutional 
approaches to the person in society”). 
 64. One leading theorist in this tradition is Joel Feinberg.  See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, 
RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 20-21 (1980) (discussing liberal individualist 
theory of self in relation to jurisprudence).  Feinberg presents intricate applications of this 
conception of the individual to many important legal topics in a series of subsequent books.  
See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT:  PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS (1994); JOEL 
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1984) (4 volume series). 
 65. On critical legal theory, see Boyle, supra note 51, at 489 (explaining “subjectivist” 
strand in critical theory); see also James Boyle, The Politics of Reason:  Critical Legal 
Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 688 (1985) [hereinafter Boyle, 
The Politics of Reason](discussing tension in critical legal thought between subjectivist and 
structuralist strands).  On liberal feminist theory, see sources cited supra note 13. 
 66. See Boyle, supra note 51, at 489. 
 67. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 35, at 142 (complaining that most discourses pose a 
prior subject); Schlag, supra note 58, at 1685 (criticizing subjectivist strands of critical legal 
studies for posing “the idea of personal liberation”). 
 68. See supra note 49. 
 69. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Common Law, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
JUSTICE HOLMES:  COMPLETE PUBLISHED WRITINGS & SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 109, 149 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1995) 
(1881) (suggesting that legal rules should be analyzed according to the incentives they 
create for a person who has no moral compunctions, i.e. a “bad man,” but is concerned 
solely with the probabilities of detection and penalty). 
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movement retains a commitment to methodological individualism, but 
seeks to capture more of the complexity of human conduct.70  These 
scholars examine social norms through a rational choice paradigm, though 
many seem to have abandoned the goal of being able to explain social 
norms from this perspective.71 
In short, diverse fields of legal scholarship rest on liberal individualist 
assumptions about the nature of the self.  The exploration of underlying 
assumptions about the nature of the self takes place most centrally in 
philosophy, and legal theorists tend to turn there to the extent that they 
critically examine their assumptions about the self at all.  Legal philosopher 
David Luban can serve as our expert in setting this stage.  
Liberal individualism, Luban explains, conceives of the individual as 
having metaphysical priority.72  Contrary to some claims, liberal 
individualists do not reject the observation that an individual’s social 
environment profoundly affects her desires, interests, and goals; 
nonetheless, liberal individualists understand the individual as existing 
separate from and prior to that social environment.  As Luban puts it, 
liberalism denies that “the self is essentially historical and relational,” not 
as a matter of personality development, but as a matter of “metaphysics.”73  
                                                          
 70. In the words of a number of writers borrowing from a remembered witticism of 
Arthur Leff, to the extent that law and economics may be a “desert,” but law and society is a 
“swamp,” the idea was to create law and economics as a more appealing and complex 
landscape than a desert, while still avoiding the opposite extreme of “swampiness.”  See, 
e.g., Robert Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 1603, 1607 (2000) (citing ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 147 (1991) (quoting Arthur Leff)). 
 71. Law and social norms scholars have been stymied in their attempts to show that 
social norms advance efficient behavior because, while some social norms, such as rules of 
honesty, may lead to efficient outcomes in the long term, others, such as racially 
discriminatory practices, clearly do not.  See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and 
Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1698 (1996) (criticizing “the view that the 
norms of closely knit groups are efficient”).  Lawrence Lessig, a leading spokesperson, has 
cited French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in calling for an “interpretative turn” in law and 
economics that would allow consideration of “context” and “[m]eaning prescriptions and 
descriptions” that “are more local, more contingent.”  Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and 
Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181, 2184, 2188 (1996); see also Cass R. Sunstein, 
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 910-11 (1996) (noting that 
“[l]ibertarians, some economic analysts of law, and many liberals give inadequate attention 
to the pervasive functions of social norms, social meanings, and social roles,” and that “[w]e 
should agree that social norms play a part in determining choices” (footnotes omitted)).  
Another emerging field seeks to unite the law and economics approach, which sees social 
norms as factors external to the rational actor, with the sociological approach, which sees 
social norms as internal and constitutive of the actor, through a new discipline of socio-
economics, which sees social norms as having both sets of potentialities.  See generally 
Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms:  Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 157 (2000). 
 72. See David Luban, The Self:  Metaphysical Not Political, 1 LEGAL THEORY 401, 402 
(1995) (“[M]etaphysical questions seem deeply embedded in public controversies over 
abortion, medical ethics, criminal responsibility, corporate personality, genetic engineering, 
equal opportunity and multiculturalism . . . .”). 
 73. Id. at 402-03. 
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Luban defends this liberal individualist conception of the self, pointing out 
that it captures many of our observations about the individual nature of 
body, memory and consciousness,74 as well as our moral intuitions that 
locate the basis for moral responsibility in the ability of individuals to 
                                                          
 74. See id. at 429 (“I continue to inhabit the same body and, second, I retain continuity 
of memory and consciousness.”); id. (“A funny thing happened on the way from Kant to 
Sandel:  Our most basic and everyday criteria of individuation—body, mind, memory—
dropped by the wayside.”); see also id. at 430 (lamenting that Sandel’s communitarian 
vision “omits any account of the role of unity of consciousness in our concept of a person”).  
Here, Luban is referring to Immanuel Kant’s notion of apperceptual unity—i.e., the 
perception of having an individual self, united through time and through different sense 
impressions, or experiences.  It would take us too far afield to explore Kant in any depth, but 
his philosophy of the self plays an important part in our received traditions.  Kant begins 
where David Hume laid off, agreeing that we cannot through reason trust the reliability of 
the conclusions we derive from our senses.  But, Kant argues, against Hume, this means that 
the world of experiences cannot be the only world of which humans have knowledge.  
Instead, our perception of apperceptual unity offers a tiny glimpse of the nature of the self 
in a metaphysical realm that we cannot know or understand.  Kant argues that this realm is a 
transcendent world of “things as they are in themselves,” or noumenon, which he 
distinguishes from the tangible or phenomenal world of things as we can perceive them.  See 
generally SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 265 (1994) 
(describing Kant’s notion of the noumenal). 
The positing of a noumenal realm solves many of the paradoxes of human knowledge and 
perception for Kant.  For one, it explains human subjectivity without falling into Humean 
skepticism.  Hume is correct that we can only experience the world through our subjective 
experiences, but the very fact that we understand that our experiences are only subjective 
points to the existence of an objective realm of things in themselves.  Indeed, many of the 
insights of post-modernism trace back to Kant, who agrees that we can never stand outside 
our own experience to reach conclusions about matters we perceive in the empirical world.  
Unlike post-modernists, however, Kant believes in human rationality and free will as a 
noumenal matter.  Kant argues that human beings possess the distinctive characteristics of 
rationality and free will as a matter of the kind of beings that humans are.  Kant’s noumenal 
self acts rationally in standing apart from its desires and ends in the phenomenal world in 
choosing its actions.  This self possesses free will, not as a question subject to empirical 
validation or refutation, but again as a noumenon—a matter existing outside space and time 
and basically unknowable to human understanding.  Free will, according to Kant, elevates 
human conduct above the casually determined nature of the phenomenal world.  Even 
though human beings clearly are constrained by causes and effects in the phenomenal world, 
we have to understand human beings, as a matter of our rational understanding of the kinds 
of beings we are, as not being causally determined.  We sense that we are the free 
originators of our actions, though we cannot understand how it is that this is so, except 
through resort to transcendent ideas of reason.  See generally ROGER SCRUTON, KANT (rev. 
ed. 2001) (providing detailed, comprehensive commentaries on Kant’s philosophy); ROBERT 
J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT’S MORAL THEORY (1989) (same) . 
Kant builds a deontological ethics on his ideas concerning the noumenal self.   
Human beings must be accorded basic respect and may not be treated as ends to other 
objectives because such respect is due to all rational human beings—not because they have 
shown themselves worthy of respect, but as an acknowledgment of the kind of beings 
humans are.  Likewise, Kant links the noumenal idea of human beings’ free will to a 
conception of moral agency.  Human beings are responsible for all of their actions because 
these actions are the product of their noumenal capacity for free choice.  Again, for Kant, 
the point is not to ask whether or to what extent a person possesses free choice in the 
phenomenal world in any particular situation, but to understand the noumenal self as 
capable of rational, free action.  See BLACKBURN, supra, at 147 (“In Kant, while the 
empirical or phenomenal self is determined and not free, the noumenal or rational self is 
capable of rational, free action.”).  This linking of free will and moral responsibility has had 
enormous importance in Anglo-American jurisprudence, as I have already discussed. 
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reflect on and choose their ends and dispositions.75 
This idea that individuals exist separate from and prior to their social 
environment and have the ability to choose their values and ends has, of 
course, been the target of many critiques.  One such challenge comes from 
communitarian philosopher Michael Sandel.76  Sandel argues that 
liberalism’s view of the self fails to take sufficient account of the way in 
which a person’s experiences in a particular life world constitute the self’s 
attachments—its interests, values, and aims.77  Indeed, Sandel argues, a 
person’s attachments to a community and its socially derived values 
constitute the person herself; we could not understand the concept of a 
person separate from these attachments.78   
Luban illustrates this difference in viewpoint between liberal 
individualists and communitarians by way of an example:  Sandel, in 
claiming that attachments are constitutive of identity, must also argue that 
whenever a person engages in a “deep revision” of a constitutive 
attachment—as, for example, in the break up of a love affair—that person’s 
identity also changes.79  For a liberal individualist, on the other hand, even 
such deep changes “leave[] one’s identity intact.”80 
This difference is in turn related to another important characteristic of 
liberal individualists’ understanding of the nature of the self.  Liberal 
individualists’ view of the self as existing separate from and prior to the 
social environment leads to a robust conception of human agency.  
Although tied to one’s social environment, the individual is able to reflect 
on and act with autonomy and choice in response to it.81  As one 
contemporary liberal theorist explains, on a liberal view of the “deep self,” 
“we do not create ourselves from nothing,” but we can nevertheless “reflect 
on what sorts of beings we are, and on what sorts of marks we make on the 
world,” and “can change what we don’t like about ourselves and keep what 
                                                          
 75. See Luban, supra note 72, at 431 (asserting that a claim that “there simply is no self 
behind the mass of dispositions” does not account for “the fact that we are able to adopt a 
reflective and critical stance toward our dispositions . . . and evaluate them”). 
 76. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 90 (1982) (posing 
the rhetorical question:  if “none can know whether he shall have the misfortune to be born 
into . . . unfavorable social and family circumstances[,]” why not “agree . . . to regard the 
distribution of natural and social liabilities as a common burden?”). 
 77. See id. at 179 (“[W]e cannot regard ourselves as independent . . . without great cost 
to those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by 
them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are . . . .”). 
 78. See id. (“To imagine a self incapable of constitutive attachments such as these is not 
to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without 
character, without moral depth.”). 
 79. Luban, supra note 72, at 428. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Susan Wolf, Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility, in THE INNER 
CITADEL:  ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 137, 143  (John Christman ed., 1989) 
[hereinafter CITADEL] (“For while other members of the natural world are not in control of 
the selves that they are, we, possessors of effective deep selves, are in control.”). 
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we do.”82  Sandel, in contrast, disagrees with conceptions that tie human 
agency to the capacity to make change in one’s circumstances.  Sandel 
writes, for “the subject whose identity is constituted in the light of ends 
already before it, agency consists less in summoning the will than in 
seeking self-understanding.”83 
For progressive legal scholars interested in promoting projects of 
emancipatory activism, however, the ability to theorize the potential for 
human agency as including the capacity to change one’s environment is 
obviously important; it is hard to promote the need for activism if we are so 
thoroughly captured by the constitutive priority of the social that we can do 
no more than seek to “understand” this—if we cannot, in other words, take 
effective purposive actions to reform our environment or reach individual 
or collective goals.  At the same time, many such scholars eschew 
traditional liberal notions of the self for the reasons Abrams, Harris and 
others discuss—namely, that traditional liberalism fails to account for the 
restraints on agency placed on persons who exist within structures of 
subordination or oppression.84  In light of the shortfalls of liberal 
individualism, some of these scholars have turned to alternative sources of 
theory that I will classify under the general rubric of post-structuralism.  I 
examine post-structuralism in a brief overview below. 
B. Post-structuralism and the Renunciation of the Subject 
Post-structuralism refers to a wide array of voices and perspectives, and 
is, accordingly, hard to characterize, as already noted.  It is fairly safe to 
generalize about one aspect of post-structuralism, however, which concerns 
post-structuralists’ attitude towards liberal individualist conceptions of the 
self.  Put most simply, post-structuralists adamantly reject notions that the 
individual possesses metaphysical primacy, or indeed, any reality at all.85  
This rejection follows from certain trends in later twentieth century thought 
in the aftermath of the structuralist movement in fields such as linguistics, 
literary theory, and cultural anthropology.86  It is not my intent to enter into 
                                                          
 82. Id.; see also David A. J. Richard, Rights and Autonomy, in CITADEL, supra note 81, 
at 203, 213 (stating that “neo-Kantian deontological moral theory” views “the capacity of 
each person self-critically to evaluate and give order and personal integrity to one’s system 
of ends in light of a point of view of how to live one’s life” and “to take ultimate 
responsibility, as free and rational beings, for adopting and revising a point of view on how 
to live their lives”). 
 83. SANDEL, supra note 76, at 153. 
 84. See supra notes 3, 13-19 and accompanying text (proposing a new theory of agency 
that takes into account more fully the experiences of traditionally oppressed groups, 
especially women). 
 85. See, e.g., Schlag, The Empty Circles, supra note 53, at 34 (critiquing the “liberal 
individual subject”). 
 86. See generally Thomas C. Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127 
(1984) (tracing the influence on the legal academy of structuralism and its critiques). 
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a lengthy analysis of post-structuralism here, but a short foray into its 
concept of the subject—or subject position, to use the preferred 
vocabulary—is in order to set up my analysis comparing the post-
structuralist subject with the classical pragmatists’ self. 
1. The self or subject as a fiction 
The influence of structuralist and post-structuralist theories on American 
legal theory is a broad and difficult topic, on which Thomas Heller offers a 
helpful account.87  In a nutshell, Heller explains, structuralism involved a 
move away from understanding meaning in language as derived from the 
connection between linguistic referents and real things, and toward a focus 
on language as a system of signs that have meaning by virtue of their 
relationships to other signs.88  Structuralist linguists posit that we see and 
understand objects and relationships only as those understandings are given 
to us through language.89  Moreover, actors do not use language to achieve 
their purposes; rather, the relationship is the reverse—language creates 
actors’ purposes.90  Indeed, structuralists argue that language not only 
creates actors’ purposes but creates the very actors—the subjects or subject 
positions—themselves.  As Heller explains: 
[S]ince meaning was contained in the intralinguistic system, the role of 
speaker as agent was displaced.  The speaker was now dependent on 
language itself to engage in meaningful activities.  The meaning 
available to a subject was that opened up by the conceptual ordering his 
or her language afforded.  The subject was better understood as a product 
of culture, an identity created by language.91 
In other words, structuralists argue that we think in terms of liberal 
individualist actors simply because our language causes us to do so.  But 
the subject position—the I—is nothing more than a linguistic construct.92  
We think the I is primary simply because that is the way our language 
constructs our consciousness.93 
This raises the question of why it seems that individual human beings 
                                                          
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 140. 
 89. See id. (“Initial formulations of structuralist linguists relocated the production of 
meaning within the network of relations that was language itself.”). 
 90. See id. (positing that the “meaning available to a subject was that opened up by the 
conceptual ordering his or her language afforded”). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Scholars in comparative linguistics have supported claims that language constructs 
cultural understandings of the self.  See, e.g., Rom Harré, The Self in Monodrama, in THE 
SELF:  PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 318, 343 (Theodore Mischel ed., 1977) 
(comparing Japanese and Western languages and correspondingly different conceptions of 
the self). 
 93. Indeed, one might speculate whether the fact that post-structuralist writing often 
appears of such “bad” quality is partly explainable by the difficulty of writing intelligibly 
with “the subject position erased.” 
CARLE OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:42:36 PM 
2005] THEORIZING AGENCY 327 
use language to express ideas that are new, creative, and original to 
themselves.  Ferdinand de Saussure, an early Swiss structuralist linguist, 
resolved this problem by dividing language into langue and parole.94  
Langue consists of the rules of language—the underlying structures that 
determine what thought or ideas can be expressed.95  Parole is made up of 
the utterances that can be made by manipulating the underlying rules.96  
Similarly, cultural anthropologist Claude Levi Strauss adapted linguistic 
structuralist theory to explain social organization, proposing that social 
organization is largely the product of unconscious structures, just as 
language is.97  Analogizing these underlying structures of social 
organization to de Saussure’s concept of langue, Levi Strauss posited that 
observed variations among cultures are merely a kind of parole.98 
Structuralism in literary interpretation, as in anthropology, seeks to look 
beyond the actions of individuals—in this context, the so-called 
“authors”—to find the underlying structures and patterns in texts.99  
Structuralist literary theorists criticize the humanist idea that individual 
authors are creators.  The author does not originate language; instead, the 
language speaks through authors.100  Authors’ apparent originality is simply 
recombination, or parole.  Structuralist literary theorists are interested in 
detecting the underlying langue. 
Post-structuralism accepts many of these basic theoretical positions, but 
rejects the totalizing tendencies of classical structuralism.101  Thus, as 
Heller explains in detail,102 post-structuralists eschew the goal of achieving 
                                                          
 94. See generally FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 16-20 
(Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye eds., Wade Baskin trans. 1959) (1916) (outlining de 
Saussure’s linguistic theory). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Cf. Joan Williams, Critical Legal Studies:  The Death of Transcendence and the 
Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 464-65 (1987) (attributing Levi-Strauss’s 
analysis of myths and other cultural institutions to his adoption of Saussure’s linguistics). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Mary Klages, J. Derrida:  Structuralism/Post-structuralism (2004), http://www. 
colorado.edu/English/ENGL2012Klages/1derrida.html (“In structuralism, the individuality 
of the text disappears in favor of looking at patterns, systems, and structures.”). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Heller surveys the many critiques to which early twentieth century structuralism fell 
sway.  See Heller, supra note 86, at 155-72.  Among these was the proliferation of different 
structural accounts, so that human conduct could be explained by linguistic, economic, or 
psychoanalytic structuralism and by different versions of structuralism within each account.  
None of these accounts seemed demonstrably better than others and all could be united only 
through use of theory at such a level of abstraction or pretension “that it is esthetically 
offensive.”  Id. at 158.  Another group of such critiques, as Heller describes, pointed to the 
dual problems in structuralist accounts of indeterminancy, on the one hand (i.e., their 
“underdetermination of practice opens a gap within the logic of structuralist argument that 
seems to demand the resuscitation of an interpreting subject”) and of overdeterminism, on 
the other (i.e., their insistence on accounting for all practices, as in Marx’s theory of 
proletarian revolution).  Id. at 157-58. 
 102. As Heller explains, post-structuralists reject the impulse toward a universalizing 
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overarching, universal theories, as many structuralists sought to do, but 
retain the emphasis on structures of language as wholly constitutive of 
thought.  Post-structuralists also adopt different conceptions of the 
operation of power than structuralists had embraced.  Rather than thinking 
of power as a form of internal or external structure, post-structuralists 
follow French social theorist Michael Foucault in viewing power as a force 
field—in other words, “as something which circulates . . . . It is never 
localised here or there . . . never appropriated as a commodity or piece of 
wealth.”103  Combining this idea with the structuralist (and Nietzschean104) 
rejection of the subject, Foucault theorizes that one of the effects of power 
so conceived is the creation of subject positions: 
[I]t is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, 
certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires come to be identified 
and constituted as individuals.  The individual, that is, is not the vis-a-vis 
of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects.105 
Put otherwise, post-structuralists reject command-and-control ideas of 
power—i.e., conceptions of power as involving claims by one powerful 
group of people to command the actions of another, less powerful 
                                                          
“metatheory” of earlier structuralists, accept multiple competing conceptions of structure, 
and recognize and embrace the indeterminacy of structural claims.  Id. at 182-83.  They also 
seek to be less serious about theory—to recognize that “explanatory theory is but another 
practice, valid in itself, but no more privileged than other representations within the 
system . . . to give up this image of a positive truth, whether of subject or structure.”  Id. at 
183. 
 103. FOUCAULT, supra note 38, at 98. 
 104. Post-structuralist theorist Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak explains the influence of 
Nietzsche on post-structuralism in the following brilliant but difficult prose: 
The “subject” is a unified concept and therefore the result of “interpretation.”  
Nietzsche often stresses that it is a specifically linguistic figurative habit of 
immemorial standing:  “that when it is thought there must be something ‘that 
thinks’ is simply a formulation of our grammatical custom that adds a doer to every 
deed.”  The “insertion of a subject” is “fictitious.”  The will to power as the 
subject’s metaphorizing or figurating, or introduction of meaning, must therefore 
be questioned. . . .  Nietzsche accordingly entertains the notion of the will to power 
as an abstract and unlocalized figurative (interpretative) process:  “One may not 
ask:  ‘who then interprets?’ for the interpretation itself is a form of the will to 
power, exists (but not as a ‘being’ but as a process, a becoming) as an affect . . . .” 
  Sometimes Nietzsche places this abstract will to power, an incessant figuration, 
not under the control of any knowing subject, but rather underground, in the 
unconscious.  The Nietzschean unconscious is that vast arena of the mind of which 
the so-called “subject” knows nothing.  As Derrida remarks:  “both [Freud and 
Nietzsche] often in a very similar way, questioned the self-assured certitude of 
consciousness . . . .  For Nietzsche ‘the important main activity is unconscious.’” 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Translator’s Preface to JACQUES DERRIDA, OF 
GRAMMATOLOGY, at ix, xxiv-xxv (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1st ed. 1976) (German 
language text and citations omitted); see also WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY:  POWER 
AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY, at xii (1995) (“Nietzsche and Foucault discern the 
atomic powers of history in microphysical particles, in ‘descriptive’ languages, in moral 
systems, and in thwarted aggression and ideals—in short, in the very making of bodily 
subjects and socio-political desire.”). 
 105. FOUCAULT, supra note 38, at 98. 
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group106—and replace such ideas with an understanding of power as a 
massive and multiply determined complex of ideologies and social forces 
that create subjects who are compliant in—even happy about—their 
domination. 
In each of three major historical works, Foucault brilliantly traces how 
discourses about the subject changed over time as the result of the 
operation of force fields of power with respect to such matters as sanity and 
insanity, moral responsibility and punishment, and sexual activity and 
identity.107  In the early Foucault, at least, there is a strong emphasis on the 
way in which such discourses change independent of the conscious efforts 
of human actors.  Leading Foucault interpreters, who worked with Foucault 
in producing their interpretation, put it this way: 
There is a logic to the practices.  There is a push towards a strategic 
objective, but no one is pushing.  The objectives emerged historically, 
taking particular forms and encountering specific obstacles, conditions 
and resistances.  Will and calculation were involved.  The overall effect, 
however, escaped the actors’ intentions, as well as those of anybody else.  
As Foucault phrased it, “People know what they do; they frequently 
know why they do what they do; but what they don’t know is what what 
they do does.”108 
Foucault strongly objected to being labeled a post-structuralist (or any 
other label),109 and, later in his life, as I will discuss in Part III.A.2 below, 
                                                          
 106. Cf. Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 13, at 308 & n.1, 325, 327 (critiquing 
Katherine MacKinnon’s “neck on the throat” concept of male domination). 
 107. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT:  THE BIRTH OF THE 
PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, 
DISCIPLINE] (tracing historically changing approaches to punishment); MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., 1990) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY] 
(undertaking similar historical analysis of constructions of sexuality); MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION:  A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON (Richard 
Howard trans., 1965) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, MADNESS] (providing a similar analysis of 
mental illness). 
 108. HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT:  BEYOND 
STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 187 (2d ed. 1982) (emphasis added) (citing personal 
communication); see also id. at 109 (“Foucault . . . sees all psychological motivation not as 
the source but the result of strategies without strategists.”). 
Spivak offers a similar concept of a subaltern subject in the context of post-colonialism 
studies, which she explains this way: 
I am progressively inclined, then, to read the retrieval of subaltern consciousness as 
the charting of what in post-structuralist language would be called the subaltern 
subject-effect.  A subject-effect can be briefly plotted as follows:  that which seems 
to operate as a subject may be part of an immense discontinuous network (“text” in 
the general sense) of strands that may be termed politics, ideology, economics, 
history, sexuality, language, and so on. . . .  Different knottings and configurations 
of these strands, determined by heterogeneous determinations which are themselves 
dependent upon myriad circumstances, produce the effect of an operating subject. 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Subaltern Studies:  Deconstructing Historiography, in THE 
SPIVAK READER 203, 213 (Donna Landry & Gerald MacLean eds., 1996). 
 109. See Interview by Gerard Raulet with Michel Foucault, Structuralism and Post-
structuralism, in MICHEL FOUCAULT, AESTHETICS, METHOD, AND EPISTEMOLOGY 433, 437 
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he began to emphasize a perspective that is strongly interactionist in 
emphasis.  But the early Foucaultian perspective strongly influences 
leading American post-structuralists in the legal academy, such as Pierre 
Schlag, whom I will discuss in Part I.B.2.a below. 
Along with many other later twentieth century theorists, post-
structuralists apply the concept of ideology to explain how humans resolve 
or disguise the logical contradictions of their language and thought 
systems.110  Ideologies are ideas with deep unconscious resonances that 
work to hide contradiction.111  As applied to the question of the subject, 
post-structuralists invoke this understanding of how ideology operates to 
argue that the great emotional weight attached to the idea of free, 
autonomous individuals in Western liberal thought masks the utter fallacy 
of that idea.112  In the legal academy, scholars labeling themselves as post-
modernists or post-structuralists have devoted much attention to this 
ideological “problem of the subject,”113 as I examine below. 
2. The post-modern subject in legal theory 
In this section, I give several examples of post-modernists influential in 
the American legal academy who passionately reject liberal individualist 
conceptions of the self.  I have selected these examples from among many I 
could have chosen, with an eye to those theorists who are best known and 
focus most extensively on the problem of theorizing the subject and human 
agency.  What I hope to show is that, despite the widely varying 
orientations of the theorists I will discuss, each espouses a position tending 
to deny or minimize the capacity of persons to engage in meaningful 
individual or collective agency. 
                                                          
(James Faubion ed., Robert Hurley et al. trans., 1998) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, AESTHETICS] 
(“I have never been a Freudian, I have never been a Marxist, and I have never been a 
structuralist.”); id. at 448 (“[I] do not understand what kind of problem is common to the 
people we call ‘post modern’ or ‘post-structuralist.’”); see also DREYFUS & RABINOW, supra 
note 108, at xxiv (“Foucault was never a structuralist, strictly speaking, or a post-
structuralist . . . .”). 
 110. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an 
Investigation), in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127, 127 (Ben Brewster 
trans., 1971). 
 111. See, e.g., id. at 172 (arguing that a “peculiarity of ideology” is that it “imposes . . . 
obviousnesses, which we cannot fail to recognize and before which we have inevitable and 
natural reaction of crying out . . . ‘That’s obvious!  That’s right!  That’s true!’” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 112. See, e.g., Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 
1193 (1985) (arguing that the subject/object dichotomy “tends to naturalize the status quo”). 
 113. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 51, at 520-23 (discussing post-modernists’ view of the 
subject); Peller, supra note 112, at 1193 (highlighting “continuity of the institutionalization 
of the subject/object dichotomy in legal representational thought”). 
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a. Pierre Schlag 
One of the most comprehensive post-structuralist treatments of the 
subject in law is Pierre Schlag’s aptly titled article, “The Problem of the 
Subject.”114  In it, Schlag critiques many schools of jurisprudence “in terms 
of the kind of subject that the school of thought presupposes or 
celebrates.”115  This is not the place to venture deeply into all of Schlag’s 
arguments;116 suffice it to say that Schlag makes no bones whatsoever 
about denying the possibility of individual or collective agency.  Schlag 
argues that 
in a Foucaultian sense, this construction of the subject entails a 
prevailing unfreedom.  Each and every social, legal, and political event is 
immediately represented as an event calling for a value-based choice.  
You are free to choose between this and that.  But, of course, you are not 
free.  You are not free because you are constantly required to reenact the 
motions of the prescripted, already organized configuration of the 
individual being as chooser.117 
                                                          
 114. Schlag, supra note 58. 
 115. Id. at 1656.  
 116. In brief summary, Schlag examines legal formalism, legal realism, critical legal 
studies, legal pragmatism and several other schools of jurisprudence and argues that all are 
deficient in their treatment of the subject.  In late nineteenth century legal formalism, the 
liberal subject is introduced by means of “a double twist.”  First, the law itself is given the 
character of the transcendent subject that moves all by itself.  Id. at 1647.  This notion of 
law as an objective order does not explain how law can change.  To explain that, subjects 
must insert themselves.  Thus, Schlag argues, the subject reasserts itself and stands in 
opposition to “various transcendental orders of the object.”  Id. at 1642. 
Schlag accuses the American legal realists of adopting the same structure of thought as 
the formalists.  The realists stabilize the new realm of the object as the realm of social 
science explanation and functionalist prescription.  Thus, whether the realm of the objective 
is doctrine or social science, jurisprudence “always leaves a stabilized, untroubled, 
unexamined subject in place.”  Id. at 1643. 
Taking on critical legal studies, Schlag points to the tension between its structuralist and 
subjectivist strains.  The subjectivist strand, “is informed by ‘the idea of personal 
liberation’ . . . by bursting free of the constraints imposed by the reified structures of social 
life.”  Id. at 1685 (quoting Boyle, The Politics of Reason, supra note 65, at 742).  Again, the 
liberal free and autonomous subject surfaces as the construction of the subject underlying 
the critical impulse of critical legal theory.  Schlag, supra note 58, at 1702.  Drawing again 
on Boyle, Schlag locates this conception of the radically autonomous subject in the 
existentialist philosophy of Sartre.  As Schlag puts it “Sartre is the worm at the heart of 
critical legal studies” and the liberal subject is the worm at the heart of Sartre.  Id. at 1693.  
The assumption is that the subject, the individual is okay, that “all the problems are situated 
on the outside—in the external objectified thought structures that constrain the critical legal 
thinker . . . .”  Id. at 1702.  Schlag also critiques the legal pragmatists.  Id. at 1708-17.  For 
Schlag’s critique of pragmatism and my response to it, see infra note 117. 
 117. Schlag, supra note 58, at 1700.  Schlag is here alluding to his assault on the 
relentless normativity of American legal scholarship.  See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Normative 
and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 177-78, 86 (1990).  For a critique of Schlag’s 
argument about normativity in legal scholarship, see Margaret Jane Radin & Frank 
Michelman, Pragmatist and Post-structuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
1019, 1021 (1991) (noting that Schlag’s call not to be normative is itself normative). 
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Debunking what he sees as the naïve optimism of pragmatism,118 Schlag 
argues that, although “[i]t is our convention to pretend that culture is 
produced by artisans of meaning,” in reality “culture is now shaped by 
techno-bureaucratic service strategies of the mall, the HMO, the school, the 
prison, and the day care.”119  Schlag concludes that “[t]here is no human 
participation in the creation of culture or relations with others that is not 
already an instance of the regimen of techno-bureaucratic strategies.”120  In 
Schlag’s words: 
The pragmatist subject, understood in pragmatic terms, is the shopper at 
the universal mall making meaning with the commodified signs of our 
traditions and culture while the social aesthetics of techno-bureaucratic 
strategies are making him think he means something.  Everything else is 
just nostalgia.121 
In other words, Schlag accuses the pragmatists as a group of an unduly 
robust conception of the capacity for agency of human beings on both the 
                                                          
 118. Schlag’s critique of legal pragmatists proceeds as follows:  To their credit, the 
pragmatists “understand that the individual and his thoughts are socially constructed.”  
Schlag, supra note 58, at 1708.  The problem, however, is that “[a]t the same time—and in 
apparent tension—the pragmatic view ‘grants no special authority to unconscious habit and 
slowly evolved custom; self-conscious reflection and innovative reason are equally 
central.’”  Id. at 1709 (quoting Thomas Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 787, 798 (1989)).  To deal with this tension between the image of the subject as 
socially constructed and the image of the subject as in charge of his or her own thought and 
action, the pragmatist “invokes[] the image of mediation.”  Id.  Thus, Schlag says—entirely 
correctly, as I discuss further in Part II supra—for the pragmatist, the subject is the site at 
which such mediation occurs. 
Schlag critiques this pragmatist conception on grounds including that:  (1) the space of 
the pragmatist subject is left “relatively unstructured and unspecified[,]” id. at 1710; (2) 
there is no way to describe the “character, temperament, and sensibility of the pragmatist 
subject outside the representation of the field within which that subject’s character, 
temperament and sensibility is constituted,” id. at 1715 (emphasis omitted); and (3) the legal 
pragmatist is allowed to separate himself “from the grounds of his own social 
constructedness” or to stand “outside his social construction as a kind of epistemic free 
agent who decides what to make . . . of his own social constructedness,” id. at 1717.  Thus, 
Schlag concludes, “[t]his understanding of the self—its agency and its situation—is, of 
course, utterly conventional—an instance of . . . the ‘relatively autonomous self.’”  Id. 
Schlag is completely right on points (1) and (2), although he can hardly be heard to 
complain about the thoroughly socially constructed nature of the pragmatist self, because 
post-structuralism takes the same position.  On point (3), Schlag is correct that the 
pragmatists claim that the self can engage in critique of its situation, but he is wrong in 
arguing that the pragmatists assert that the self can stand outside its socially constructed 
circumstances to engage in such a critique.  As I discuss in Part II, the pragmatists’ 
conception of how the self generates critique is rooted in the interaction between the self 
and the environment and among socially constructed selves, all of which are interacting with 
the environment and with each other.  There is no “outside” in pragmatism, just as there is 
not in post-structuralism.  The key difference is that in pragmatism the socially constructed 
self is interactive, deliberative, and creative; it gives birth individually or through collective 
action to new ideas, objects, institutions, and the like.  Conversely, in Schlag’s version of 
post-structuralism, subjects are merely tinkering with—combining and recombining 
(parole)—forms or structures (langue) that are impervious to willed change.  
 119. Schlag, supra note 58, at 1721. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
CARLE OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:42:36 PM 
2005] THEORIZING AGENCY 333 
individual and collective levels.   
Not all so-called pragmatist theorists share the same views on this 
question, however.  To the contrary, as intellectual historian James 
Kloppenberg has helpfully analyzed,122 the so-called neo-pragmatists 
exhibit crucial differences from the classical pragmatists on a number of 
key points.  One of these (which follows from Kloppenberg’s analysis 
although he does not explicitly focus on it) concerns the contrast between 
the classical pragmatists’ and the neo-pragmatists’ view of human beings’ 
capacity for agency.   To illustrate this point, I will use two of the best 
known neo-pragmatist philosophers who contribute to American law 
reviews:  Stanley Fish and Richard Rorty. 
b. Neo-pragmatists Stanley Fish and Richard Rorty 
Stanley Fish, a literary theorist by training, has also written extensively 
on the nature of legal practice and legal training.123  Fish rejects 
conceptions of the self as existing separate from or prior to social context in 
favor of his neo-pragmatist version of social constructivism.124  As Fish 
puts it, the self is “always and already constrained by the contexts of 
practice (interpretive communities) that confer on it a shape and a 
direction.”125  Fish uses this concept of interpretative communities to stake 
out a strong position on the nature of legal interpretation.  In an essay 
analogizing baseball to law practice, Fish argues that the knowledge upon 
which judges draw in making legal decisions is a form of tacit, intuitively 
absorbed practice, just as baseball skills are.126  Furthermore, carrying out 
law practice has no more relation to reflection on or understanding of that 
practice than playing baseball has to explaining it.  Once the task becomes 
one of understanding a cultural practice, Fish argues, it ceases to be that 
                                                          
 122. Kloppenberg, supra note 27, at 83 (describing the differences between classical and 
neo-pragmatists). 
 123. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY:  CHANGE, RHETORIC, 
AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989) (collecting essays). 
 124. On the difference between Fish’s neo-pragmatism and Dewey’s classical 
pragmatism, see, for example, Stanley Fish, Afterword:  Truth and Toilets:  Pragmatism and 
the Practices of Life, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM:  NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, 
LAW, AND CULTURE 418, 419 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998) (“If pragmatism points out that 
its rivals cannot deliver what they promise—once and for all answers to always relevant 
questions—pragmatism should itself know enough not to promise anything, or even to 
recommend anything.  If pragmatism is true it has nothing to say to us; no politics follows 
from it or is blocked by it; no morality attaches to it or is enjoined by it.”); Kloppenberg, 
supra note 27, at 84. 
 125. FISH, Introduction:  Going Down the Anti-Formalist Road, in DOING WHAT COMES 
NATURALLY, supra note 123, at 1, 26. 
 126. FISH, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, in DOING WHAT COMES 
NATURALLY, supra note 123, at 372, 398 (analogizing law practice to baseball).  But see 
DONALD A. SCHÖN, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER:  HOW PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION 
278 (1983) (noting that “even the pitcher who never ‘thinks’ during the game is happy to 
review films of the game in the privacy and safety of the locker-room”). 
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practice, and becomes another kind of practice with its own set of tacit, 
inarticulable norms.127 
Fish, like Schlag, argues that normative reflection cannot affect 
practice.128  Nothing can be done, in theorizing or teaching how to theorize, 
that can change the trap we are in within our interpretative community.  
Writing about pedagogy, Fish argues: 
To put the matter in a nutshell, the knowledge that one is in a situation 
has no particular payoff for any situation you happen to be in, because 
the constraints of that situation will not be relaxed by that knowledge.  It 
follows, then, that teaching our students the lesson of anti-
foundationalism, while it will put them in possession of a new 
philosophical perspective, will not give them a tool for operating in the 
world they already inhabit.129 
Fish’s argument that normative inquiry or critical reflection cannot affect 
practice places him, much like Schlag, in the category of post-modernists 
who exhibit a distinctly apolitical bent.  If action based on reflection or 
normative inquiry can have no meaningful effect on the social context in 
which the action is conducted, then there seems little point in planning and 
carrying out such action. 
Richard Rorty has a similar view.  Rorty shares with other post-
modernists an emphasis on language as completely constitutive of human 
thought, a shift in later twentieth century philosophy Rorty aptly terms the 
“linguistic turn.”130  As Rorty explains, one of the “great differences 
between the classical pragmatists and the neopragmatists . . . is the 
difference between talking about ‘experience,’ as James and Dewey did, 
and talking about ‘language,’ as Quine and Davidson do.”131  Kloppenberg 
                                                          
 127. Thus, Fish argues, once “actors in the legal community” cease to be forgetful of the 
social origins of their practices, they cease being legal actors and become “psychologists, or 
sociologists, or statisticians.”  FISH, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, in DOING 
WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 123, at 372.  For a philosophical discussion of the 
question whether tacit cultural knowledge can ever be fully articulated, see generally Brian 
Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253 (1996) (discussing 
Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s theories as to the lack of full accessibility to actors within a 
cultural system of tacit cultural knowledge). 
 128. See FISH, Anti-Foundationalism, Theory, Hope, and the Teaching of Composition, 
in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 123, at 342, 350-51 (“One must remember 
that circumstantiality—another name for situatedness—is not something one can escape by 
recognizing it, since the act of recognition will itself occur within circumstances that cannot 
be the object of our self-conscious attention.”). 
 129. Id. at 351. 
 130. Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, in 
PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY, 89, 96 n.15 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 
1991). 
 131. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 35 (1999); see also Thomas C. 
Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 21, 23 (1996) (describing the 
rejection of the concept of experience by contemporary philosophers); Richard Rorty, 
Dewey Between Hegel and Darwin, in MODERNIST IMPULSES IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES, 
1870-1930, 54, 55 (Dorothy Ross ed., 1994) [hereinafter Rorty, Dewey Between Hegel and 
CARLE OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:42:36 PM 
2005] THEORIZING AGENCY 335 
thus terms Rorty’s version of neo-pragmatism “linguistic pragmatism” and 
points to what he views as the unfortunate consequences of discarding the 
classical pragmatists’ concept of experience as an epistemological term.132  
In Kloppenberg’s words, the classical pragmatists had “already 
incorporated the most valuable insights of the linguistic turn and the 
postmodern suspicion of power,” but these “insights did not blind James 
and Dewey, nor have they blinded the contemporaries who have 
resurrected the spirit of their pragmatism, to the world of experience that 
lies beneath and beyond language . . . .”133  The classical pragmatist 
emphasis on experience, in other words, provides a bridge between human 
perception and the material world in a way that an emphasis on the wholly 
constitutive nature of language cannot.134 
Many important differences between classical pragmatism and Rorty’s 
neo-pragmatism follow from this shift in focus from experience to 
                                                          
Darwin] (same). 
 132. Kloppenberg, supra note 27, at 116. 
 133. Id. at 117. 
 134. In retort, Rorty argues that Dewey’s and James’s reliance on the concept of 
experience to bridge the gap between human knowledge and external reality is 
philosophically problematic because it leads back to the difficulties of connecting mind and 
reality, but simply moves those difficulties to another level.  Rorty writes: 
The problem with this way of obtaining continuity between us and the brutes is that 
it shoves the philosophically embarrassing discontinuity back down to the gap 
between, say, viruses and amoebae.  But why stop there?  Only by giving 
something like experience to protein molecules, and perhaps eventually to 
quarks—only a full-fledged panpsychism—will eliminate such embarrassments. 
Rorty, Dewey between Hegel and Darwin, supra note 131, at 58-59; see also id. at 60 
(“Dewey’s and James’s attempt to give a ‘more concrete,’ more holistic, and less dualism-
ridden account of experience would have been unnecessary if they had not tried to make 
‘true’ a predicate of experiences and had instead let it be a predicate of sentences.”). 
A well received recent treatment argues that the classical pragmatists get the better of this 
argument.  See DAVID L. HILDEBRAND, BEYOND REALISM & ANTIREALISM:  JOHN DEWEY 
AND THE NEO-PRAGMATISTS 155 (2003) (arguing that the classical pragmatists have a better 
solution to the realist/anti-realist problem than do neo-pragmatists).  The leading textbook 
on epistemology takes a similar view.  See JOHN L. POLLOCK, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF 
KNOWLEDGE, at xii (arguing for an epistemology that espouses a naturalistic view of a 
human being as “a kind of biological information processor” capable of “interacting with its 
environment and surviving in a hostile world”); see also Leiter, supra note 27, at 267 
(arguing for a return in philosophy to the naturalism of early pragmatists); POLLOCK, supra, 
at 35 & n.7 (rejecting Rorty’s version of anti-foundationalism). 
Recent discoveries of neurology suggest that human thought and language are not 
coextensive.  Individuals who do not acquire language or lose it through brain damage can 
engage in many kinds of complex thought, and certain very disabling forms of learning 
disability are characterized by very high language skills but very low abstract reasoning 
abilities.  Neuroscientists believe that these disabilities arise from a lack of sufficient 
connections in areas of the brain that process non-language based data, such as spatial 
reasoning.  See, e.g., STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 44-73 (1994) (summarizing 
research suggesting that thought occurs in part in a medium other than language); JOHN J. 
RATEY, A USER’S GUIDE TO THE BRAIN 285-89 (2001) (describing neuroscience findings 
about differences between language and thought); BYRON P. ROURKE, NONVERBAL 
LEARNING DISABILITIES:  THE SYNDROME AND THE MODEL (1989) (describing findings about 
the impact of nonverbal learning disabilities on cognitive functioning). 
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language, but for my purposes the key issue concerns the view of 
contemporary neo-pragmatists such as Fish and Rorty on the question of 
human agency.135  As Rorty writes: 
the notions of criteria and choice (including the idea of “arbitrary” 
choice) are no longer in point when it comes to changes from one 
language game to another.  Europe did not decide to accept the idiom of 
Romantic poetry, or of socialist politics, or of Galilean mechanics.  That 
sort of shift was no more an act of will than it was a result of 
argument.136 
Commentators analyzing this passage summarize Rorty’s view on 
human agency this way: 
The point upon which Rorty is fastening here is important:  the concept 
of decision, as it is employed within the context of a given language 
game (for example, to decide between competing descriptions of a given 
state of affairs), has no obvious application at the level of language 
games as a whole.  But he takes this to imply that cultural change is itself 
primarily a matter of shifts in vocabulary which are as little affected by 
human will and reason as is the weather.  And what is true of culture per 
se must be true of political culture:  in other words, for Rorty, liberalism 
is now simply a part of our cultural weather system.137 
Indeed, Rorty’s perspective on the potential of human beings to engage 
in effective action to bring about purposive change in their social 
environment is so weak that critics sometimes accuse him of being 
“insufficiently pragmatic” for this reason.138  In denying the possibility that 
human agency can affect the course of human affairs, Rorty, like Schlag 
                                                          
 135. For example, another important difference between classical pragmatism and 
Rortian neo-pragmatism that follows from this shift but lies beyond the scope of this article 
concerns scientific inquiry.  As many commentators have noted, under Rorty’s anti-realism 
“the widely held distinction between the ‘soft’ human sciences and the ‘hard’ natural 
sciences collapses.”  WEST, supra note 6, at 202; see also J. JUDD OWEN, RELIGION & THE 
DEMISE OF LIBERAL RATIONALISM:  THE FOUNDATIONAL CRISIS OF THE SEPARATION OF 
CHURCH & STATE 30 (2001) (noting the “enormous” differences between Rorty and Dewey 
on ideas about science).  Rorty argues that the only kind of knowledge humans can produce 
is poetry:  there “is nothing more for man to be, in short, except a poet.” Richard Rorty, 
“Heidegger against the Pragmatists,” unpublished essay quoted in WEST, supra note 6, at 
204 & 268 n.64.  Classical pragmatists, in contrast, saw an important role for science-based 
disciplines in deliberative judgment. 
 136. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, SOLIDARITY 6 (1989). 
 137. STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS & COMMUNITARIANS 245 (1992). 
 138. See, e.g., Kloppenberg, supra note 27, at 106 (arguing that Rorty’s “liberal ironism 
encourages selfishness, cynicism, and resignation by undercutting efforts to confront the 
hard facts of poverty and greed”); id. (describing Rorty’s neo-pragmatism as a “symptom of 
the crisis in a highly specialized professional stratum of educational workers”); WEST, supra 
note 6, at 225 (arguing against neo-pragmatists’ “exclusive ascription of agency to 
impersonal forces, transcendental entities, or anonymous and autonomous discourses” and 
contending that “[f]or prophetic pragmatists, human agency remains central—all we have in 
human societies and histories are structured and unstructured human social practices over 
time and space”). 
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and Fish, arrives at a scholarly attitude that all but calls for abandoning 
projects linked to political activism or social reform. 
Although the three leading post-modernists I have examined above adopt 
perspectives that are distinctly apolitical in their implications, many 
theorists who identify as post-modernists or post-structuralists are far from 
apolitical in this sense.  Indeed, there is a great deal of intensely political 
writing among some such scholars.  The pessimistic fatalism of Schlag and 
Fish, who claim, respectively, that normative thought is useless and that 
theorizing does nothing to alter practice, simply cannot do for those 
committed to such political projects, because it leaves those “subject to”139 
social oppression with nowhere to go.  For this reason, arriving at an 
alternative theory of agency has been high on the agenda of many post-
modern theorists.  This theory must avoid the implausibility of an overly 
robust conception of agency, but also must not cast aside members of 
oppressed groups as so thoroughly socially constructed as to be mere 
victims or “the other.”  One such leading theorist, on whom many 
progressive legal theorists frequently draw, is philosopher and self-
described post-structuralist feminist and queer theorist Judith Butler. 
                                                          
 139. See ALTHUSSER, supra note 110, at 182 (noting the dual meaning of term “subject” 
as “free subjectivity, a center of initiatives, author of and responsible for its actions,” and “a 
subjected being, who submits to a higher authority, and is therefore stripped of all 
freedom”). 
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c. Judith Butler 
Butler examines the problem of theorizing agency in several books:  the 
classic work, Gender Trouble;140 Bodies that Matter,141 which sought to 
respond to critics of Gender Trouble and offer “a rethinking” of some parts 
of the earlier book; and The Psychic Life of Power:  Theories in 
Subjection.142  In the first two books Butler’s central project is to theorize 
how a person takes on gender identity.  As one part of that project, Butler 
addresses the thorny problem of locating agency within a post-structuralist 
approach.  This question, Butler writes, “is usually associated with the 
viability of the ‘subject,’ where the ‘subject’ is understood to have some 
stable existence prior to the cultural field that it negotiates.”143  Under this 
approach, “‘culture’ and ‘discourse’ mire the subject, but do not constitute 
that subject,” a move that “has appeared necessary to establish a point of 
agency that is not fully determined by that culture and discourse.”144  
Butler, on the other hand, seeks a concept of agency in which the subject 
appears only “through a signifying practice that seeks to conceal its own 
workings and to naturalize its effects.”145 
To create such a space for change while repudiating the existence of an 
agenic actor, Butler draws on J. L. Austin’s theory of performative 
utterances.146  Structures, Butler explains, do not simply exist and 
perpetuate themselves; they continue by being “instantiated” through 
repetition.147  The repetitions are not voluntary; they are not the product of 
choice of free autonomous subjects.  Instead, they are compelled by 
discourse rules and normative structures.  Butler theorizes that “‘agency,’ 
then, is to be located within the possibility of a variation on that 
repetition.”148 
Butler describes several possible ways in which the repeated 
performance of gender can lead to subversion or change.  The first arises 
from inevitable slips or mistakes in repetition:  “The injunction to be a 
                                                          
 140. BUTLER, supra note 35. 
 141. JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER:  ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF “SEX”, at xii 
(1993). 
 142. BUTLER, supra note 24. 
 143. BUTLER, supra note 35, at 142. 
 144. Id. at 143. 
 145. Id. at 144. 
 146. See generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (2d ed. 1975).  Butler 
further explains that she uses Austin as “read through” Jacques Derrida and Paul de Man.  
See Butler, For A Careful Reading, in FEMINIST CONTENTIONS, supra note 23, at 134 
(referring to a performative act as “one which brings into being or enacts that which it 
names, and so marks the constitutive or productive powers of discourse” and further stating 
that “[t]o the extent that a performative appears to ‘express’ a prior intention, a doer behind 
the deed, that prior agency is only legible as the effect of that utterance”). 
 147. Butler, For A Careful Reading, in FEMINIST CONTENTIONS, supra note 23, at 134. 
 148. BUTLER, supra note 35, at 145. 
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given gender produces necessary failures, a variety of incoherent 
configurations that in their multiplicity exceed and defy the injunction by 
which they are generated.”149  The second arises through the intersecting 
and conflicting pressures of social structure.  These pressures produce 
change, but not, Butler emphasizes, because a prior agent exists behind 
social roles or structural conflicts to do the choosing or thinking.150 
Butler develops her views on agency in the context of understanding 
how persons take on gender identities and sexual orientations.  As Butler 
repeatedly emphasizes, these are aspects of personality that are particularly 
embedded in unconscious forces and thus particularly resistant to conscious 
change.  Nevertheless, Butler’s conception of agency as lying primarily in 
mistakes in compelled repetitions gives rise to the question of what Butler 
proposes as the political project for feminist and gay rights activists.  In 
Gender Trouble, Butler suggests that 
[t]he critical task is . . . to locate strategies of subversive repetition 
enabled by those constructions, to affirm local possibilities of 
intervention through participating in precisely those practices of 
repetition that constitute identity and, therefore, present the immanent 
possibility of contesting them.151 
Butler is here specifically addressing the arena of sexual identity 
formation, a field of erotic attachment that is, as already noted, particularly 
unsusceptible to deliberative judgment.  But theorists have not interpreted 
Butler’s ideas as confined to questions related to sexual identity.  Instead, 
her call for engaging in localized projects of subversion involving 
contesting oppressive practices and repetitions while participating in 
them—along the lines of performances “in drag”—became an icon for 
Butler’s ideas generally.152  In turn, the image of performing in drag as a 
form of political activism has generated enormous controversy, even 
among sympathetic commentators.153  Abrams, for example, argues that 
                                                          
 149. Id. 
 150. BUTLER, supra note 141, at 10.  Thus, Butler explains, in discussing “the forcible 
reiteration of norms surrounding sex”: 
As a sedimented effect of a reiterative or ritual practice, sex acquires its naturalized 
effect, and yet, it is also by virtue of this reiteration that gaps and fissures are 
opened up as the constitutive instabilities in such constructions, as that which 
escapes or exceeds the norm, as that which cannot be wholly defined or fixed by 
the repetitive labor of that norm.  This instability is the deconstituting possibility in 
the very process of repetition, the power that undoes the very effects by which 
“sex” is stabilized, the possibility to put the consolidation of the norms of “sex” 
into a potentially productive crisis. 
Id.  
 151. BUTLER, supra note 35, at 147. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See, e.g., Nancy Fraser, Pragmatism, Feminism, and the Linguistic Turn, in 
FEMINIST CONTENTIONS, supra note 23, at 157, 163 (arguing that “in Gender Trouble, Butler 
vastly overestimated the emancipatory potential of such gender-bending performance in 
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Butler, “notwithstanding the breadth of her endorsement of a politics of 
‘drag’ or ‘subversive repetition,’” fails to account for “which repetitions 
become ‘disruptive’ and which become ‘domesticated[.]’”154  Similarly, 
Joel Handler argues that the idea that resistance is only possible through 
small-scale, localized acts of subversion produces a politics that fails to 
address the crucial task of guiding large-scale, “macro” level political 
change.155 
In later work, Butler returns to the problem of theorizing agency yet 
again, and sketches a theory based on the dynamic of ambivalence, 
contained in Freud’s theory of melancholia,156 as a starting point.157  Butler 
notes that the adoption of a particular sexual identity, such as 
heterosexuality, involves the renunciation of other objects of sexual desire, 
but those objects remain in the psyche precisely by virtue of their 
renunciation.158  Similarly, Butler suggests, there is ambivalence or 
melancholia in all forms of identity construction achieved through the 
operation of social power.159  Butler proposes that this melancholic 
ambivalence may point to the beginnings of a theory of resistance at the 
political level:  “The ‘plaints’ of the melancholic are invariably 
                                                          
everyday life” and “missed its susceptibility to commodification, recuperation, and 
depoliticization—especially in the absence of strong social movements struggling for social 
justice”). 
 154. Kathryn Abrams, Cross-Dressing in the Master’s Clothes, 109 YALE L.J. 745, 774 
(2000) (reviewing JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER:  WHY FAMILY AND WORK 
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000)) (citing Susan Bordo, Post-modern Subjects, 
Post-modern Bodies, 18 FEMINIST STUD. 159, 172 (1992) (internal citations omitted)). 
 155. See, e.g., Joel F. Handler, Post-modernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 
26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 697, 719-28 (1992) (criticizing focus of post-modernist activism on 
local disruptions that fail to produce sustained, large-scale political change). 
 156. See generally SIGMUND FREUD, Mourning and Melancholia, in GENERAL 
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 164 (Phillips Rieff ed., 1963) (describing the general features of 
“melancholia” and recommending methods of treatment). 
 157. BUTLER, supra note 24, at 132. 
 158. Concerning this rejection, Butler explains: 
For a gay or lesbian identity position to sustain its appearance as coherent, 
heterosexuality must remain in that rejected and repudiated place.  Paradoxically, 
its heterosexual remains must be sustained precisely through insisting on the 
seamless coherence of a specifically gay identity.  Here it should become clear that 
a radical refusal to identify suggests that on some level an identification has already 
taken place, an identification has been made and disavowed, whose symptomatic 
appearance is the insistence, the overdetermination of the identification that is, as it 
were, worn on the body that shows. 
Id. at 49. 
 159. Butler expands on this notion of ambivalence: 
The power imposed upon one is the power that animates one’s emergence, and 
there appears to be no escaping this ambivalence.  Indeed, there appears to be no 
“one” without ambivalence, which is to say that the fictive redoubling necessary to 
become a self rules out the possibility of strict identity.  Finally, then, there is no 
ambivalence without loss as the verdict of sociality, one that leaves the trace of its 
turn at the scene of one’s emergence. 
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misdirected, yet in this misdirection resides a nascent political text.”160 
Post-modern scholars in the legal academy have not taken up Butler’s 
psychoanalytical exploration of agency as inhering in a melancholic 
ambivalence about social identity formation to nearly the same extent as 
the ideas in her first two books.  This third work of Butler’s is 
exceptionally preliminary, tentative—often couched in terms of 
questions—and deeply invested in Freudian analysis, an approach not 
currently in vogue in the American legal academy.  It is nevertheless 
significant because in it Butler, first, continues to acknowledge the still 
unmet need for a theory of agency that can enable and guide emancipatory 
political activism,161 and, second, acknowledges the paradoxically 
empowering, unpredictable, and transformative potential of human 
agency.162  In Part II below, I argue that classical pragmatism offers some 
of the tools for enhancing contemporary theoretical perspectives on agency 
in both of these respects. 
II. THE CLASSICAL PRAGMATISTS’ INTERACTIONIST                         THEORY 
OF THE SELF 
It is surprising that the classical pragmatists’ approach to the self has not 
received more attention in law, especially in light of the recent resurgence 
of interest within the legal academy in pragmatism generally.163  Scholars 
                                                          
Id. at 198. 
 160. Id. at 184.  The dynamics of melancholia produce an unstable, changing playing 
field: 
Melancholia is a rebellion that has been put down, crushed.  Yet it is not a static 
affair; it continues as a kind of “work” that takes place by deflection.  Figured 
within the workings of the psyche is the power of the state to preempt and 
insurrectionary rage.  The “critical agency” of the melancholic is at once a social 
and psychic instrument. 
Id. at 190-91. 
 161. In Butler’s words: 
  As much as a perspective on the subject requires an evacuation of the first 
person, a suspension of the “I” in the interests of an analysis of subject formation, 
so a reassumption of that first-person perspective is compelled by the question of 
agency.  The analysis of subjection is always double, tracing the conditions of 
subject formation and tracing the turn against those conditions for the subject—and 
its perspective—to emerge. 
  A critical evaluation of subject formation may well offer a better 
comprehension of the double binds to which our emancipatory efforts occasionally 
lead without, in consequence, evacuating the political.  Is there a way to affirm 
complicity as the basis of political agency, yet insist that political agency may do 
more than reiterate the conditions of subordination? 
Id. at 29-30; see also id. at 18 (asking “how we might make such a conception of the subject 
work as a notion of political agency in postliberatory times”). 
 162. Id. at 29 (“A critical analysis of subjection involves . . . how agency may well 
consist in opposing and transforming the social terms by which it is spawned.”). 
 163. Law school symposia on pragmatism include Symposium, The Revival of 
Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996); Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism 
in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 16 (1990). 
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have discussed pragmatist theory in relation to contemporary feminist 
theory,164 democratic political theory,165 anti-foundationalist theories of 
adjudication,166 socio-legal studies,167 substantive law,168 legal 
representation,169  and much more.  The rise of neo-pragmatism has also 
spurred renewed historical interest in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century classical pragmatists.170  In law, scholars displayed particular 
interest in Dewey, in part because Dewey had the closest relationship with 
the legal realists.171  Thus a large literature focuses on Dewey’s few 
writings on the subject of law.172  But this literature has not yet explored in 
any depth the classical pragmatists’ theory of the self.  This neglect may in 
part be due to the fact that legal theorists remember the classical 
pragmatists primarily as instrumentalists—as thinkers concerned with 
common sense and expediency.173  Recent scholarship in disciplines 
outside law, however, argues that such readings overemphasize the 
pragmatists’ instrumentalism at the expense of the interpretative, 
contextual, and aesthetic themes of their work.174  My treatment here is 
                                                          
 164. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1699 (1990) (exploring how pragmatism and feminism interact). 
 165. See, e.g., Hilary Putnam, Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1671, 1671 (1990) (borrowing concepts and language from Dewey to support a claim 
that democracy is “the precondition for the full application of intelligence to the solution of 
social problems”). 
 166. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 
(1996) (defending his concept of pragmatic adjudication and criticizing others). 
 167. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY:  PRAGMATISM 
AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW, at xi (1997) (arguing for a “nonpolitical” version of neo-
pragmatism as a helpful approach to socio-legal studies). 
 168. See, e.g., James R. Hackney, Jr., The Intellectual Origins of American Strict 
Products Liability:  A Case Study in American Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 39 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 443, 443-44 (1995) (discussing pragmatism’s influence on theories of tort liability). 
 169. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights:  The 
Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 127, 181 (2004) 
(contrasting pragmatist approach to legal representation to legal liberalism).   
 170. See, for example, LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001) for recent 
Pulitzer prize-winning treatment of the classical pragmatist movement. 
 171. See supra note 43 for an illustrative list of works discussing Dewey’s pragmatist 
approach.  Because I hope this Article will be read by scholars beyond the legal academy, I 
take the precaution of noting, to avoid the potential for serious confusion, that American 
legal realism is very different from philosophical realism.  Writing in the 1920s and 1930s, 
the American legal realists challenged the naturalness of and necessity for traditional legal 
doctrines.  See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW:  
1870-1960, 169-92 (1992) (discussing transition from classical to realist legal thought); G. 
EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 99-135 (1978) (discussing 
transition from late nineteenth century legal thought to legal realism). 
 172. See, e.g., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 153, 185 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 
1993) (including Dewey’s two main law review articles in a collection of the most important 
legal realist writings); Scott Brewer, On the Possibility of Necessity in Legal Argument:  A 
Dilemma for Holmes and Dewey, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 9, 10 (2000) (criticizing fallacies 
in Dewey’s theory of judicial reasoning). 
 173. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 10 (1994) (arguing that pragmatism 
“subordinates the demands of theory to the exigencies of future-directed problem solving”). 
 174. See Thomas Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 798 
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firmly rooted in this later perspective, finding little of interest in 
instrumentalist readings—as favored, for example, by legal neo-pragmatists 
such as Richard Posner175—and instead emphasizing the ethical, 
interactionist, and critical-evaluative aspects of the classical pragmatists’ 
thought. 
In broad summary, the classical pragmatists’ theory of the self has the 
following distinctive features:  It (1) rejects individualist conceptions of the 
self as existing apart from, or prior to, social context; (2) conceives of the 
self as thoroughly constituted by its social context, which precedes the self 
and provides it with all meaning and identity, and understands habit as the 
mediating link between social context and the human organism; and (3) 
views purposive intelligence or deliberative judgment as a process of 
achieving aesthetic resolution or fit among conflicts between habits and 
between habits and the changing demands of the environment.  Finally, in 
Dewey, especially, these features of the self are (4) linked to a pedagogy 
and political theory that provides collective goals for such purposive 
striving.  I discuss each of these features in turn in Part II.B below.  
Consistent with Dewey’s thought, which views all ideas as the product of 
particular historical circumstances, I begin in Part II.A with a short 
synopsis of Dewey’s intellectual context. 
A. Dewey’s Context 
As Louis Menand’s Pulitzer-prize winning book, The Metaphysical 
Club,176 has recently brought back to popular attention, classical 
pragmatism arose in the context of a gentlemen’s conversational club 
founded in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1872.177  Members of this club 
                                                          
(1989) (noting that while “older accounts of pragmatism emphasized its instrumentalism, 
the distinctive feature of recent reinterpretations of pragmatism is to give equal significance 
to the contextual thesis”).  Examples of this literature include THOMAS M. ALEXANDER, 
JOHN DEWEY’S THEORY OF ART, EXPERIENCE, AND NATURE:  THE HORIZONS OF FEELING 
(1987).  Alexander comments on Dewey: 
It is the thesis of this book that the best approach to what Dewey means by 
“experience” is not to be gained by focusing primarily on the theme by which 
Dewey is generally known, his “instrumentalism,” but instead by looking at 
experience in its most complete, most significant, and most fulfilling mode:  
experience as art. 
Id. at xiii.  See generally DEWEY RECONFIGURED:  ESSAYS ON DEWEYAN PRAGMATISM 
(Casey Haskins & David I. Seiple eds., 1999) (collecting new approaches to Dewey); 
READING DEWEY:  INTERPRETATIONS FOR A POSTMODERN GENERATION (Larry A. Hickman 
ed., 1998) (compiling new Dewey scholarship). 
 175. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 4 (1995) (explaining that his 
concept of pragmatism is “practical and instrumental”). 
 176. MENAND, supra note 170. 
 177. See PHILIP P. WIENER, EVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDERS OF PRAGMATISM 18-30 
(1949) (providing one of the the first historical works documenting the origins of the 
American pragmatist movement in the Metaphysical Club); see also MENAND, supra note 
170, at 200 (drawing heavily on Weiner’s historical research to explore Menand’s own set 
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included the jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., whose hard-nosed, anti-
classical approach to law set the stage for the transformation of American 
jurisprudence through the course of the twentieth century;178 William 
James, the influential turn-of-the-century philosopher and psychologist; 
and Charles Sanders Peirce, a brilliant mathematician, logician, and 
philosopher whose difficult writings have enjoyed a great renaissance along 
with the growth of interest in semiotics.179 
Members of this first generation of classical pragmatists were in many 
ways still anchored to the preoccupations of the nineteenth century, and 
their views exhibit what today can appear to be a strange mix of 
foundationalist and teleological conceptions of human knowledge and 
history,180 on the one hand, and strong interests in naturalism and 
experimentalism,181 on the other.  Especially in these latter interests, Peirce 
and James served as important intellectual forerunners for the second 
generation of pragmatists Dewey and Mead represent, bridging old and 
new ideas in ways that pointed this next generation toward the path their 
mature thought would take. 
                                                          
of questions related to the burgeoning contemporary interest in classical pragmatism).   
 178. See generally Grey, supra note 174, at 811-57 (analyzing Holmes’s thought in 
relation to pragmatist movement); THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE:  THE LEGACY 
OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000) (collecting leading legal 
scholarship on Holmes’s influence). 
Three other members of the Metaphysical Club were also lawyers, prompting a 
preeminent historian of the pragmatist movement to observe that “it is significant 
historically to note that there were more lawyers than natural scientists in the Metaphysical 
Club,” and that to these lawyers should go credit for “major steps” in the “history of 
American social thought.”  WIENER, supra note 177, at 152.  One of these lawyer members 
was law professor Nicholas St. John Green, a proto-realist foe of legal formalism.  Green’s 
most famous articles, written in 1870, advanced the proto-realist argument that the law’s 
concept of proximate cause was merely a metaphor used by judges to arrive at the result 
they wished to achieve in particular cases.  See MENAND, supra note 170, at 223-24 (quoting 
NICHOLAS ST. JOHN GREEN, Proximate and Remote Cause, in ESSAYS AND NOTES ON THE 
LAW OF TORT AND CRIME 1, 13, 15 (1933)).  According to Menand, Peirce found this legal 
“method of analysis thrilling.”  Id. at 224.  Green ended up resigning from his professorial 
position at Harvard Law School, disgusted with the legal formalism that came to dominate 
the school after Christopher Langdell was appointed dean there in 1875.  Id. at 231.  See 
generally Hackney, supra note 168, at 450-56 (discussing Green’s influence on theories of 
product liability); WIENER, supra note 177, at 152-71 (describing Green’s departure from 
Harvard). 
 179. See KAJA SILVERMAN, THE SUBJECT OF SEMIOTICS 3-4 (1983) (defining semiotics as 
the subfield of philosophy that studies the use of signs and symbolic systems in the creation 
of meaning). 
 180. For a discussion of the teleological aspects of Peirce’s views, see MENAND, supra 
note 170, at 199-200.  For a discussion of James’s teleological functionalism, see 
ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 41. 
 181. Peirce, for example, “claimed that the infantile condition of philosophical inquiry 
was due to the fact that philosophy ‘has been pursued by men who have not been nurtured in 
dissecting rooms and other laboratories, and who consequently have not been animated by 
the true scientific Eros . . . .’”  VINCENT M. COLAPIETRO, PEIRCE’S APPROACH TO THE SELF:  
A SEMIOTIC PERSPECTIVE ON HUMAN SUBJECTIVITY, at xvii (1989) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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By the time this second generation of pragmatists reached maturity as 
thinkers in the late 1890s, their intellectual focus was aimed at the anti-
foundationalist, secular preoccupations of the twentieth century.182  Full of 
progressive optimism, confident in the promise of scientific inquiry, and 
bullish on the potential of humankind to solve its age-old problems once it 
escaped from the shackles of convention, this second generation of 
pragmatists developed a philosophy that abjured many of the traditions of 
liberalism and laid groundwork for many later developments in twentieth 
century social theory. 
Born in Burlington, Vermont, in 1859, Dewey described his heritage as 
“‘of New England culture,’ with its dualisms of self and world, soul and 
body, nature and God . . . .”183  The “consequent painful oppression” first 
led Dewey to his interest in philosophy and especially in “Hegel’s synthesis 
of subject and object, matter and sprit, [and] the divine and the 
human . . . .”184  In college, Dewey studied primarily a classical curriculum, 
but in his zoology and geology classes he also discovered evolutionary 
theory.185  In 1882, Dewey enrolled for postgraduate studies at Johns 
Hopkins University.186  There he studied primarily with professors who 
espoused Hegel’s “absolute idealism”—the notion that, through the gradual 
unfolding of history, truths in the form of “absolute objective ideals” would 
reveal themselves to human consciousness.187  Charles Sanders Peirce was 
also a teacher at Johns Hopkins while Dewey was studying there, but, 
Dewey later reported, had little influence on him at the time.188  
                                                          
 182. The turn of the century also saw changes in the structural location of the American 
intelligentsia.  The transmission of ideas no longer took place through informal 
conversations of gentlemen-scholars in small, elite social clubs; this second generation of 
pragmatists was comprised of full-time academics located in universities, which were 
evolving into increasingly professionalized practice locations.  See generally THE 
ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE IN MODERN AMERICA, 1860-1920, 51-268 (Alexandra 
Oleson & John Voss eds., 1979) (addressing, in a collection of essays, the increasing 
specialization of science and scholarship in the early twentieth century).  At these 
universities, Dewey and Mead enjoyed frequent interactions with a variety of scholars who 
were likewise looking for new approaches to solve the problems of a new century.  
Representatives of the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, social work, law, and 
anthropology exerted significant reciprocal influences on each other, producing an 
outpouring of new ideas and lines of inquiry.  See generally PURCELL, supra note 43, at 3-
113 (describing common themes of social science disciplines in early twentieth century). 
 183. ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 15-16. 
 184. Id. at 16 (quoting 5 JOHN DEWEY, THE LATER WORKS 1925-1953, at 153 (Jo Ann 
Boydston ed.) (internal quotations omitted).  Consistent with his emphasis on the basis of 
thought in emotion and impulse, Dewey noted that the ideas of philosophy were to him in 
his youth “no mere intellectual formula,” but an “immense release.”  Id. (quoting DEWEY, 
supra, at 153). 
 185. NEIL COUGHLAN, YOUNG JOHN DEWEY:  AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY 7 (1975). 
 186. See id. at 17 (stating that Dewey enrolled to study philosophy and psychology). 
 187. See MENAND, supra note 170, at 263-67 (detailing Dewey’s study of Hegel at John 
Hopkins University). 
 188. Dewey reported that he “only dropped in” to some of Peirce’s lectures and “was 
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Nevertheless, Peirce’s views on the self presaged some of the most 
important elements of Dewey’s and Mead’s later approach. 
Peirce and Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure are considered the two 
founders of semiotics.189  But whereas de Saussure pioneered a structuralist 
approach, as already discussed, Peirce’s version reflected a process 
approach, which emphasized the role of human creativity.  As one Peirce 
scholar explains, for structuralists such as de Saussure “the decentering of 
the subject amounts to nothing less than the liquidation of the 
agent . . . .”190  For the pragmatist Peirce, on the other hand, the 
“repudiation of the Cartesian starting point means the recovery of flesh-
and-blood actors who are continuously defining themselves through their 
give-and-take relationships with both the natural world and each other.”191  
To capture this element of indeterminacy, Peirce’s semiotics envisions a 
triadic interaction among sign, symbol, and object.192  Several scholars 
have analyzed the echos of Peirce in Mead’s conception of the self as a 
dialogue between the Me and the I, as I explore in Part II.C.1 below.193  
Peirce’s emphasis on the role of reflective analysis and creativity in the 
human organism’s interaction with the natural and social world is evident 
in Dewey’s mature philosophy as well. 
                                                          
never a regular student of his,” because he was “not prepared at that time, either by my 
dominant interests or my previous training, to appreciate the significance of his work.”  
Letter from John Dewey to Paul Weiss (Oct. 1, 1931), in DEWEY’S CORRESPONDENCE VOL. 
II (electronic edition 2002), Rec. No. 07611; see also MENAND, supra note 170, at 273 
(reporting that Dewey, concerned that his mathematical talents fell below the standards 
Peirce required in his logic class, did not take courses with Peirce until his last year of 
study).  Dewey began to understand Peirce only after he had “reached under other 
influences a position somewhat akin to his.”  Letter from John Dewey to Read Bain (Mar. 
12, 1935), in DEWEY’S CORRESPONDENCE, supra, at Rec. No. 07781. 
 189. See generally SILVERMAN, supra note 179, at 4-25 (contrasting semiotics of Peirce 
and de Saussure). 
 190. COLAPIETRO, supra note 181, at xix. 
 191. Id.; see also id. at 27-29 (further analyzing the differences between the semiotics of 
Peirce, who, “in granting priority to signs over ideas shifts the focus from what occurs 
within a finite, individual consciousness to what occurs between social beings within a 
common framework of experience and action,” and structuralist semiotics, as exemplified 
by Umberto Eco, who “leaves unexamined the subject, the fabricator of codes and the 
producer of signs,” “questions the very possibility of examining the subject from the 
perspective of semiotics,” and “holds that the human subject, precisely as subject, falls 
outside the ‘natural boundaries’ of semiotic inquiry,” thus creating “what appears to be the 
case of the vanishing subject in semiotic theory”).   
 192. See COLAPIETRO, supra note 181, at 5 (explaining that the difference between 
structuralists’ and Peirce’s versions of semiotics “can be stated simply:  The focus of 
Peircean semiotic is the disclosure of trichotomies (e.g., icon, index, symbol), whereas the 
concern of Saussurean semiology is the detection of oppositions (e.g., langue and parole; 
diachrony and synchrony; paradigm and syntagm)”). 
 193. See id. at 90-91 (quoting Peirce’s 1905 article, What Pragmatism Is, stating that 
“[w]hen one reasons, it is that critical self that one is trying to persuade” and describing 
Peirce’s self “as a being in dialogue with itself[,]” with this “intrapersonal dialogue [being] 
potentially part of a larger context, an interpersonal dialogue”); NORBERT WILEY, THE 
SEMIOTIC SELF 34 (1994) (exploring parallels between Peirce’s semiotics and Mead’s 
symbolic interactionism). 
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When Dewey graduated from Johns Hopkins, however, he was still very 
much aligned with the Hegelian idealists.  For the next four and a half 
decades, Dewey made his living as a university professor, at the University 
of Michigan (1884-1894), the University of Chicago (1894-1904), and 
Columbia University (1904-1930).194  At Michigan, Dewey met and 
became close friends with Mead, and Mead remained an important 
intellectual collaborator and friend for the rest of Dewey’s life.195  Mead, 
like Dewey, had been strongly influenced by Hegelian idealism, but, 
starting in the 1890s, both men began to reject idealism in favor of an 
experimental naturalism grounded in a view of the human organism as a 
product of its surroundings.196 
Dewey first turned to William James’s work, Principles of 
                                                          
 194. See JOHN P. MURPHY, PRAGMATISM FROM PEIRCE TO DAVIDSON 60 (1990) 
(describing Dewey’s academic career).  After his retirement, Dewey enjoyed another 
twenty-two years of active engagement with the issues of his time, remaining involved in 
social activism on a wide variety of fronts and producing almost half of his written output, 
until his death in 1952 at the age of ninety-three.  A visionary thinker who tended to leave 
the details of his ideas to be worked out by others, Dewey’s work spans great divides in 
subject matter and made important contributions in a wide variety of fields including 
philosophy, psychology, education, political science, and social theory.  See THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY, 1882-1953 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1991); see also 
ALAN RYAN, JOHN DEWEY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 201 (1995) 
(describing Dewey’s output).  On top of this prodigious written output, and consistent with 
his philosophical commitment to experience as the source of all knowledge, Dewey was an 
enormously energetic left-wing social activist, who was involved in many leading early 
twentieth-century reform movements.  He was, for example, a founder and early advisory 
board member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(“NAACP”), a frequent visitor to Jane Addams’ Hull House settlement in Chicago, an anti-
war activist, a founder of the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), and an outspoken 
opponent of McCarthyism.  On Dewey’s energetic social activism on a wide variety of 
fronts, see SIDNEY HOOK, JOHN DEWEY:  AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT 23-25 (Greenwood 
Press 1971) (1939) (summarizing Dewey’s activism on causes including farm-labor 
organizing, ending war, government relief and unemployment, the Sacco-Vanzetti case, and 
chairmanship of commission of inquiry that exonerated Leon Trotsky from Soviet charges 
of treason); MENAND, supra note 170, at 235-36 (recounting Dewey’s prolific writings on a 
variety of subjects and membership in his several prominent educational and political 
organizations); STEVEN C. ROCKEFELLER, JOHN DEWEY:  RELIGIOUS FAITH AND DEMOCRATIC 
HUMANISM 207 (1991)  (recounting Dewey’s collaborative projects with Jane Addams); id. 
at 286-88 (describing Dewey’s commitments and speeches on issues of feminism and race 
equality); id. at 303 (describing Dewey’s participation in founding the organization that 
became the ACLU); RYAN, supra, at 284 (“Dewey threw himself into a postretirement 
career as a political activist, propagandist, pamphleteer, and gadfly to the New Deal with an 
energy that would have been astonishing in a man half his age.”).  Dewey conceived of his 
philosophy and his social activism as intertwined.  See THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY 44 
(Paul Schilpp & Lewis Edwin Hahn eds., 3d ed. 1989) (quoting Dewey’s statement that “I 
doubt if the force of the idea in the theory of social action would have come home to me 
without my experience in social and political movements”). 
 195. See ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 123 (describing Dewey’s and Mead’s mutual 
influence on each other); THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY, supra note 194, at 25 
(describing the friendship between Dewey and Mead at Michigan and then at Chicago, 
where they moved together). 
 196. COUGHLAN, supra note 185, at 146-47. 
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Psychology,197 for a model of human behavior that emphasized the primacy 
of active experience.198  He also began to return to his early studies of 
zoology and other biological sciences for metaphors to explain human 
experience.  He was especially interested, as were many of the pragmatists, 
in Darwin’s theory of evolution,199 and drew from it an organic theory of 
the self as an active, ever changing product of its natural environment.200 
Rejecting the Cartesian idea that human consciousness should be separated 
from the natural world, Dewey used the terms “organism” and 
“environment” in place of “mind” and “matter” to describe a relationship of 
interaction rather than radical opposition.201  He similarly rejected the 
“spectator” theory of knowledge—i.e., the theory that “knowing is direct 
grasp or beholding of the forms of things, totally unrelated to practical 
action . . . .”202  In contrast, Dewey viewed all knowledge as experiential 
and aimed at future action.  The key article in which Dewey worked out 
these ideas, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” was published in 
1896;203 most Dewey scholars date this as the point of Dewey’s coming 
into maturity in his thinking and commitment to pragmatism.204  Dewey 
                                                          
 197. 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (Harvard Univ. Press 1981) 
(1890). 
 198. See ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 41 (discussing Dewey’s period of 
“experimental idealism” in which he sought to assimilate James’s seminal writings). 
 199. See Larry A. Hickman, Dewey’s Theory of Inquiry, in READING DEWEY, supra note 
174, at 166, 167 (noting the influence of Darwin on Dewey, including Dewey’s 
understanding of the necessity of ideas adapting to changing conditions).  See generally 
WIENER, supra note 177 (analyzing the impact of evolutionary theory on the pragmatist 
movement).  Dewey’s interest in evolutionary theory was not at all like that of the “social 
Darwinists” of roughly the same period.  See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO UNITED STATES 
HISTORY 725 (Paul S. Boyer et al. eds. 1966) (explaining that social Darwinists believed in 
the economic survival of the fittest and laissez faire capitalism).  Nor would Dewey have 
brooked the simplistic approach espoused by sociobiologists today.  For Dewey’s views on 
what we today call sociobiology, see DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (Swallow 
Press/Ohio Univ. Press 1954) (1927) (“[T]he alleged instinct and natural endowment 
appealed to as a causal force . . . represent physiological tendencies which have previously 
been shaped into habits . . . by means of the very social conditions they are supposed to 
explain.”). 
 200. As one Dewey scholar puts it: 
Once species themselves had been brought into the world of change, once they 
came into and went out of existence, philosophers could no longer feel justified in 
assuming the superiority of the fixed and final, and change and origin could no 
longer be justifiably treated as signs of defect and unreality.  For Dewey, the 
influence of Darwinism on philosophy ‘resided in its having conquered the 
phenomena of life for the principle of transition, and thereby freed the new logic 
for application to mind and morals and life.’ 
MURPHY, supra note 194, at 63 (internal citations omitted). 
 201. See JAMES GOUINLOCK, JOHN DEWEY’S PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE 21 (1972) (“[T]he 
two sets of complementary terms have very different connotations . . . .”). 
 202. Id. at 71. 
 203. John Dewey, The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology, PSYCHOL. REV., III 357-70 
(1896), reprinted in 5 JOHN DEWEY, THE EARLY WORKS, 1882-1898 96-109 (Jo Ann 
Boydston ed., 1972) [hereinafter DEWEY, EARLY WORKS]. 
 204. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 41 (“This essay marks the breakthrough 
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declared his renunciation of Hegelian idealism in favor of a thoroughly 
naturalistic, or scientific, account of even “man’s most ‘spiritual’ activity, 
thinking.”205  This article laid the groundwork for much of Dewey’s later 
work on the self including the idea of conflicts within a situation that give 
rise to the need for reconstitution or reconstruction.206 
Dewey shifted from a biological to a social framework for understanding 
the self after his move in 1904 to the Philosophy Department of Columbia 
University.207  There he began his lively exchanges with the legal 
realists,208 and enjoyed intellectual friendships with social scientists such as 
anthropologist Franz Boas.209  In this stimulating environment, Dewey 
wrote his two most important works on his theory of self, Human Nature 
and Conduct210 and Experience and Nature.211  These books mark Dewey’s 
turn to the socially constructed nature of human conduct.212 
B. Dewey’s Social Self 
Dewey’s theory of the self rests on the proposition that all human belief 
                                                          
toward which Dewey had been struggling . . . and is the foundation upon which his later 
philosophy is erected.”); RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, JOHN DEWEY 15 (1967) (stating that the 
essay was “the basis of Dewey’s mature theory of experience”); COUGHLAN, supra note 185, 
at 142 (asserting that at this point Hegelianism had “slipped away” and Dewey’s own 
philosophy was coming into its “maturity”). 
 205. COUGHLAN, supra note 185, at 142. 
 206. BERNSTEIN, supra note 204, at 20. 
 207. COUGHLAN, supra note 185, at 150 (explaining that during Dewey’s time at 
Columbia he wrote extensively while “exploring that ‘flash of insight’ he had in his last 
years at Michigan.”). 
 208. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 50 (1986) (noting that 
legal realist Thomas Reed Powell met Dewey at Columbia and regarded him as his 
intellectual mentor); SCHLEGEL, supra note 43, at 24-25, 59-60 (asserting that Dewey’s 
pragmatic philosophy was a centerpiece of the early realist consciousness and giving many 
examples of the interactions between Dewey and legal realists Walter Wheeler Cook and 
Underhill Moore at Columbia). 
 209. See GEORGE DYKHUIZEN, THE LIFE AND MIND OF JOHN DEWEY 118-19 (Jo Ann 
Boydston ed., 1973) (listing many leading scholars in various disciplines with whom Dewey 
came into contact at Columbia); MENAND, supra note 170, at 383-86 (discussing the 
relationship between Boas and Dewey); ROCKEFELLER, supra note 194, at 278 (discussing 
influence of Boas, historian Charles Beard, and others on Dewey at Columbia).  Boas 
sought to develop anthropology as a discipline that would study cultural differences without 
imposing ethnocentric views of Western values, and heavily influenced Dewey with his 
ideas about the lack of moral superiority of one culture over another.  MENAND, supra note 
170, at 383-86; see also RYAN, supra note 194, at 166-67 (describing Boas’s influence on 
Dewey). 
 210. DEWEY, MIDDLE WORKS, supra note 34. 
 211. JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE (Waverly Press 1926) (1925). 
 212. These works gained great popularity among American intellectuals on their release 
and arguably marked the apex of Dewey’s influence as America’s leading public 
philosopher.  See BERNSTEIN, supra note 204, at 1, 59 (noting the great popularity of these 
books); see also Grey, supra note 174, at 791 (highlighting how Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr., on reading the books in the 1920s, commented that they contained a “‘view of the 
universe [that] came home to me closer than any other that I know’”) (quoting a letter dated 
July 26, 1930 in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 272 (M. Howe ed., 1941)). 
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and conduct begins with its construction by preexisting associations of 
human beings.213  These associations, in turn, represent “modes of 
interaction of persons with one another” in the form of customs and 
institutions.214  Like Sandel, Dewey argues that individuals have no 
existence prior to or separate from historically received customs and 
institutions.  Also like Sandel, Dewey is a strong critic of liberal 
individualism, and it is helpful in understanding Dewey’s thought to 
examine how he positioned his philosophy in relation to this tradition. 
1. Dewey on liberal individualism 
Dewey’s opposition to liberal individualism is a topic to which he 
returns in many of his works.215  His thoughtful and measured critiques 
trace the intractable problem of divesting modern thought of its liberal 
individualist fallacies to a form of historical error.  That error occurred, 
Dewey argues, when the political ideas of liberalism, which arose as a 
progressive and laudable reaction to particular social circumstances, came 
to be conflated with epistemological ideas that should have been 
discarded.216   
Under earlier conceptions of knowledge as “divinely revealed,”217 it 
would never have occurred to people to identify mind with the personal self 
because beliefs were transmitted by custom.218 
With the rise of liberalism as a political theory in an historical era 
characterized by a struggle for greater freedom in thought and action, 
however, two very different sets of ideas became conflated.  One set 
consisted of political ideas that promoted the right to espouse beliefs 
different from orthodoxy—a right to which, Dewey argues, we should 
continue to be fully in favor.  The other was a set of ideas aimed at a 
different level of analysis, which Dewey calls philosophical 
subjectivism.219  By first identifying “mind with self” and then positing the 
“self” as “independent and self-sufficient,” the subject (or “knower”) and 
object (or “thing to be known”) became “wholly separate from one 
another,” making it “necessary to frame a theory to explain how they get 
                                                          
 213. DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 44. 
 214. Id. 
 215. These include DEWEY, supra note 199; JOHN DEWEY, INDIVIDUALISM OLD AND NEW 
(Prometheus Books 1999) (1930); JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 
(Prometheus Books 2000) (1935); JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (1916) 
[hereinafter DEWEY, DEMOCRACY]. 
 216. DEWEY, supra note 199, at 87-88 (“[T]he practical movement for the limitation of 
the powers of government became associated . . . with the doctrine that the ground and 
justification of the restriction was prior non-political rights inherent in the very structure of 
the individual.”). 
 217. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 215, at 341. 
 218. DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 43-53. 
 219. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 215, at 302.  
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into connection.”220  This problem “became almost the exclusive 
preoccupation of philosophic thought.”221  Dewey seeks through his 
pragmatist theory of the self to overthrow this entire constellation of ideas. 
He does so, first, by rejecting methodological individualism.  As he 
explains, “[w]e often fancy that institutions, social customs, collective 
habit, have been formed by the consolidation of individual habits,” but 
“this supposition is false to fact.”222  Customs or uniformity of habit may 
exist in part because individuals “face the same situation,” but a much more 
important factor accounting for the persistence of customs is the fact that 
individuals form their personal habits under the conditions set by prior 
customs.223  These customs, or social context, constitute the self:  the 
human organism cannot think or be without a prior social context.224  
Dewey thus embraces a form of social constructivism, in the sense that he 
rejects the idea that individuals have an existence prior to or separate from 
historically received customs and institutions.  But his is a quite different 
form of social constructivism than that of the post-structuralists because his 
version retains, inter alia, a conception of individual biological existence 
and personality, as I will discuss further below. 
2. The self as habits 
To Dewey, as already noted, historically received institutions provide the 
social context that constitutes the self.  But Dewey’s interactionism 
provides an alternative to strong versions of social constructionism in that 
selves in interaction with each other and their historically received 
institutions continually reconstitute their environment at the same time that 
they are constituted by it.   
Ever the unrepentant naturalist, Dewey conceives of morality as a 
product of one’s social environment just as all other customs are:  Morality 
“is as much a matter of interaction of a person with his social environment 
as walking is an interaction of legs with physical environment.”225  Thus, 
                                                          
 220. Id.  
 221. Id. at 342. 
 222. DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 43. 
 223. See id. at 43-44 (arguing that, in the same way in which individuals learn the 
language of their social group, which exists in a preexisting association prior to every 
particular human being born into the world, they learn the preexisting forms of association 
that we call customs and institutions). 
 224. Or, to be even more precise, Dewey would say that neither environment nor human 
organism can be stated to be conceptually prior, since the organism gives continued 
meaning to its environment just as its environment gives meaning to it.  See ALEXANDER, 
supra note 174, at 133 (“Environments are not prior to organisms.  That is, both are 
dynamically interdependent and are understood in terms of the other.”). 
 225. DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 219.  Thus, Dewey writes, “‘[i]t thinks’ is 
a truer psychological statement than ‘I think.’”  Id. at 216.  The thoughts we experience, the 
ideas that “sprout and vegetate” proliferate as they “come from deep unconscious sources.”  
Id. at 216.  This “stuff of belief and proposition is not originated by us.  It comes to us from 
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an idea that, in “The Reflex Arc Concept,” is a biological theory about how 
the human organism responds to its natural environment, shifts to focus on 
the primacy of social context.226  Morals “mean customs, folkways, 
established collective habits,” and people acquire morality just as they 
inherit the speech of their social group.227  To explain how people come to 
inherit customs in this way, Dewey invokes the concept of habit. 
Customs and habits are to Dewey “the sole agents of observation [and] 
recollection.”228  Thus habits “constitute the self”; “they are will.”229  
Habits do “the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, 
conceiving and reasoning . . . .”230  What we think of as character is no 
more than the “interpenetration of habits”:  were it not for “the continued 
operation of all habits in every act, no such thing as character could 
exist.”231  Without the force of habit, formed through the human organism’s 
repeated interactions with the social and natural environment, the organism 
would simply be “a bundle, an untied bundle at that, of isolated acts.”232 
But even habits do not produce a unified personality or coherent self.  
Just as “the environment is many, not one,” so too “will [or] disposition is 
plural.”233  Here Dewey’s concept of the self appears to resonate with the 
inconsistent or fragmented self of the post-structuralists; to Dewey, “any 
self is capable of including within itself a number of inconsistent selves, or 
unharmonized dispositions.”234  Likewise, Dewey agrees with the post-
structuralists that our sensation of individual consciousness or subjective 
specialness is not evidence of the priority of individual existence.235  What 
traditional individualism sees as “distinctively individual in behavior and 
mind” is not, in fact, “an original datum” but merely the “physical or 
physiological individuality” that colors responsive activities.236  Dewey 
                                                          
others, by education, tradition and the suggestion of the environment,” and “is bound up . . . 
with community of life of which we are a part.”  Id. 
 226. RYAN, supra note 194, at 126. 
 227. DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 43, 54. 
 228. Id. at 123. 
 229. Id. at 21. 
 230. Id. at 124.  In using the term “habit,” Dewey was drawing both from James’s 
biological version of habit, discussed in JAMES, supra note 197, at 109-27, and Peirce’s 
extensive treatment of the same concept.  See ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 141 (“[The 
concept of habit], so central in pragmatism, received extensive treatment from Peirce and 
James before Dewey.”). 
 231. DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 29. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 38. 
 234. Id. at 96; see also id. (“Only the hold of a traditional conception of singleness and 
simplicity of soul and self blinds us to perceiving . . . the relative fluidity and diversity of 
the constituents of selfhood.”). 
 235. Id. at 60 (“Orthodox psychology starts however from the assumption of precisely 
such independent minds.”). 
 236. Id.  In downgrading the importance of the sensation of personal selfhood, Dewey 
was following the view of Peirce, as opposed to that of James.  See COLAPIETRO, supra note 
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argues that what we experience as consciousness is simply the constant 
process of adjustment between the human organism and its ever changing 
environment.237  Sensations arise from the continual readjustment of habits 
as they interact with the environment.  This constant bumping of habits 
against the environment results in our experience of a “stream of 
consciousness.”238  We experience consciousness continually because 
habits are never static.  Readjustments of habits occur continually:  “[I]n 
every waking moment, the complete balance of the organism and its 
environment is constantly interfered with and as constantly restored.”239 
Conversely, according to Dewey, the more “suavely efficient a habit” is, 
the more unconscious it is.240  Dewey’s concept of the unconscious is thus 
quite different from that of his contemporary, Sigmund Freud.241  For 
Freud, the unconscious is the repository of instincts and drives that arise 
from within the individual but lack acceptable social outlets and thus must 
be repressed back into the individual psyche.242  For Dewey, in contrast, the 
unconscious is the seat of socially derived habits that function so efficiently 
and effortlessly that we lose awareness of their operation.243  Rather than 
the site of that which is conflict-ridden and problematic, as in Freud’s 
account, the unconscious is the site at which habits are working the most 
smoothly. 
For the most mundane activities (dressing, eating, walking) to the 
highest human achievements (art and science), the unconscious serves as 
                                                          
181, at 62-63 (noting that, for James, “the finite self is characterized by an ineradicable 
privacy,” whereas for Peirce, “this dimension possesses neither the importance nor the scope 
that James grants it,” so that Peirce stated:  “Everybody will admit a personal self in the 
same sense in which a snark exists; that is, there is a phenomenon to which that name is 
given,” and that:  “It is an illusory phenomenon; but still it is a phenomenon.  It is not quite 
purely illusory, but only mainly so.” (quoting 8 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, THE COLLECTED 
PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE § 8.82 (Hartshorne & P. Weiss eds., 1934))). 
Likewise, Dewey’s theory of personality as a “bundle of habits” echoes Peirce’s similar 
conceptions.  See id. at 113 (summarizing Peirce’s view of habits); COLAPIETRO, supra note 
181, at 83, 88 (quoting Peirce on his bundle of habits theory).  This focus on the importance 
of habits is evident in James as well.  See JAMES, supra note 197, at 109-31 (asserting that 
habits, while controllable by living beings, work to define to a large extent who they are). 
 237. DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 125. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Dewey is sometimes accused of lacking an awareness of the unconscious.  See, e.g., 
RYAN, supra note 194, at 368 (“Dewey was oddly untouched by Freud and oddly 
uninterested in either the anxieties or the possibilities of emancipation that Freud brought 
the twentieth century.”).  Careful scrutiny of his work, however, suggests otherwise.  Dewey 
clearly was familiar with Freudian psychoanalytic theory, but found it lacking, for reasons 
that will be explored further in infra notes 242-246 and accompanying text. 
 242. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID 5-7 (James Strachey ed., Joan 
Riviere trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1962) (1923) (describing the unconscious as containing 
ideas that are dynamically repressed from the ego). 
 243. DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 125. 
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the site of cultural intelligence.244  Indeed, as I will suggest later, the post-
structuralists’ conception of the unconscious, derived largely from Freud 
and his intellectual heirs, is ironically individualist in its focus on 
idiosyncratic, rebellious and irrational qualities.  Dewey’s view of the 
unconscious, on the other hand, embraces the concept of purposive human 
intelligence (and, indeed, is the source of legal realist Karl Llewellyn’s 
important concept of “horse sense,” as I note below245).  Dewey located this 
concept of purposive intelligence—thinking, as he called it—in the 
constant process of interaction and adjustment between habit and 
environment as well as in the interstices, conflicts and problems of received 
ideas.246 
3. Purposive intelligence and deliberation 
To Dewey, ideas arise primarily from the frustration of habits:  A “habit 
denied overt expression asserts itself in idea.”247  Ideas thus are not 
“bloodless abstractions” arising in the mind, as the Cartesians would have 
it, but have great urgency because they are “charged with the motor 
force . . . of habit.”248  Ideas work to change the environment so that it is in 
accord with habit.  The example Dewey uses is that of food.  The human 
organism has the habit of eating.  If it finds this habit stymied by a lack of 
food, it is motivated by the urgency of the drive to eat, as shaped into a 
habit, to find the kind of food for which it has a liking.249 
Another way in which habits change is through conflicts among habits.  
Such conflict “releases impulsive activities” that require a “modification of 
habit, of custom and convention.”250  Similarly, conflicts among institutions 
can produce the impulse for deliberation and change.251  This view of habit 
                                                          
 244. Id. at 124-25. 
 245. See infra note 347 and accompanying text (explaining Llewellyn’s “horse sense” 
concept). 
 246. DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 125. 
 247. Id. at 39. 
 248. Id.  (“[An idea] has its source in objective conditions and it moves forward to new 
objective conditions.”). 
 249. Id.  Thus to Dewey, biological drives have a natural basis—wholly unshaped, yet 
existing as a fact of the human organism’s natural status.  Dewey saw impulses toward 
activity and problem solving as part of the human organism’s natural endowment.  See 
Grey, supra note 174, at 802 (adding that the “pragmatists treat critical reflection as a 
natural aspect of thought”).  This anchoring of the human organism in the natural world is 
part of what gives classical pragmatism a framework on which to build a self capable of 
agency, as I will discuss further in infra notes 328-331 and accompanying text. 
 250. DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 62.  Dewey further notes that these 
clashes among habits, which result in some desires being “rejected by the immediate 
situation,” are another phenomenon that can produce the sensation of a separate and private 
self.  Id. 
 251. Id. at 90 (finding that just as complex culture includes “habits formed on differing, 
even conflicting patterns,” so too can a “conflict of patterns involved in institutions which 
are inharmonious with one another” produce change). 
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in interaction with the environment forms the foundation for Dewey’s 
theory of deliberation, which Dewey views as the process of reconciling 
conflicts in a situation through purposive thought.252 
Dewey describes deliberation as “a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) 
of various competing possible lines of action.”253  Each “habit [or] impulse 
involved in the temporary suspense of overt action takes its turn in being 
tried out” to see what the resultant action would be, and a choice is made as 
soon as some combination of habits finds its way open.254  It is thus not that 
we do not have a preference until we make a choice, but that we choose 
among an “excess of preferences.”255  As he puts it, “reasonableness is [] a 
quality of an effective relationship among desires rather than a thing 
opposed to desire.”256  This resolution or fit gives rise to an aesthetic 
appreciation that signifies an idea for future action.257 
Dewey’s theory of aesthetics deserves some attention here because of its 
connection to his theory of deliberation.258  For Dewey, all human 
judgments, from everyday life to the highest forms of art, call for aesthetic 
judgment, which involves in every instance the achieving of an emotional 
or tactile quality—a bodily sense, to foreshadow Merleau-Ponty—of fit in 
connection with the resolution of ruptures in or among aspects of the 
environment.259  Ethical judgment involves the same type of judgments:  
What we experience as “good” involves the activity of reconciling conflict 
or the “entanglement of various incompatible impulses.”260 
                                                          
 252. Id. at 132-33. 
 253. Id. at 132. 
 254. Id. at 132-34. 
 255. Id. at 134.  Arguing against Kant and others, Dewey asserts that “[r]ationality . . . is 
not a force to evoke against impulse and habit [but] attainment of a working harmony 
among diverse desires.”  Id. at 136. 
 256. Id. at 135. 
 257. Id. at 66.  Dewey illustrates the point with an example of making judgments about 
another person in a job interview: 
It is even possible for each attitude and gesture, each sentence, almost every word, 
to produce more than a fluctuation in the intensity of the basic emotion; to produce, 
that is, a change of shade and tint in its quality.  The employer sees by means of his 
own emotional reactions the character of the one applying.  He projects him 
imaginatively into the work to be done and judges his fitness by the way in which 
the elements of the scene assemble and either clash or fit together.  The presence 
and behavior of the applicant either harmonize with his own attitudes and desires or 
they conflict and jar.  Such factors as these, inherently esthetic in quality, are the 
forces that carry the varied elements of the interview to a decisive issue.  They 
enter into the settlement of every situation, whatever its dominant nature, in which 
there are uncertainty and suspense. 
JOHN DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE 43 (Capricorn Books 1959) (1934) [hereinafter DEWEY, 
EXPERIENCE]. 
 258. See generally DEWEY, EXPERIENCE, supra note 257 (systematically presenting 
Dewey’s aesthetic theory). 
 259. See id. at 10-11 (noting that our everyday experiences involve aesthetic judgments). 
 260. DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 146. 
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Elsewhere in his writing, Dewey describes a similar process as one of 
valuation,261 which he invokes as the basis for his model of scientific 
inquiry.  To Dewey, valuation involves an interactive process between facts 
and values.262  Neither side in this process has priority or a stronger claim 
to reality or truth.263  Instead, understandings of facts are always infused 
with values, just as values are always affected by understandings of facts.264  
As changes occur on one side of this process, changes occur on the other, 
so that they cannot be separated.265  Here, as elsewhere in his philosophy, 
Dewey strives to break up what he views as false dichotomies—to explain 
how these dichotomies, such as between facts and values, exist only by 
virtue of their relationship to each other. 
In particular, Dewey uses his theory of valuation to explain the process 
of inquiry in the human and social sciences.266  There is thus an 
interpretative thrust to his view of social science. Dewey argues that there 
is no neutral or objective perspective from which anyone, including a social 
scientist, can evaluate human phenomena.267  Instead, with respect to such 
inquiry, facts and values must always interact.   
This position leads Dewey to eschew what he sees as the determinism of 
                                                          
 261. Dewey elaborated on his theories of deliberative valuation in John Dewey, Theory 
of Valuation, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE 1, 33 (Otto Neurath 
et al. eds., 1939); see also GOUINLOCK, supra note 201, at 21 (discussing Dewey’s theory of 
valuation). 
 262. Dewey, supra note 261, at 64-65. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Dewey’s views on the natural and human sciences and their influence on American 
legal thought are complex and highly contested questions among contemporary scholars, but 
need not detain us here.  For a flavor of that debate, compare MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960:  THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 209-
10, 270 (1992) (arguing that legal realists’ interest in behavioral social science dulled that 
movement’s critical edge), with SCHLEGEL, supra note 43, at 7 (questioning Horwitz’s 
interpretation). 
Dewey was often confusing on his views about social science inquiry, but, to the extent 
the impression exists among legal scholars that Dewey embraced a vision of objective, 
value-neutral social science that would emulate natural science and detach facts from 
values, that impression is belied by Dewey’s texts.  For one, it fails to jibe with Dewey’s 
theory of valuation, which posited a continual interaction between facts and values, and 
which he designed specifically for social science inquiry, as just discussed.  Second, it 
contradicts Dewey’s statements about the difference between the natural and social science, 
such as the following: 
The prestige of the mathematical and physical sciences is great, and properly so.  
But the difference between facts which are what they are independent of human 
desire and endeavor and facts which are to some extent what they are because of 
human interest and purpose, and which alter with alteration in the latter, cannot be 
got rid of by any methodology.  The more sincerely we appeal to facts, the greater 
is the importance of the distinction between facts which condition human activity 
and facts which are conditioned by human activity.  In the degree which we ignore 
this difference, social science becomes pseudo-science. 
DEWEY, supra note 199, at 7. 
 267. Dewey, supra note 261, at 63. 
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structuralist sociologists such as Durkheim and Marx.268 Indeed, Dewey 
attempts to avoid the free will/social determinism debate altogether.  He 
does so by arguing for the social construction but ultimate indeterminacy of 
all normative judgment.  Dewey argues that, although morality is always 
socially constructed, it is not ever “socially determined.”269  This is because 
moral consciousness, though always embodied in institutions, is “never 
wholly self consistent.”270 
Moral consciousness may realize ideas in some relationships but not 
others, such as when institutions are supposed to embody a common good 
that ends up being available only to “the privileged few.”271  In this 
situation, reflective intelligence “cross-questions the existing morality” and 
pulls from it ideas that it only “pretends to embody,” thus arriving at 
criticisms of existing morality:  It “points out the inconsistencies, the 
incoherencies, the compromises, the failures, between the actual practice 
and the theory at the basis of this practice.”272  This active process of 
human judgment or valuation happens continually, on matters both 
insignificant and extremely consequential.  The reflective examination that 
happens at the smallest scale all the time involves essentially the same 
process as that which gives urge to deeper criticism and transformation.273  
Dewey demonstrates the application of this process by analyzing and 
critiquing the institutions of his own times, including education and 
democracy. 
4. Pedagogy and democracy 
Precisely because he believed in the power of human agency, Dewey 
devoted a great deal of his writing to developing prescriptions for change in 
response to the issues of his times.  It is worth quickly surveying some of 
those prescriptions here because they help illuminate the relationship 
between Dewey’s theory of the self and his overall philosophic system.  
Dewey’s deliberative theory ties elegantly into his theory of democracy, 
which in turn displays an ascetically pleasing “fit”274 with his pedagogical 
vision. 
Dewey’s political theory is a large topic, to which he devoted much 
                                                          
 268. See JOHN DEWEY, The Need for Social Psychology, reprinted in 10 DEWEY, MIDDLE 
WORKS, supra note 34, at 53, 60 (referring to Durkheimian thought as a “school of 
collective mind” and criticizing “unremitting structuralism” generally). 
 269. Id. 
 270. John Dewey, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics, in 3 JOHN DEWEY, EARLY 
WORKS, supra note 203, at 358. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 359. 
 273. Id. at 357. 
 274. See supra text accompanying notes 258-260 (discussing theory of aesthetics 
underlying Dewey’s theory of deliberative judgment). 
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writing but to which I can give only passing attention.  Suffice it to say that 
Dewey passionately believed in the virtues of democracy; indeed, Dewey 
scholars have described democracy as Dewey’s deepest preoccupation—
the underlying passion that motivated him in his prolific output.275  Unlike 
philosophers such as John Rawls, however, Dewey uncoupled democracy 
from the institutions of Western capitalism, and was intensely critical of 
capitalism as he saw it developing in his lifetime.  To Dewey, capitalism 
spelled economic inequality, which was anathema to his vision of 
democracy based in local deliberative processes.276 
Dewey saw education as the process through which children would 
acquire the habits that would allow them to become members of a 
democracy, well equipped for the kind of reflective thought and 
deliberation that democracy required.277  Thus, education was for Dewey a 
fundamental method of social progress and reform.278  For this reason, 
Dewey, unlike most modern philosophers, gave pedagogy a central place in 
his philosophy.  Dewey saw education as the scientific laboratory in which 
the ideas of pragmatism would be put to the test of experience.279  To 
Dewey, the ability to engage in good deliberative judgment—to exercise 
clear foresight on ethical as well as instrumental matters—was a habit that 
could and should be cultivated through education.  Thus Dewey thought 
that education should not be a “succession of studies but the development 
of new attitudes towards, and new interests in, experience.”280 
                                                          
 275. For a biography emphasizing this dimension of Dewey’s life project, see ROBERT B. 
WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1999). 
 276. See, e.g., DEWEY, EXPERIENCE, supra note 257, at 8 (lamenting the tendency of 
capitalism to promote “the idea that [works of art] are apart from the common life”); 
DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 186 (criticizing the mundane and oppressive 
nature of “modern economic life”). 
 277. See, e.g., DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 89 (“[T]he chief means of 
continuous, graded, economical improvement and social rectification lies in utilizing the 
opportunities of educating the young to modify prevailing types of thought and desire.”). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Unfortunately, Dewey does not appear to have written about pedagogy in the 
context of higher education.  Nor do Dewey’s ideas about education seem to have 
influenced his own teaching, which was not reputed to be particularly innovative or 
inspiring.  One anecdote describes Dewey’s classroom teaching as follows: 
Always carefully prepared before he came to class, Dewey would seem to be 
making a fresh start when he began to lecture.  There was something unconsciously 
optimistic about the literal way he took the ideals of graduate instruction.  For he 
would never spend time in motivating interest or attention.  Once, after spending 
three consecutive hours on the analysis of the meaning of the word “this,” he 
tentatively concluded with the remark “I think this is a little clearer to me now.”  
He was a little perplexed at the amusement of the class, most of whose members 
had never imagined that there was anything problematic about “this” except why 
Dewey was discussing it. 
HOOK, supra note 194, at 21. 
 280. John Dewey, My Pedagogic Creed, in 5 DEWEY, EARLY WORKS, supra note 203, at 
84, 91.  Dewey thus rejected, as a matter of educational theory as well as epistemology, the 
idea of the mind as something passive that merely receives the imprint of what is instilled in 
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No relativist on matters concerning his own place and time, Dewey 
denounced the “inert stupid quality of current customs,” which “perverts 
learning into a willingness to follow where others point the way, into 
conformity, constriction, surrender of scepticism and experiment.”281  In 
lieu of teaching to new generations habits that represent such “enslavement 
to old ruts,”282 Dewey wanted to inculcate better habits—“flexible, 
sensitive” ones that could grow “more varied, more adaptable by practice 
and use.”283  These, in turn, were the habits Dewey identified as necessary 
for democracy to succeed. 
Here, the contrasts with Stanley Fish are stark.  Fish, as we have seen, 
argues that teaching methods of critical analysis to students does not 
change practice outside the classroom.284  Practice in the world outside the 
classroom and the doing of theory proceed on two unrelated planes.  
Dewey, conversely, repudiated the separation of theory and practice as a 
false dualism, arguing that those who espouse theory for theory’s sake are 
in fact espousing “two kinds of practice.”285  Moreover, he argued, “[t]hose 
who wish a monopoly of social power find desirable the separation of habit 
and thought” because this “dualism enables them to do the thinking and 
planning, while others remain the docile . . . instruments of execution.”286  
Thus, for Dewey, theory was a form of practice in the world that had great 
potential to fuel political and social change, and the decision to do and 
teach theory as a practice separate from political and social issues was a 
political decision with particular normative consequences—namely, the 
promotion of political disengagement and apathy.287 
What I will call Dewey’s “soft” perspectivism also figures strongly into 
his ardent belief in the virtues of participatory democracy.  Consistent with 
his emphasis on experience as the basis for all knowledge, Dewey 
unabashedly argued that persons with different life experiences will tend to 
hold different perspectives on political issues.288  This is the very reason 
                                                          
it.  Instead, Dewey argued, learning involves a “process [that] begins unconsciously almost 
at birth, and is continually shaping the individual’s powers, saturating his consciousness, 
forming his habits, training his ideas, and arousing his feelings . . . .”  Id. at 84. 
 281. DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 47. 
 282. Id. at 48. 
 283. Id. at 51-52. 
 284. FISH, Anti-Foundationalism, Theory, Hope, and the Teaching of Composition, in 
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 123, at 342, 351.  
 285. DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 50. 
 286. Id. at 52. 
 287. See id. at 50 (discussing the practice of theory as a device to promote “popular 
education—up to the point of disseminating as matter of authoritative information for the 
many what the few have established by thought, and up to the point of converting an 
original docility to the new into a docility to repeat and conform”). 
 288. As one feminist and expert scholar of the classical pragmatists explains: 
Dewey explicitly uses his pragmatist principle of perspectivism to argue that 
women’s experiences differ significantly enough from men’s to affect the 
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active participatory democracy is necessary—in order to ensure that all 
viewpoints figure into the deliberative process.  Dewey is only a “soft” 
perspectivist, however, because in his version of perspectivism all 
viewpoints and voices matter and add value in the process of political 
debate.  Under Dewey’s theory of participatory democracy, no viewpoint is 
infallible.  Thus, although Dewey is deeply concerned about the effects of 
privilege in amplifying power and political voice, he would not agree, as I 
discuss further in Part III.D.1, with what I will distinguish as “hard” 
perspectivism—namely, the idea that only those subject to a particular 
experience of oppression or subordination have legitimate standing to 
address it.  To Dewey, no one social group has the best view or 
understanding about any situation, even about a situation that particularly 
affects that group; but, by the same token, participation and 
representativeness are key to effective deliberation. 
C. Dewey, Mead, and Theorizing Agency Today 
In disciplines outside law, an exciting body of scholarship is building 
that explores the potential of the classical pragmatists’ theory of the self in 
theorizing agency for contemporary purposes.  In his eloquent call to what 
he terms prophetic pragmatism, for example, Cornel West argues that 
neither “methodological individualism” nor Foucault’s “downplaying” of 
“human agency” will do:289 
In stark contrast, prophetic pragmatists take seriously moral discourse—
revisable means and ends of political action, the integrity and character 
of those engaged and the precious ideals of participatory democracy and 
the flowering of the uniqueness of different human individualities.290 
Another scholar with a similar purpose, who is independently engaged in 
a painstaking excavation that complements West’s more sweeping call, is 
Vincent Colapietro.  Colapietro has toiled in careful, insightful scholarship 
to illuminate the ways in which Peircean process semiotics offers theories 
of robust agency missing from structuralist accounts,291 as well as to 
                                                          
philosophies they develop.  He says that “women have as yet made little 
contribution to philosophy.  But when women who are not mere students of other 
persons’ philosophy set out to write it, we cannot conceive that it will be the same 
in viewpoint or tenor as that composed from the standpoint of the different 
masculine experience of things.” 
Charlene Haddock Seigfried, John Dewey’s Pragmatist Feminism, in READING DEWEY, 
supra note 174, at 187, 202 (internal citation omitted); see also Radin, supra note 164, at 
1720 (arguing that a pragmatist focus on perspectivism “finds its concrete payoff in the 
perspective of feminism and in the perspectives of oppressed people generally.”). 
 289. CORNEL WEST, On Prophetic Pragmatism, in THE CORNEL WEST READER 149, 163 
(1999). 
 290. Id. at 164; see also id. at 163 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Edward Said’s 
“perceptive” critiques of Foucault). 
 291. See COLAPIETRO, supra note 181, at xix (arguing that Peirce’s “refusal to eliminate 
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resurrect Dewey’s theory of the self from its current neglect.292  Colapietro 
succinctly puts it this way:  “[W]hat need[s] to be stressed at the outset is 
the general point regarding radical agency:  we are inherently active beings 
who inevitably undergo transformations as a consequence of our 
activities.”293 
Thomas Alexander, a leading Dewey scholar interested in the links 
between pragmatism and other strains of contemporary theory, locates the 
classical pragmatists’ conception of agency in Dewey’s process-based 
understanding of time: 
[Time] is a feature of the nature of individuals, from sub-atomic particles 
to human beings, and this always involves an element of novelty, the 
realization of some potentiality . . . . Dewey, again like Peirce, conceives 
of potentiality as the “tychistic” factor in nature, i.e., the domain of “the 
precarious,” the aleatory and chancy, undetermined, brute, and 
contingent face of things . . . .294 
Alexander further highlights the importance of “the situation” in 
Dewey’s metaphysics:  such qualities as unfold through time are not 
inherently “in” individuals or in structures waiting to unfold but “arise” in 
the interactions between the living organism and its environment.295 
In short, as these contemporary theorists explain, Dewey’s metaphor of 
the developing organism embraces an account of human conduct as 
socially constructed, but not in the same way structuralists do.  Indeed, as I 
have already discussed, Dewey emphatically rejects structuralist accounts 
of human conduct—not only the historical idealism of Hegel296 and the 
dialectical materialism of Marx,297 but also the structuralism of his 
contemporary Emile Durkheim, the founder of modern sociology.298  To 
Dewey, as to Peirce and other process philosophers, “once you have 
embraced the principle of continuity no kind of explanation of things will 
                                                          
the acting subject along with the Cartesian cogito is one of the important respects in which 
Peirce’s semiotic vision is superior to the antihumanist orientation of Saussure’s structuralist 
and poststructuralist offspring”). 
 292. See Vincent M. Colapietro, Embodied, Enculturated Agents, in DEWEY 
RECONFIGURED, supra note 174, at 63, 64 (defending a pragmatic, Deweyan theory of 
selfhood as “especially helpful in illuminating the nature of subjectivity or selfhood”). 
 293. Id. at 68-69. 
 294. ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 100-01 (quoting DEWEY, supra note 211, at 236, 
239-40).  
 295. See id. at 112 (“The ‘quality’ of the situation is neither ‘in’ the sentient organisms 
nor ‘in’ the object.  The quality is only in the situation and is of it.”). 
 296. See id. at 99 (“Dewey’s account of emergence of new types of order rejects the 
Hegelian belief that this emergence is dialectically necessary . . . .”). 
 297. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 30-31 (1999) (quoting 
Dewey’s views rejecting Marx). 
 298. See JOHN DEWEY, The Need for Social Psychology, reprinted in 10 DEWEY, MIDDLE 
WORKS, supra note 34, at 53, 60 (discussing Durkheim). 
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satisfy you except that they grew.”299 
Still other scholarly treatments along these lines draw from Mead in 
mining classical pragmatism to revitalize a theory of agency for 
contemporary use.  These scholars suggest that Dewey’s sweeping theory 
of the self is best read along with Mead’s more careful and detailed 
examination, and point out that Dewey often seems to incorporate Mead’s 
work into his own, often without explicit attributions but with sufficiently 
detailed reference to make his connection with Mead unmistakable.300 
1. Mead on the I and the Me 
For all Dewey’s prolixity, Mead had a massive case of writer’s block, 
and his ideas are preserved mostly through his students’ sometimes cryptic 
transcriptions of his lectures, first published after Mead’s death.301  He is 
best known today as the founder of the school of social theory called 
symbolic interactionism.302  The key component of Mead’s thought of 
importance here is his emphasis, paralleling Dewey’s, on the interactive 
process between humans and their social and natural environment.  For 
Mead, like Dewey, this process begins with the infant’s interactions with its 
social and natural world.303  Mead, however, focuses on the way in which 
this interaction becomes internalized, from which he develops a theory of 
how social identity is formed and modified. 
Mead conceives of the self as an internal conversation and uses the 
concepts of the Me and the I to describe this interaction.  The Me is the 
                                                          
 299. ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 100 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Peirce). 
 300. See GOUINLOCK, supra note 201, at 93 n.64 (“Dewey never explicitly discusses the 
self-conscious self as a social emergent.  There could hardly be doubt that his thought on 
this matter would proceed much like that of G.H. Mead.”); see also id. (noting that 
Experience and Nature “owes much to Mead” and citing an example of a passage in which 
“the connection with Mead is most obvious”). 
Intellectual historians disagree about who took the lead in influencing whom with respect 
to their theory of the self.  Compare RYAN, supra note 194, at 123 (“[Dewey] took over 
Mead’s account of the formation of the self and the nature of reflective thinking lock, stock, 
and barrel.”), with COUGHLAN, supra note 185, at 149 (“[Mead] adopted Dewey’s construct 
but then developed it brilliantly . . . .”).  Accepting the pragmatists’ contention that all ideas 
are social, not individual, we need not tease out who led whom.  What is clear is that their 
theories of reflective intelligence are so similar that the writing of one and the other is 
sometimes indistinguishable.  See generally John D. Baldwin, Mead’s Solution to the 
Problem of Agency, 58 SOC. INQUIRY 139, 150 (1988) (internal citations omitted) (quoting 
passages from Mead on selfhood reminiscent of Dewey in their emphasis on experiential 
development of the self). 
 301. A large literature debates Mead’s intent with respect to these sometimes cryptic 
transcriptions, but those debates concern advanced matters of interpretation that need not 
concern us. 
 302. See HERBERT BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM:  PERSPECTIVE AND METHOD 3 
(1969) (describing symbolic interactionism as taking the position that “the meanings that 
things have for human beings are central in their own right”). 
 303. See, e.g., DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 89 (describing “impulsive 
activity” of the young as “vivid, flexible, experimenting, curious”). 
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socially constructed interpretation of the self reflected back to itself as the 
result of its interaction with its environment; the I exists in the space that 
precedes awareness of this ever changing Me.  As Mead puts it: 
The “I” reacts to the self which arises through  the taking of the attitudes 
of others.  Through taking those attitudes we have introduced the “me” 
and we react to it as an “I”.  The simplest way of handling the problem 
would be in terms of memory.  I talk to myself, and I remember what I 
said and perhaps the emotional content that went with it.  The “I” of this 
moment is present in the “me” of the next moment . . . . It is as we act 
that we are aware of ourselves.  It is in memory that the “I” is constantly 
present in experience . . . . As given, it is a “me,” but it is a “me” which 
was the “I” at the earlier time.  If you ask, then, where directly in your 
own experience the “I” comes in, the answer is that it comes in as a 
historical figure.  It is what you were a second ago that is the “I” of the 
“me.”304 
Mead’s rather obscure concept of the I, which forms the basis for his 
theory of agency, derives from process metaphysics,305 and it is therefore 
helpful to briefly revisit process metaphysics in seeking to interpret Mead’s 
concept of agency as embedded in the I. 
As contrasted to substance metaphysics, process metaphysics 
emphasizes chance (tychism), flux, unpredictability, and opportunity.306  
Process philosophers’ ability to conceptualize human agency within a 
socially constructed self stems in part from this emphasis on the 
indeterminateness of being; to use William James’s language, a process 
approach allows the substitution of the concept of “chance” for notions of 
human freedom.307  Process philosophers can be understood further as 
locating individual and collective agency in the dimension of time—in the 
space between the past and what is now becoming.308  Mead’s I, in other 
                                                          
 304. GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY 174 (Charles W. Morris ed., Univ. of 
Chi. Press 1969) (1934). 
 305. See NICHOLAS RESCHER, PROCESS METAPHYSICS:  AN INTRODUCTION TO PROCESS 
PHILOSOPHY 32-33 (1996) (“[P]rocess philosophy is best seen as a broad movement that 
urges a particular sort of approach to the problems of metaphysics . . . .”). 
 306. See id. at 35 (comparing substance and process metaphysics through adjectival 
opposites such as “discrete individuality/interactive relatedness”; “separateness/wholeness 
(totality)”; “condition (fixity of nature)/activity (self-development)”; “uniformity of 
nature/innovation”; “classificatory stability/fluidity and evanescence”; and “passivity (being 
acted upon)/activity (agency)”). 
 307. See William James, The Dilemma of Determinism, in PHILOSOPHERS OF PROCESS, 
54, 76 (Douglas Browning & William T. Myers eds., 2d ed. 1998) (arguing that “the word 
‘chance,’ with its singular negativity, is just the word” to use “instead of ‘freedom’”). 
 308. See, e.g., John Dewey, Time and Individuality, in PHILOSOPHERS OF PROCESS, supra 
note 307, at 211, 224 (“Genuine time . . . is all one with the existence of individuals as 
individuals, with the creative, with the occurrence of unpredictable novelties.”); RESCHER, 
supra note 305, at 16 (quoting William James, A World of Pure Experience, in ESSAYS IN 
RADICAL EMPIRICISM 34, 54 (1912)) (“We live, as it were, upon the front edge of an 
advancing wave-crest, and our sense of a determinate direction in falling forward is all we 
cover of the future of our path.”). 
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words, exists in the interaction between present and the past, in the moment 
in which one becomes conscious of what one is about to do, which will in 
the next moment become part of the socially constructed Me.309 
Thus for Mead, as for Dewey, there is no free and autonomous 
individual out in the world pursuing its goals.  Mead and Dewey agree that, 
to the extent that a “sense of freedom” created by the experience of the 
momentary I leads some people to a metaphysical belief in free will, this is 
an illusion—a fallout from the way we experience consciousness.  
Nevertheless, for Mead, a space for creative agency exists in the 
unpredictable process that takes place through a dialogue between the Me 
and the I: 
 That which takes place in present organic behavior is always in some 
sense an emergent from the past, and never could have been precisely 
predicted in advance . . . and in the case of organic behavior which is 
intelligently controlled, this element of spontaneity is especially 
prominent by virtue of the present influence exercised over such 
behavior by the possible future results or consequences which it may 
have . . . . 
 As we reflect on the possible solutions of problems, we become aware 
of novel and unexpected alternatives, reevaluate and reconstruct our 
memories of past experiences, and reassess the possible future outcomes 
of the alternatives.  From the complicated interaction of the perceptual 
present with images of the past and future, complex decisions and 
actions emerge.310 
Social theorists have begun to explore Mead’s notion of the I for its 
potential value in reinvigorating an agenic theory of the self.311 
                                                          
 309. MEAD, supra note 304, at 175 (“The ‘I’ is his action over against that social 
situation within his own conduct, and it gets into his experience only after he has carried out 
the act.  Then he is aware of it.”). 
 310. MEAD, supra note 304, at 98-99.  In analyzing the interaction between the I and the 
Me, Mead also asserts: 
The ‘I,’ then, in this relation of the ‘I’ and the me,’ is something that is, so to speak, 
responding to a social situation which is within the experience of the 
individual . . . .  Now, the attitudes he is taking toward them are present in his own 
experience, but his response to them will contain a novel element. 
Id. at 177. 
 311. Norbert Wiley, for example, presents a complex argument linking Mead’s symbolic 
interactionism with Peircean semiotics to arrive at a justification for democratic social 
theory.  Most interesting for our purposes is his emphasis on the pragmatists’ process-based 
understanding of the self in creating room for voluntary action.  According to Wiley: 
Viewed in this way, the voluntarist and egalitarian qualities of the self are more 
solidly anchored.  Voluntarism or freedom is built into the semiotic process, which 
emerges over time.  The agent or I of the present interprets the history or me of the 
past to and with the you of the future.  This interpretation does not mirror, nor is it 
caused by, the past.  It creates, and it does so by a kind of cognitive reality 
construction.  It defines and redefines the situation in a somewhat undetermined 
manner.  In this theory, the action itself, which may flow from the interpretation, 
can be viewed as determined (e.g. by the greater good) or “compatible” with 
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Some of these same scholars have turned to an investigation of the 
parallels between continental phenomenology and classical pragmatism to 
further elucidate the ways in which theorizing about agency can be 
reinvigorated in contemporary thought.  Although my focus is on the 
classical pragmatists, this literature deserves brief summary in order to 
further situate my argument within contemporary currents of social theory. 
2. Parallels with phenomenology 
As a fascinating comparative literature is beginning to investigate,312 
social theorists on the other side of the Atlantic—most notably, Merleau-
Ponty in his work in phenomenology starting in the 1940s—independently 
pursued conceptions of the self with uncanny similarities to classical 
pragmatism.  Like Dewey and others, Merleau-Ponty sought to study 
human consciousness in ways that avoided the trap of mind/body dualism.  
Like Dewey and Mead, Merleau-Ponty developed theories that looked to 
“embodied” human experience in social context as the source of human 
knowing.313  Merleau-Ponty’s opus, Phenomenology of Perception, which 
                                                          
determinism.  But the freedom is still there, back a step, in the creative act of 
interpretation.   
Wiley, supra note 193, at 15; see also Mustafa Emirbayer & Ann Mische, What is 
Agency?, 103 AM. J. SOC. 962, 963 (1998) (arguing for an interactionist theory of agency 
“as a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its 
habitual aspect), but also oriented toward the future (as a capacity to imagine alternative 
possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity to contextualize past habits and future 
projects within the contingencies of the moment)”). 
 312. See, e.g., VICTOR KESTENBAUM, THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL SENSE OF JOHN DEWEY:  
HABIT AND MEANING 7, 26, 111 (1977) (highlighting similarities between Dewey’s and 
French phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty’s views of experience, habit, and judgment); 
Joseph Margolis, Dewey in Dialogue with Continental Philosophy, in READING DEWEY, 
supra note 174, at 231, 249 (noting convergences between Dewey’s pragmatism and 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology); SANDRA B. ROSENTHAL & PATRICK L. BOURGEOIS, MEAD 
AND MERLEAU-PONTY:  TOWARD A COMMON VISION 86 (1991) (discussing the “common 
focus” of Mead’s and Merleau-Ponty’s views of the self). 
So far as the historical record reveals, Dewey and Merleau-Ponty worked independently, 
drawing on some of the same sources in the Western philosophical tradition but not directly 
from each others’ work.  Nevertheless, they arrived at theories of the relationship between 
self and society that are almost uncanny in their similarities.  See, e.g., Mitchell Aboulafia, 
A (neo) American in Paris:  Bourdieu, Mead, and Pragmatism, in BOURDIEU:  A CRITICAL 
READER 153, 155-56 (Richard Shusterman ed., 1999) (discussing similarities between 
Dewey’s and Mead’s emphasis on habit and Bourdieu’s concept of habitus); see also PIERRE 
BOURDIEU & LÖIC J.D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 122 (1992) 
(relaying an interview with Bourdieu in which he states that “the affinities and convergences 
are quite striking” between his work and Dewey’s, and that his theory of practical sense 
“presents many similarities with theories, such as Dewey’s, that grant a central role to the 
notion of habit, understood as an active and creative relation to the world”); Mustafa 
Emirbayer & Ann Mische, What is Agency?, 103 AM. J. SOC. 962, 967 (1998) (noting links 
between American pragmatism and Continental phenomenology). 
 313. These similarities have led one Dewey expert to dub Merleau-Ponty Dewey’s 
“French twin.”  Posting of Thomas Alexander, talex@siu.edu, to dewey-
L@Ganges.CSD.SC.EDU (Aug. 22, 2001) (on file with the American University Law 
Review). 
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articulates a concept of the embodied body similar to Dewey’s and Mead’s 
theories of the self,314 has been a particular focus of this comparative 
literature.315 
Another related literature traces the influence of Merleau-Ponty on 
important contemporary French theorist Pierre Bourdieu.316  American 
legal theory has barely begun to contend with Bourdieu’s important work 
on social class, which shows how subtle manifestations of taste reflect class 
origins and reinforce class hierarchies in realms of human conduct ranging  
from art to food, styles of dress, and academic argument.317  Bourdieu’s 
central concept of habitus318 sounds like a darker, post-modern version of 
Dewey’s habit;319 however, Bourdieu is most interested in how habitus 
produces agents who accept their lots in life rather than in how the agents 
seek to change them.  In any event, Bourdieu’s project signifies a key late 
twentieth century effort to reconcile the insights of structuralist and 
phenomenological theorists, in much the same way as Dewey sought to 
span philosophical dualisms early in the century.  As one commentator has 
observed: 
                                                          
 314. See generally MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 77-232 
(Colin Smith trans., Routledge Classics 2002) (1945). 
 315. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 143-45 (comparing Dewey’s theory of the 
whole organism being involved in experience with Merleau-Ponty’s habituated body); id. at 
144 (noting agreement between Dewey’s and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of habit); 
KESTENBAUM, supra note 312, passim (containing a lengthy point-by-point comparison of 
similarities between Dewey’s and Mead’s theories of the self); ROSENTHAL & BOURGEOIS, 
supra note 312, at 26 (discussing similarities between Mead’s and Merleau-Ponty’s 
understandings of “the emergence of perceptual objects within the context of holistic, 
anticipatory bodily activity”); id. at 86 (describing how Merleau-Ponty’s “focus on the lived 
body” informs Mead’s “concept of the self”); id. at 96 (“Merleau-Ponty, like Mead . . . has 
developed a view of the essentially intersubjective or social nature of the self.”); Margolis, 
supra note 312, at 249 (arguing that “Dewey, from the side of pragmatism” converges with 
Merleau-Ponty “from the side of phenomenology”). 
 316. See, e.g., DAVID SWARTZ, CULTURE AND POWER:  THE SOCIOLOGY OF PIERRE 
BOURDIEU 30 (1997) (noting the importance to Bourdieu of Merleau-Ponty’s use of the 
social sciences in his philosophy). 
 317. See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION:  A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE 
JUDGMENT OF TASTE (Richard Nice trans., 1979) (showing that consumers’ choices and 
popular taste result in an “aristocracy” of culture). 
 318. See generally Cheleen Mahar et al., The Basic Theoretical Position, in AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE WORK OF PIERRE BOURDIEU:  THE PRACTICE OF THEORY 1, 10-12 
(Richard Harker et al. eds., 1990) (discussing the role of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus in 
linking structure and subjectivity). 
 319. Bourdieu defines habitus as a set of dispositions, explaining that: 
The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence 
produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions . . . as principles 
which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an 
express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. 
PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 53 (Richard Nice trans., Stanford Univ. Press 
1990) (1980).  But see supra Part II.B.2 (explaining Dewey’s habit). 
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One of Bourdieu’s main contributions is to propose a framework that 
addresses the agency/structure problem in contemporary social theory.  
He in fact was one of the first poststructuralist sociologists to bring 
actors back into structural models of stratification by showing that the 
idea that structures reproduce and function as constraints is not 
incompatible with the idea that actors create structures. . . .  Yet he also 
criticizes interpretative and phenomenological approaches for not 
situating action with respect to broader structural constraints.  
Bourdieu’s idea that action is generated by the interaction of the 
opportunities and constraints of situations with actor dispositions—the 
repository of post experience, tradition, and habit—seems to constitute a 
considerable advance over these alternative views.320 
Put otherwise, Bourdieu’s “principal concern was to introduce the idea 
of agency into structuralist analysis without recourse to the kind of 
voluntarism he found in Sartre’s existentialism . . . .”321  Whether 
Bourdieu’s conception of habitus contains a sufficiently robust conception 
of human agency has been the topic of much debate,322 but that question is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  The point for this preliminary exploration 
is simply that theorists on both sides of the Atlantic have recognized the 
usefulness of the concept of habit in providing a mediating link between 
self and social context that does not emphasize static form, or unchanging 
structure, as in overly structuralist interpretations. 
III. THE BENEFITS OF CLASSICAL PRAGMATISM 
My central claim in this Article is that an updated classical pragmatist 
theory of the self can help avoid both liberal individualism’s tendency to 
discount the self’s socially constructed nature and the tendency of some 
leading post-modernists to discount the possibilities of effective human 
agency.  In this Part, I do my best to make good on this claim.  I begin in 
Part III.A by summarizing key contrasts between classical pragmatism and 
                                                          
 320. SWARTZ, supra note 316, at 290-91. 
 321. Id. at 101. 
 322. Compare James Bohman, Practical Reason and Cultural Constraint:  Agency in 
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice, in BOURDIEU:  A CRITICAL READER, supra note 312, at 129, 
148 (arguing that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus leaves insufficient room for critical 
reflection), and SWARTZ, supra note 316, at 294 (“[Bourdieu] has very little to say on the 
central questions of when subordinate groups will have the inclination and capacity to act 
upon the critical findings of social science to actively resist domination.”), with Scott 
McLemee, “Not a Fish in Water”:  Close Colleague of Bourdieu Reflects on His Influence, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 8, 2002, at A18, available at 
http://chronicle.com/weekly/v48/i22/22a01801.htm (interview with Löic Wacquant 
discussing Bourdieu’s desire to “give the broadest possible range of people the instruments 
to think for themselves, the critical tools to get through the crust of preconceived ideas and 
discourse, so they could collectively engage in enlightened civic debate”), and  Katha 
Pollitt, Pierre Bourdieu, 1930-2002, THE NATION, Feb. 18, 2002, at 10 (arguing that 
Bourdieu “retained . . . faith in people’s capacities for transformation”). 
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post-structuralism, in an effort to demonstrate the importance of engaging 
in a detailed interrogation of various theories of the self in order to expose 
points of difference.  In Part III.B, I outline my version of a classical 
pragmatist theory of the self.  This theory, I argue, has the important virtue 
of sustaining a sufficiently robust theory of human agency to make it useful 
for progressive legal scholars seeking to aid projects of emancipatory 
activism.  My theory draws from classical pragmatism, yet revises it to take 
account of—indeed, to embrace—important developments in social theory 
over the course of the twentieth century, all without sliding into the 
political pessimism theorists such as Butler, Fish, Rorty, and Schlag 
display.  In Part III.C, I return to the quotes with which this Article began 
in order to examine more specifically the benefits of my theory in 
comparison to liberal individualist or post-structuralist approaches.  
Finally, in Part III.D, I give concrete examples of the application of my 
classical pragmatist approach in the context of several contentious debates 
within the American legal academy in recent years. 
A. Classical Pragmatism and Post-structuralism Compared 
In their emphasis on the socially constructed nature of meaning and the 
self, classical pragmatists such as Dewey and Mead sound much like the 
post-modernists described in Part I.B.  But the classical pragmatists were 
decidedly not post-modernists on certain key points,323 and these contrasts 
bear summary in order to sharpen my claim that something important is at 
stake in interrogating alternate theories of the self.  Key differences involve  
the concepts of experience, repetition, reflective analysis, power, ideology, 
and the unconscious, all resulting in different conclusions about the scope 
of human agency. 
1. Experience versus language as constitutive of the self 
The first key difference I and others have explored involves the classical 
pragmatists’ naturalism324—that is, their grounding of the self in a material 
world of experience.  In this respect, the classical pragmatists hold 
assumptions very different from those of post-modernists who embrace the 
late twentieth century “linguistic turn.”325  To classical pragmatists such as 
                                                          
 323. See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 27, at 268 (discussing Heidegger and Wittgenstein’s 
theories of tacit cultural knowledge). 
 324. See generally Kloppenberg, supra note 27, at 101 (discussing Dewey’s enthusiasm 
for naturalism as encompassing multi-dimensional elements of experience); Leiter, supra 
note 27 (distinguishing realism, with its aspects of naturalism and pragmatism, from post-
modernism). 
 325. See Kloppenberg, supra note 27, at 84, 91-100 (noting the contemporary trend 
toward language as critical to all experience); see also text accompanying notes 130-134 
(discussing the later twentieth century linguistic turn). 
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Dewey, certain biological drives have a natural basis—wholly unshaped, 
yet existing as a fact of the human organism’s natural existence.326  Thus, 
while Dewey would agree that, with respect to such activities as eating (and 
probably also sex, although Dewey had little to say about that subject327), 
what we consider desirable is thoroughly socially constructed, Dewey 
would insist that the drive to perform these activities has a basis in human 
beings’ biological makeup. 
Dewey likewise saw human impulses toward activity and problem-
solving as natural aspects of the human organism’s endowment.328  In this 
sense, human beings’ natural existence provides a foundation for Dewey’s 
self in a way that the construction of subject positions through language 
does not.  This anchoring of the human organism in the natural world is 
part of what allows classical pragmatism to theorize a self capable of robust 
agency. 
The social constructivism of classical pragmatism thus turns out to be 
quite different from that of late twentieth century post-modernism.329  
Along with the move from the classical pragmatist emphasis on experience 
to the later twentieth century emphasis on language as constitutive of 
human knowledge330 comes greater difficulty in theorizing human agency.  
The classical pragmatists’ theory of the self based in experience 
emphasizes the multidimensional interactions among organisms and their 
social and natural environments—through which persons constantly create 
and change environments, just as environments continually create and 
recreate them.  The post-modernist focus on language as exclusively 
constitutive of human thought and action, on the other hand, leads to an 
                                                          
 326. See, e.g., DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 67 (“[I]t goes without saying 
that original, unlearned activity has its distinctive place and that an important one in 
conduct.  Impulses are the pivots upon which the re-organization of activities turn . . . .”). 
 327. See RYAN, supra note 194, at 367 (“[Dewey] had nothing to say about sex, neither 
about its emancipatory possibilities nor about the difficulties that sexual passion, sexual 
jealousy, and sexual boredom pose for the progressive.”). 
 328. Grey, supra note 174, at 802 (“[P]ragmatists treat critical reflection as a natural 
aspect of thought . . . .”).  A post-structuralist, of course, would point out that our conception 
of human organisms as having a status in the natural world itself reflects a socially 
constructed discourse.  In response, a pragmatist would agree, but argue that, in our 
particular historically and socially constructed moment, the concept appears more 
normatively valuable than its alternatives. 
 329. This difference can be further illustrated by an example drawing on Foucault.  In 
History of Sexuality, Foucault argues that our current conception of sexuality as something 
social forces have historically repressed is as much a product of the reigning discourse of 
our times as earlier discourses that viewed “deviant” sexuality as a the product of mental 
illness.  See generally FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY, supra note 107.  Foucault thus argues that 
even as seemingly natural and instinctive a realm as sexuality is thoroughly socially 
constructed; there is no more natural basis for the human impulse for sex than any other 
socially constructed human activity.  Dewey, in contrast, naturalizes human biological 
drives and includes problem solving among them. 
 330. Interestingly, some contemporary trends in epistemology seem to be swinging back 
toward Dewey, as discussed supra note 134.  
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emphasis on the one-way influence of language in constituting the 
subject.331 
2. Habit versus iteration 
 A comparison between Dewey and Butler illustrates another key 
difference between classical pragmatism and post-structuralism.  This 
contrast involves the difference between the classical pragmatist 
conception of habit and post-structuralist conceptions of iteration.  As we 
saw in Part I.B.2.c, Butler theorizes that change results from the mistakes 
and contradictions inevitable in compelled repetitions of identity 
performances.  In contrast, Dewey stresses that in his system, habits are not 
repetitions:  “Repetition is in no sense the essence of habit.  Tendency to 
repeat acts is an incident of many habits but not of all.”332  Butler focuses 
on performative acts, but Dewey emphasizes that habits are “acquired 
predisposition[s] to ways or modes of response, not to particular 
acts . . . .”333  Habits involve “special sensitiveness or accessibility to 
certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than 
bare recurrence of specific acts.”334 
This distinction reflects an important difference.  Dewey’s conception of 
the link between the individual and social as occurring through disposition 
or general habit emphasizes tendency—the embodied nature of experience 
in shaping future conduct—but not compulsion.335  For Butler, on the other 
                                                          
 331. Classical pragmatism, in other words, conceives of the relationship between selves 
and the social and natural environment as an interaction with multiple directions, whereas 
individualism and post-structuralism each sometimes tend to overemphasize a single 
directionality in what we should envision as a much more complicated process.  
Individualism can too greatly emphasize the individual’s priority in relation to his or her 
social surroundings; post-structuralists, revealing their origins in classic structuralism, tend 
to emphasize too greatly the overwhelming force of the social on the subject.  This point can 
be represented graphically as follows: 
Individualism 
Individual———————————————————>>  Social Environment 
Structuralism and Post-structuralism 
Individual <<———————————————————Social Environment 
Classical Pragmatism 
Individual <<——————————————>> Social Environment  
 332. DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 32. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. The same result can be reached through French phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty.  
See, e.g., JAMES SCHMIDT, MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY:  BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND 
STRUCTURALISM 49 (1985) (noting that, according to Merleau-Ponty, arguing against 
Durkheim, “the social is not collective consciousness but intersubjectivity, a living 
relationship and tension among individuals” (emphasis and internal citations omitted)); see 
also id. at 52 (“Merleau-Ponty argued, against Durkheim, that society be conceived not as a 
‘conscience collective’ but rather as ‘intersubjectivity’ . . . .” (emphasis and internal 
citations omitted)).  Indeed, as I show in Part II.C.2, infra, important contemporary 
continental theorists who are frequently included in the post-structuralist camp, such as 
Pierre Bourdieu, likewise draw on the concept of habit—as developed through Merleau-
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hand, performance—in the context of sexual identity formation, at least—
occurs through forced iterations and compelled repetition.  Change arises 
not from a deliberative process in reconciling conflicts among competing 
pressures as mediated through habits, as in the classical pragmatist 
conception, but from accidental, non-purposive mutations.336 
As we saw in Part II.C.2, both classical pragmatists and contemporary 
continental theorists such as Bourdieu and Merleau-Ponty337 share a view 
of habits as enduring dispositions or historically received, internalized 
approaches to solving problems.  This approach preserves room for human 
agency in a way that post-structuralist accounts do not.  Although habits 
can be resistant to change, they are never completely static.  They are 
coping mechanisms, but generally are not irresistible compulsions.  They 
interact and adapt to changes in the environment in unpredictable and 
creative ways that reflect intelligent reflection and agency, whereas 
compelled performances cannot.   
Indeed, it bears pointing out, even Foucault, whom Schlag and many 
other American post-structuralists take as their theoretical mentor,338 began 
to emphasize by the end of his life the importance of an interactionist view 
of the subject.  In his late writing, Foucault cautions that “[r]efusing the 
philosophical recourse to a constituent subject does not amount to acting as 
if the subject did not exist, making an abstraction of it on behalf of a pure 
objectivity.”339  Instead, Foucault writes, this “refusal has the aim of 
eliciting the processes that are peculiar to an experience in which the 
subject and the object ‘are formed and transformed’ in relation to and in 
terms of one another.”340  Alluding to each of his major historical projects, 
Foucault further explains: 
The discourses of mental illness, delinquency, or sexuality say what the 
subject is only in a certain, quite particular game of truth; but these 
games are not imposed on the subject from the outside according to a 
necessary causality or structural determination.  They open up a field of 
experience in which the subject and the object are both constituted only 
under certain simultaneous conditions, but in which they are constantly 
modified in relation to each other, and so they modify this field of 
                                                          
Ponty—to avoid falling into overly structuralist accounts of the relationship between 
individual conduct and social context. 
 336. See supra text accompanying notes 148-151 (describing Butler’s theory of social 
change). 
 337. See supra notes 312-322 and accompanying text (discussing Bordieu and Merleau-
Ponty). 
 338. See supra text accompanying note 117 (giving an example of Schlag’s reliance on 
Foucault). 
 339. Maurice Florence, Foucault, in FOUCAULT, AESTHETICS, supra note 109, at 459, 
462.  Foucault wrote this summary of his work under the pseudonym “Maurice Florence” 
for an encyclopedia of philosophy.  Id. at 459 n.*.   
 340. Id. at 462. 
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experience itself.341 
In short, even in Foucault, by the time of his late writings, the subject 
takes on a reality and capacity for agency (and, interestingly, becomes 
anchored in “a field of experience”) that is missing from the conceptions in 
much Anglo-American post-structuralist writing.  It seems as if the “fiction 
of the subject” is in fact the fiction, one that deserves retirement as having 
outlived its useful theoretical life. 
To be sure, even in its most interactionist version, Foucault’s conception 
of the subject as constructed by the operation of multiple insidious force 
fields of power is far bleaker than the socially constructed self of the 
classical pragmatists.  But the point remains:  even Foucault in the end 
embraces an interactionist view, an observation that may lend still further 
support to the classical pragmatist position in the eyes of post-modernists 
who view Foucault as canonical. 
3. The unconscious 
A third key difference between classical pragmatism and post-
structuralism concerns perspectives on the unconscious.  Here again, 
drawing a contrast between Dewey and Butler proves illuminating.  Both 
Dewey and Butler agree that the unconscious is a powerful force in 
directing human conduct.  Dewey, however, views the unconscious as a 
seat of rational, culturally transmitted intelligence;342 Butler, with a much 
more strongly Freudian view, emphasizes the unconscious’s irrational and 
antisocial qualities.343  These contrasts lead to differences between classical 
pragmatists and post-structuralists on the potential efficacy of collective 
and individual action.  Post-structuralists such as Butler view the pull of 
force fields of power as so strong that small, localized acts of subversion 
are the most we can hope for in seeking to make change.344  Dewey, though 
also aware—and wary—of the strong pull of tradition,345 sees in the 
complex conflicts and inchoate flux inherent in the situations that confront 
us an equally compelling mandate to engage in recreation, experimentation, 
and reform. 
To be sure, the classical pragmatists’ theory of the self is in need of 
                                                          
 341. Id. (emphasis added). 
 342. Supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 343. Supra notes 148-153 and accompanying text. 
 344. See supra note 159-160 and accompanying text (discussing Butler’s call for 
subversive acts). 
 345. See, e.g., DEWEY, Human Nature, supra note 34, at 77 (“The force of lag in human 
life is enormous . . . .  Ways of belief . . . are not easily modified after they have once taken 
shape.”); see also id. (“[T]he short-cut revolutionist fails to realize the full force of . . . 
institutions as embodied habits. . . . A social revolution may effect abrupt and deep 
alterations in external customs . . . . But the habits that are behind these institutions . . . are 
not so easily modified.”). 
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refurbishing in light of our deeper contemporary appreciation of the effects 
of power, operating through ideology, as well as the importance of 
unconscious and erotic processes in forming identity and distinguishing self 
from the other.  Although the classical pragmatists were not naïve about 
these issues, later twentieth century theory surely offers a more developed 
view.  As I will argue below, however, there is no reason one cannot 
embrace both sets of ideas:  those concerning the unconscious and ideology 
operating through force fields of power and those concerning purposive 
human conduct that can have significant transformative effects.  Put 
otherwise, the post-modern wariness of the way in which the pull of 
unconscious forces can co-opt well-meaning efforts at reform offers a 
reflective insight of enormous importance from a classical pragmatist 
perspective. 
B. Updating Classical Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century 
My version of an updated classical pragmatist account approaches the 
central question of human agency as follows:  Agency lies in the interactive 
process between organism and environment and among different or 
competing aspects of this environment, internalized as experience and 
tradition in the form of habits.  The process of reconciling or achieving 
aesthetic resolution among these competing aspects of the environment and 
habits occurs through a deliberative process that may be more or less 
conscious depending on the circumstances and degree of difficulty 
associated with the reconciliation.  Indeed, it is probably the case that a 
considerable amount of experiential knowledge is not fully accessible to 
descriptive articulation.346  But this does not mean that such tacit 
knowledge is not subject to change and development through experience.  
For the classical pragmatists, much of the best deliberative judgment occurs 
at a preconscious level—as embodied, for example, in legal realist and 
Dewey admirer Karl Llewellyn’s notion of the “horse sense” that guides 
expert practitioners of any craft, including law.347 
                                                          
 346. See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 127, at 264 (discussing Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s 
theories as to the limited accessibility of tacit cultural knowledge to actors within a cultural 
system). 
 347. Llewellyn argued that legal practice was “really a rather elaborate and Janus-faced 
set of techniques” with regard to which “very considerable portions” are “not taught, resting 
largely in the inarticulate, though they are learned by most men of the law.”  Karl N. 
Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences—Especially Sociology, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 
1289 (1949) [hereinafter Llewellyn, LSS].  Llewellyn frequently invoked his concepts of 
“situation sense” and “horse sense” to describe the way in which good lawyers creatively 
apply the intuitively learned “know how” of their professional specialties:  lawyers apply 
legal rules to achieve sensible results “through smuggling bits of horse-sense into action and 
discussion by techniques akin to that of the wizard’s hat, though largely unconscious in their 
operation.”  Id. at 1290-91; see also Karl Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer 
Jurisprudence, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 581, 602 (1940) (“[A] goodly portion of our effective 
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At the same time, my updated classical pragmatist account of agency is 
both aware and wary of the relationship between unconscious and 
conscious intents.  There is no reason Freudian insights into the erotic 
dimensions of human energy—his focus on the preconscious and erotic 
processes through which identity formation and distinction of the other 
occurs—cannot supplement a classical pragmatist paradigm.  There are, in 
fact, many interesting parallels between Dewey’s theory of natural drives 
towards achieving aesthetically satisfying resolutions of unmet desires and 
Freud’s theories of libidinal attachments.348  Where the two part ways is in 
Freud’s emphasis on the individualist, inherently irrational and antisocial 
tendencies of the libido as compared to Dewey’s emphasis on the tacit 
social intelligence built into the unconscious.  One might easily start with 
Dewey’s social constructivist framework and add to it Freud’s insights into 
the erotic, as given shape and content (as with any other biological drive, as 
Dewey would say), by the social environment.   
In short, the emphasis on the unconsciousness in late twentieth century 
social theory offers important insights.  Its problematic aspect  arises from 
the way in which, in some forms of post-modernism at least, this insight 
overshadows attention to the possibilities for productive agency contained 
in preconscious as well as conscious judgment. 
C. The Benefits of Classical Pragmatism 
1. Rejecting paradigms based on “choice” 
The key advantage of employing the classical pragmatists’ interactionist 
framework is that it emphasizes that an interactive process between 
organism and environment, defined as deliberative judgment, affects both 
the organism and the environment.  Just as the environment constantly 
changes the organism, the organism’s responses to the environment alter 
the environment, in ways small and large, which in turn lead to a changed 
                                                          
tradition is not taught at all, but remains hidden in the unspoken; it is only learned, it is 
absorbed through the pores or through haphazard imitation, or it is reinvented, man by man, 
in the process of doing the job.”).  Moreover, Llewellyn, much like Dewey, viewed this 
largely unconscious absorption of situation sense as the seat of much that is good and 
graceful about human action.  Llewellyn thus described the “craft know-how” of various 
specialists as endeavors that could “be handled on a high and successful level of questing 
for beauty, health, glory.”  Llewellyn, LSS, supra, at 1298.  As his biographer points out, 
Llewellyn frequently uses such aesthetic terms in his writing about even the driest areas of 
the law—rhapsodizing, for example, “about the beauty of the letter of credit” and “praising 
judgments for their loveliness.”  WILLIAM L. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE LEGAL 
REALIST MOVEMENT 122 (1973). 
 348. See Sigmund Freud, The Libido Theory, in GENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 180 
(Philip Rieff ed., 1963) (explaining Freud’s theory of the libido).  See generally PHILIP 
RIEFF, FREUD:  THE MIND OF THE MORALIST (1979) (comparing Freud and Dewey along 
these lines); PHILIP RIEFF, THE TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC (1968) (discussing the 
interplay between Freud’s therapeutic tradition and models for political emancipation). 
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environment that again influences the organism, and so on.349  Human 
beings constantly remake and alter their worlds in the process of living in 
them—and in this sense have agency, to a greater or lesser degree 
depending on complicated and unpredictable combinations of factors 
involving the interaction of chance, opportunity, context, and capacities.  
But this is not also to say that human beings can choose the world in which 
they want to live.  As Mead’s theory of the Me insists, individuals do not 
choose social identities;350 social identities construct them.  The actions of 
individuals and communities in interaction with their social context may—
and indeed, constantly must—remake meanings, either by preservation, 
alteration, or some of both.  But that vision of agency is not equivalent to 
claims based in notions of “choice.”351 
A critique of the positions on choice of the two leading theorists whose 
quotes preface this Article can illustrate this important point.  Haney López 
uses the term “choice” in discussing racial identity formation; Williams 
compares a middle class woman’s “choice” to stay home with her children 
to a black man’s decision not to drink from a fountain labeled “whites 
only.”  Haney López’s suggestions connote liberal individualist 
understandings of the self’s priority and capacity for free choice; 
Williams’s comment is subject to the interpretation that she thinks there is 
no real difference between the subject positions of a middle class woman in 
late twentieth century America and a black man in the Jim Crow South. 
Both quotes inspire controversy because of the ways in which they employ 
the concept of choice.  The use of this term in both contexts is problematic 
because it does not allow for recognition of differences or graduations in 
the agency permitted by one’s social circumstances.   
As legal philosophers note in examining ideas about choice embedded in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence, choice refers to any purposive action—any 
action performed through the voluntary contraction of one’s muscles.352  As 
                                                          
 349. See, e.g., GOUINLOCK, supra note 201, at 22 (“[t]here are functionally inseparable 
processes of organism and environment; and in the very interaction of these processes traits 
of nature emerge whose character depends in crucial ways on this interaction itself”). 
 350. This is true with the limited exception of persons situated near the margin between 
identity categories, who can choose to “pass” as one or the other identity.  Some critical race 
theorists, including Haney López, have been particularly fascinated by cases reflecting the 
problematic policing of these margins between identity categories, especially in the race 
context, because of the underlying assumptions about social meanings such cases reveal.  
But such cases are, of course, the exception to the immediate and automatic ascription of 
social identity once persons transmit information about themselves to others through 
socially relevant codes over which they often have little  control. 
 351. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 1464-65 (noting implausibility of 
Robinson’s “New Age Philosophy” claim that “persons of color” mired in poverty can 
simply change their circumstances through the exercise of free will). 
 352. Cf. Coleman, Mental Abnormality, supra note 59, at 107 (arguing that “mental 
deficiency may surface as a defense in torts not to deny fault, but to deny that the minimal 
conditions of agency or action have been satisfied”). 
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one philosopher puts it, when a bank robber holds a gun to a bankteller’s 
ribs, the bankteller “chooses” to turn over the cash—in other words, in “a 
strange sense you choose, you want to do, what you are forced to do.”353  
But the mere fact that we have inherited a theory of choice through 
traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence354 does not mean we must use it 
it in the context of scholarship seeking to understand the capacity of legal 
actors for agency with respect to the pressing problems of our times.  A 
theory of agency suitable for these purposes must be able to distinguish 
between various types of “choice.” 
Interactionism offers just such a finely tuned instrument for thinking 
about agency.  Under an interactionist view, a person can have more or 
fewer options for action, depending on circumstances.  Whereas a post-
structuralist might see little difference between the two situations posed by 
Williams—both reflect socially constructed “choices” mediated through 
complex systems of language and symbols—a classical pragmatist account 
would see a large difference between actions taken due to a menacing 
threat of physical violence and legal prescription, on the one hand, and 
actions motivated by social conventions and emotional attachments that 
disadvantage identity categories organized on axes of class and gender, on 
the other.  Both situations involve injustice, but there is a vastly different 
quality of experience embodied in the two examples.  A social theory 
aimed at assisting in projects of emancipatory activism surely should make 
a distinction between levels of economic, legal, social and physical 
oppression through violence in order to distinguish the two examples.  This 
is not to say that we should not work on both forms of injustice, of course, 
but simply that an adequate theory of agency should be able to distinguish 
between the two scenarios. 
By the same token, my version of an updated classical pragmatist 
account avoids exaggerating the degrees of agency even privileged actors 
possess.  Haney López, in arguing that whites should “renounce” their 
whiteness, can be argued to slide into a liberal individualist fallacy that 
members of dominant social identity categories, at least, are free to 
“choose” race.  Perhaps López commits this error because his own identity 
is at the boundary between two social identity categories.355  But the fact 
                                                          
 353. Irving Thalberg, Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action, in CITADEL, supra note 
81, at 123, 24. 
 354. See, e.g., Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, supra note 59, at 23 
(describing jurisprudence as “middle level theory,” that seeks to extract “principles and 
norms from existing practices” but does not seek to justify those principles as correct); 
Ernest Weinrib, supra note 59, at 108 (noting that whether the Kantian “notion of rational 
agency is plausible is a philosophical question that lies beyond tort theory,” though it 
undeniably provides the foundation for such theory). 
 355. See López, supra note 7, at 10 (explaining that his personal background is as the 
son of a Latina mother and white father, and contrasting his identification with the Latina—
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remains that people most often cannot choose the identity categories—the 
Me—to which they are assigned.  We do not choose our identity categories; 
socially constructed meanings about race, gender, class, and other salient 
characteristics precede us in our social milieus and are operationalized at 
every moment by those we encounter in ways that we are often unable to 
renounce. 
Nevertheless, this rebuttal to Haney López’s apparent suggestion that 
whites “renounce” their racial identity does not compel the opposite 
conclusion to which too many post-structuralists resort—namely, that 
whites have no agency—i.e., no meaningful capacity to engage in 
purposeful action aimed at social change with respect to the construction of  
meanings about race.  Some might make compelling arguments to this 
effect, pointing out the ways in which social reformers’ well-meaning 
efforts often have had unintended and counterproductive consequences.  In 
the Part that follows, however, I suggest that we are not necessarily forced 
to this conclusion.  An interactionist theory of the self along the lines of the 
updated version of classical pragmatism I propose can help us develop a 
conception of partial agency that is open to the possibility of purposive 
political change, but still wary of and on guard against claims that anything 
near completely free agency is possible in this regard. 
2. Meaning, social identity, and difference 
For classical pragmatists, social meanings arise through language and 
symbols and through experience.356  As I discussed in examining Mead in 
particular, the social construction of identity occurs through both the social 
construction of, and the organism’s experience of, difference.  Such 
socially constructed, interactively generated differences produce the 
salience of identity categories organized around difference.  Even though 
human beings are generally not free to choose their identity categories with 
respect to such socially constructed matters as race, they do contribute, 
through collective and individual action and with limits imposed by social 
constraints, to the development of meanings within and about social 
identity categories.357  In this regard, it seems to me Haney López is exactly 
right.  Racial meanings are in flux and do depend, in part, on the effects of 
agency, particularly at the collective level but, in some less significant way, 
at the individual level as well.358  But to say that human actors’ conduct 
                                                          
López—side of his heritage with his brother’s identification with the white—Haney—side). 
 356. See supra Part III.A.1.  
 357. Id. 
 358. As an interesting historical note, it is worth pointing out that “new institutionalism,” 
the theoretical framework in which Haney López identifies himself as working, has direct 
historical links to symbolic interactionism, the school of social theory to which Mead’s 
work gave birth.  See Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism:  Judicial Conduct and a 
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continually contributes to racial meaning is not to say that such conduct 
creates that meaning ab initio or can erase it at will, but instead that 
purposive human action counts in the mix. 
Drawing from Mead’s claim with respect to the unpredictable futurity 
inherent in the I—an I present at both the individual and collective levels, 
as Mead emphasizes359—we can further apply interactionist theory to 
highlight the potential for agency in shaping future constructions of 
meanings around race and other social identity characteristics, just as 
Haney López asserts.  This is, to repeat once again, not to suggest either 
free will or optimism about the possibilities for progressive change on such 
matters.  It is instead simply to observe, first, that social meanings are 
subject to change over time—as, indeed, any Foucaultian devotee would 
necessarily acknowledge360—and, second, as classical pragmatists but not 
all post-modernists would add, that the processes by which such meanings 
change involve multidimensional interactions in which purposive human 
action has a significant impact on those meanings, just as those meanings 
shape human action. 
Moreover, as classical pragmatists, but not all Foucaultian devotees, 
would add, the way in which people contribute to the development of such 
meanings is not solely through mistakes in performance or unwitting 
participation in the operation of force fields of power, but is also in part 
subject to reflection and control.  Force fields of power mediated through 
unconscious identification with repressed values or ideologies bend 
conscious purposes in directions other than those actors may intend, but 
purposive human effort contributes to the mix.  Contrary to the positions of 
theorists such as Schlag, Fish, and Rorty, critical reflection and deliberative 
judgment do matter in the creation and change of social meanings.  This, I 
believe, is the best way to interpret and benefit from Haney López’s 
arguments that human beings create and change race and racial meanings 
through their individual and collective actions.  Although a person typically 
                                                          
New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1769-76 (2000) (identifying 
himself as a “new institutionalist” and explaining that new institutionalism identifies its 
theoretical father as ethnomethodologist Harold Garfinkel); see also Gary A. Fine, The Sad 
Demise, Mysterious Disappearance, and Glorious Triumph of Symbolic Interactionism, 19 
ANN. REV. OF SOC. 61, 66-69 (1993) (explaining that the intellectual roots of 
ethnomethodology can be traced to symbolic interactionism and its founder, Mead); Donald 
D. Searing, Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
1239, 1246 (1991) (tracing links between new institutionalism and Mead’s symbolic 
interactionism). 
 359. See MEAD, supra note 304, at 176-77 (discussing his concept of the “I”). 
 360. Foucault’s central project was, after all, to trace how discourses about the subject 
changed over time with respect to such matters as sanity and insanity, moral responsibility 
and punishment, and sexual activity and identity.  See generally FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, 
supra note 107 (tracing historical changes in approaches to punishment); FOUCAULT, 
MADNESS, supra note 107 (similar analysis of mental illness); FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY, supra 
note 107 (undertaking similar historical analysis of constructions of sexuality). 
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cannot choose her socially ascribed identity categories (the Me), the I (both 
individually and collectively in communities) reacts and responds to such 
socially received meanings.  In the process of doing so, meanings change.  
Again, this is not say that we can erase racism or refuse to be treated as one 
who belongs to a “race” simply by willing this to be so—that kind of claim 
skirts far too close to liberal individualist notions of free will.  But it is to 
say that purposive human action affects outcomes within limits—that 
humans do possess, in variable and somewhat unpredictable degrees, what 
Abrams refers to as “partial agency.”361 
D. Concrete Examples 
In this final Part, I apply my updated version of classical pragmatism to 
several concrete examples of debates within the legal academy in recent 
decades that could benefit from the application of classical pragmatist 
insights.  I show that examining assumptions about the theories of the self 
that underlie such debates can help explain them, and that application of 
interactionist insights can help move them forward. 
1. The scholars of color debate 
One debate that could have benefited from the insights of classical 
pragmatism was that about perspectivism, which took place in the 
American legal academy in the mid-1980s.362  This debate arose after 
critical race theorists Mari Matsuda, Richard Delgado, and Derrick Bell 
each published works arguing that scholars of color had special 
perspectives on race matters to which the legal academy should pay more 
attention.363  With very different approaches and tones,364 these scholars 
                                                          
 361. See Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 13, at 361 (proposing partial agency as a 
strategy for adjudicating claims of sexualized injury). 
 362. See Pierre Schlag, Commentary, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 1047, 1085 (2002) (“The introduction and development of a perspectivist aesthetic in 
American law owes much to feminist and critical race theory scholarship of the 1980s and 
1990s.”). 
 363. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:  THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR 
RACIAL JUSTICE 181-235 (1987) (addressing various issues affecting African-Americans in 
the United States, including crime, affirmative action, and reparations); Richard Delgado, 
The Ethereal Scholar:  Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 302-14 (1987) (assessing the negative and positive features of the 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) program); Richard Delgado, Commentary, The Imperial 
Scholar:  Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 561-62 
(1984) [hereinafter Delgado, The Imperial Scholar] (claiming that minority scholars were 
underrepresented in civil rights literature); Mari J. Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal 
Knowledge:  Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 1-2 (1988) 
[hereinafter Matsuda, Affirmative Action] (using the claim that women and persons of color 
have different “personal knowledge” based on their life experience as an argument for 
affirmative action in law school hiring, on grounds that “outsiders” will bring new 
perspectives on law); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:  Critical Legal Studies and 
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 325-26 (1987) [hereinafter Matsuda, Looking 
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argued that, because persons of color living in the United States inevitably 
had personal experiences of racism, they could be expected to have special 
insights into race issues.  Along with this argument came various claims 
about what implications should flow therefrom.  Bell’s fictional story 
seemed to suggest that race should be the deciding factor for candidates 
whose academic credentials were otherwise equal,365 but Delgado, in the 
most provocative volley in these skirmishes, argued that, no matter what 
their views or politics, white scholars had no place contributing to civil 
rights scholarship, but should instead “redirect their efforts” and “stand 
aside,” so that the resulting “gap” could be “quickly filled by talented and 
innovative minority writers and commentators.”366 
This was so strong a claim367 that it must have been, at least in part, a 
strategy designed to provoke strong reaction.  It certainly had this result.  
Randall Kennedy, then one of the few tenured African-American 
professors at the Harvard Law School, published the most notable 
response.  Kennedy argued for greater appreciation of the complexity of 
human experience, more careful methodology in drawing conclusions from 
complex and incomplete empirical evidence, and adoption of a spirit of 
democracy and inclusion in which all interested voices should be respected 
and heard.368 
                                                          
to the Bottom] (suggesting a “new epistemological source for critical scholars:  the actual 
experience, history, culture, and intellectual tradition of people of color in America” and 
arguing that “victims of racial oppression have distinct normative insights”). 
 364. Compare Matsuda, Affirmative Action, supra note 363, at 2 (inviting legal scholars 
to try to explore and cite “outsider” literature), with Delgado, The Imperial Scholar, supra 
note 363, at 577 (suggesting that, while white scholars might “contribute occasional articles 
and useful proposals” to the civil rights movement, they ought not “make a career out of 
it”). 
 365. See BELL, supra note 363, at 140, 142-43 (narrating a fictional story about a law 
school that refused to hire a seventh African-American law professor despite his outstanding 
credentials). 
 366. Delgado, Imperial Scholar, supra note 363, at 577. 
 367. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited:  How to Marginalize 
Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (1991) (noting that even 
friend Derrick Bell had described the article as “an intellectual hand grenade”) (further 
citations omitted). 
 368. Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 
(1989).  Kennedy argued, for example, that Matsuda should be faulted for two forms of 
“reductivism,” claiming that her analysis was marred “by both her tendency to homogenize 
the experience of persons of color and her tendency to minimize the heterogeneity of 
opinions held and articulated by persons of color.”  Id. at 1782.  Responding to Matsuda’s 
assertion that “‘Black Americans, because of their experiences, are quick to detect racism, to 
distrust official claims of necessity, and to sense a threat to freedom,’” Kennedy 
acknowledged that “some black Americans undoubtedly do display certain moral and 
intellectual virtues derived from experience with racial oppression,” but noted that this is by 
no means always true.  Id. at 1780 (quoting Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 
363, at 360).  “The mere experience of racial oppression provides no inoculation against 
complacency.  Nor does it inoculate the victims of oppression against their own versions of 
prejudice and tyranny.”  Id.  Instead, Kennedy suggested, the decision to fight against 
oppression should be seen as “an act of will.”  Id. at 1804.  Thus, Kennedy argued, “the 
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Little that Kennedy said in this regard would meet with the disagreement 
of a pragmatist in the Deweyian tradition.  In a crucial final parry, however, 
Kennedy argued that neutral, objective standards—detached from race or, 
presumably, other indicia of social identity—should be used to differentiate 
the best scholarship from that which was second-rate.  Instead of using race 
as a proxy for the quality of legal scholars’ work, Kennedy argued, we 
should evaluate “the work itself.”369  In this respect, Kennedy was 
decidedly not a pragmatist in the Deweyian tradition, because, as we have 
seen, Dewey’s theory of valuation would emphasize the need for ongoing 
evaluation of facts and values in relation to each other.  Moreover, Dewey 
would argue, dominant groups’ judgments of value will tend to reflect the 
perspectives and interests of those groups, just as Delgado, Matsuda and 
Bell had asserted.  Applied to legal academia, this model would predict that 
the scholarly writing on race and civil rights issues most likely to be valued 
would be that of scholars at the top of the profession’s status hierarchy, and 
correspondingly would likely reflect the interests and purposes of that elite, 
in which scholars of color were at the time clearly under-represented.370 
Dewey was not a “hard” perspectivist, however, as I have already 
discussed; to the contrary, what I have labeled his “soft” perspectivism 
recognized the potential fallibility of all socially constructed viewpoints.  
For Dewey, “such differing standpoints will exhibit the limitations as well 
as the strengths of their points of view and need to be corrected by listening 
to and interacting with others differently situated.”371 
The advantage of an interactionist theory, in other words, is that it offers 
a version of perspectivism that recognizes the socially contingent nature of 
value judgments without reaching the conclusion that perspectives are no 
more than the product of persons’ subject positions.  Instead, as we have 
seen, perspectives involve continual processes of deliberative valuation—a 
                                                          
relationship between thought, experience, and racial status is not nearly so predictable” as 
Matsuda suggested.  Id. at 1781.  Kennedy further criticized Matsuda for presuming that all 
legal scholars of color share similar race experiences without actually examining what such 
experiences were, thus assuming that class identity is much less important than race as a 
determinant of outlook.  As Kennedy put it, “Matsuda’s analysis wraps in one garment of 
racial victimization the black law professor of middle-class upbringing with a salary of 
$65,000 and the black, unemployed, uneducated captive of the ghetto.  In the overwhelming 
majority of cases, however, these two social types will inhabit radically dissimilar social 
universes.”  Id. at 1782 (citation omitted).  To this point Kennedy’s approach sounds like a 
classical pragmatist’s in its interest in complexifying rather than reducing social phenomena, 
in remaining tentative in the face of uncertainty, and in its spirit of collective, free ranging 
deliberation. 
 369. Id. at 1798. 
 370. Cf. PIERRE BOURDIEU, HOMO ACADEMICUS (Peter Collier trans., Stanford Univ. 
Press 1988) (1984) (correlating the social positions of French academics with the scholarly 
styles they value). 
 371. Seigfried, supra note 288, at 202. 
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continual interaction between facts and values.372  Contrary to the claims of 
Fish and Schlag that such reflective analysis is futile to practice, this 
process of valuation is key to all practices, including scholarly production. 
On the classical pragmatists’ model, to raise the issue of the operation of 
force fields of power in the social construction of hierarchies of scholarship 
is not to claim that better and worse scholarship cannot be distinguished, 
but to urge reflective analysis of the criteria used to make such distinctions.  
Classical pragmatism, in other words, preserves the idea of reflective 
capacity that theorists working in a revised liberal tradition emphasize.  
Reflection does not give us entirely free agency, as a strong liberal theory 
might argue, but at least provides the possibility of partial agency.  
Reflection on values (such as standards for scholarship) in the context of 
evaluating facts (such as the racial and gender distributions of publication 
statistics), provides possibilities of deliberative judgment leading to 
change. 
 Today the scholars of color debate has largely wound down,373 
though related issues continued to percolate in American law reviews 
throughout the 1990s.374  In its wake, the increase in outstanding, creative 
scholarship on race in law reviews suggests at least several lessons:  First, 
that perspective can enhance the contributions, be it to scholarship or to 
formulating an agenda for social activism; and, second, that agency does 
matter—that forcing an examination of the standards applied to choose 
                                                          
 372. See generally Dewey, supra note 261 (articulating his theory of deliberative 
valuation). 
 373. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to 
the Voice of Color:  Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 
IOWA L. REV. 803, 804 (1994) (claiming that the “Voice of Color” debate “fizzled to a halt 
as a result of the limitations caused by the current era of ‘political correctness’”). 
 374. One such debate concerned the legitimacy of the use of narrative as a genre in legal 
scholarship, which its participants closely associated with, and traced back to, the scholars 
of color debate.  See, e.g., id. at 819 (claiming that those “employing the Voice of Color” 
subvert “the neutral process of writing and evaluating scholarship, a process in which the 
author’s identity is said to be irrelevant,” and that they instead, “speaking in the Voice of 
Color demonstrate that society largely constructs social reality”).  See generally Daniel A. 
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories of School:  An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) (questioning the legitimacy of narrative as a genre in legal 
scholarship). 
Another debate with themes similar to the 1980s scholars of color debate took place 
among Asian-American scholars in the mid-1990s.  Compare Robert S. Chang, Toward an 
Asian American Legal Scholarship:  Critical Race Theory, Post-structuralism, and 
Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (1993) (calling for an “Asian American 
Moment” in legal scholarship), with Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IOWA L. REV. 145, 145-49 
(1994) (condemning Chang’s position as embracing a form of “racial fundamentalism” 
opposed to important principles of individualism and freedom of association).  See also 
Garrett Epps, What’s Loving Got to Do With It?, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1489, 1500 (1996) 
(collecting comments on Chang/Chen debate); Ilhyung Lee, Race Consciousness and 
Minority Scholars, 33 CONN. L. REV. 535, 536-39 (2001) (examining the Chang/Chen 
debate and calling for greater civility in debating race conscious versus race blind 
approaches). 
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“leading” scholarship arguably did help open the arena to significant new 
contributions.  As Delgado described in an article written a decade later, 
there has been change in the legal scholarship on race in leading law 
reviews, not only in terms of approaches but also in the racial and gender 
identities of the leading scholars in the field.375 
One contemporary outgrowth of the scholars of color debate is Derrick 
Bell’s interesting and provocative interest convergence thesis.  This thesis 
asserts that political and social change that helps the position of racial 
minorities occurs only when that change converges with the interest of the 
more powerful majority.376  I have discussed and critiqued this thesis 
elsewhere,377 but it is worth noting that, here again, my updated version of 
classical pragmatism offers a somewhat different perspective.  On such a 
classical pragmatist account, no invisible hand or unvarying law of social 
forces mandates that change can occur only when it benefits the interests of 
the majority.  There is, instead, opportunity—for success and for failure—
in the changing flux of many factors in interaction with each other.  These 
factors include, importantly, the fact that the very definition of what is in 
the interests of the dominant class is a question subject to social 
construction.  Almost any progressive reform can be justified as in the 
long-term interests of the privileged.  Wealth redistribution in favor of 
greater economic equality can be argued to be in the long-term interests of 
the wealthy because this step lessens social strife, for example, even though 
it directly contravenes the short-term economic interests of the well-to-do. 
My version of a classical pragmatist perspective, therefore, would call 
for a focus on the construction, manipulation, and transformation of social 
meanings about entitlement, fairness, and equality.  This perspective seems 
better suited to guiding strategies for successful social and political change 
                                                          
 375. See generally Delgado, supra note 367.  Delgado surveyed the publication practices 
of three elite law reviews and found that scholars of color and women were the authors of 
nearly three-quarters of the articles on civil rights.  See id. at 1352-53 n.15 (concluding 
overall that “most civil rights writing published in top law reviews these days is written by 
women and minorities”).  He further concluded that at least some majority-race scholars 
were citing this scholarship of women and scholars of color appropriately—though he also 
noted many ways in which other scholars were resisting the call for fairer citation practices, 
such as by engaging in only minimal or cursory treatment of outsider scholarship.  See id. at 
1355-72 (detailing varied techniques majority scholars still use to marginalize outsider 
voices). 
 376. The classic statement of this thesis can be found in Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, 
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
518 (1980). 
 377. See Susan D. Carle, How Should We Theorize Class Interests in Thinking about 
Professional Regulation?, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 571, 589-90 (2003) [hereinafter 
Carle, Class Interests] (critiquing use of overly reductionist theses concerning class interests 
as explanations for legal ethics regulation); Susan D. Carle, Response, Elite Privilege and 
Public Interest Lawyering, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 153, 154-55 (2002) (responding to a 
“materialist thesis” concerning the motivation of elite lawyers’ involvement in social change 
advanced in comments of David Wilkins). 
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than one that dismisses out of hand any aspirations for change that do not 
serve the apparent interests of those in power. 
2. Feminist legal theory 
Like critical race theory, feminist theory became bogged down in a 
sameness/difference debate, which played itself out in the American legal 
academy in the mid-1980s.  The debate revolved around whether the 
growing influx of women lawyers could be expected to bring a special, and 
potentially transformative, perspective to the legal profession.  Occurring 
both in the same time period and with a similar underlying structure of 
argument and rebuttal as the scholars of color debate, the 
sameness/difference debate began when some feminists argued that 
women’s life experiences could be expected to give them a more 
“relational” or “caring” perspective in their jobs as lawyers.378 
On the other side of the debate, feminist legal theorists such as Joan 
Williams, who identifies herself as a post-modernist, and Margaret Jane 
Radin, who identifies herself as a pragmatist, strongly dissented from 
arguments for change within the legal profession based on purported 
differences between the lawyering styles of men and women.  These 
commentators cautioned that the use of any generalizations about gender-
linked lawyering approaches, even positive ones, risked creating 
stereotypes that would do great harm to women’s attempts to advance in 
the legal profession.379 
                                                          
 378. In the words of one participant in this debate, explaining the “difference” 
perspective: 
Drawing on the work of the affiliational or relational feminist theorists, like [Carol] 
Gilligan . . . and others, I speculated that women who reason with ethics of care and 
concern, as well as justice, and who took account of relationships and context 
rather than searching for abstract principles to solve legal problems might structure 
the legal system and legal practice in different ways. 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of the Feminization of the Legal 
Profession:  Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 289, 312 
(1989); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:  Speculations on a 
Woman’s Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 40 (1985) (considering 
implications for the legal profession of social psychology data revealing differences in male 
and female styles of moral reasoning); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux:  Another 
Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 75, 76 (1994) 
(reassessing earlier article in light of decade’s further insights). 
In a similar vein, constitutional scholar Suzanna Sherry argued that women tend to exhibit 
a uniquely “feminine jurisprudence,” characterized by a greater concern with connection 
and context, and that this different style of reasoning can be detected in the opinions of 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.  See Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 615 (1986) (“[R]ecognition of Justice 
O’Connor’s unique perspective, and the unique perspective of women in general, might aid 
us in ameliorating the distortions of an overly individualist liberal paradigm.”). 
 379. See, e.g., Margaret Radin, Remarks, Reply:  Please Be Careful with Cultural 
Feminism, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1993) (suggesting that “we should push for more 
freedom to get women out of those stereotypical roles of cultural feminism”); Joan C. 
Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 806 (1989) (arguing against 
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Williams later proposed a resolution to the sameness/difference debate, 
resting on what she referred to as the post-modernist idea of a fractured and 
decentered self.380  As Williams pointed out, the problem inherent in strong 
forms of structuralism that claim that social structure creates and 
constitutes subject positions is that this claim leads to the conclusion that 
all people who are structurally located within similar social categories—
organized on axes such as gender, race, class, or religion, for example—
should have the same socially constructed perspectives.381  But such claims, 
as with the “special voices” of outsiders, easily fall into the traps of 
stereotyping or essentialism.  Williams argued that moving from crude 
structuralism to a more sophisticated approach in the same tradition could 
solve these problems.  As Williams explained: 
This post-modern approach starts from the notion of a fragmented and 
shifting self.  Sometimes I feel like a white, sometimes a heterosexual, 
sometimes a Jew, sometimes a lawyer, sometimes an Episcopalian.  
Often I feel simply like my mother’s daughter.  A post-modern approach 
to difference highlights that each person is embedded in a matrix of 
social and psychological factors that interact in different contexts.  
Essentialism dissolves before the notion of a shifting, constantly 
reconfigured self, shaped but not determined by membership in sets of 
social categories that crystallize power relations in America.382 
In other words, according to Williams, it is not that we are defined by 
one structural location but by a great many such locations.  The great 
variation we see in opinions and perspectives, even of people who appear 
to have similar locations in the matrix, arises from the fact that beneath our 
individual skin shells exist an infinite array of combinations of socially 
constructed perspectives. 
As already discussed in the context of the scholars of color debate, 
however, perspectivism need not be reduced to the operation of structurally 
defined subject positions existing within skin shells that create the illusion 
of individuality.  The classical pragmatist approach sees the self, not 
merely as a combination of socially constructed fragments created by 
locations in a complex structural matrix, but as an unpredictable interaction 
among internalized habits or dispositions, the demands of new situations, 
and biological capacities, including personality traits and cognitive 
processes.383 
                                                          
“stereotypes” about how women’s personalities differ from men’s on grounds that these 
marginalize women). 
 380. See Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate:  A Post-Modern 
Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296, 306-
22 (using post-modernism to re-conceptualize the sameness/difference debate). 
 381. Id. at 307. 
 382. Id. at 307-08. 
 383. In more recent work, Williams takes a perspective on questions of personality 
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Feminists continue to debate these and related issues.  The ongoing 
dialogue is reflected in Kathryn Abrams’s review of Williams’s book, 
Unbending Gender.384  In that review, Abrams praises Williams’s work in 
many respects, but questions Williams’s decision to rely on Judith Butler’s 
theory about how to achieve social change through small, localized acts of 
subversion, or, put otherwise, performances “in drag.”385  True to her 
commitments to a revised form of liberal theory, Abrams further questions 
Williams’s “Deweyian” pragmatism in seeking to find new paths on the 
basis of a “reshuffling of traditional norms.”386  In this Article, of course, I 
have argued that there is a large difference between Butler and Dewey and 
that Dewey’s pragmatism offers a better model for social change than 
Butler’s post-structuralist approach, because Dewey in fact embraces the 
very theory of a reflective, partially agenic self that Abrams is working 
toward in her important work based in a revised version of liberalism.387 
Some feminist philosophers are beginning to explore the potential of a 
classical pragmatist theory of the self in resolving the tensions in feminist 
theory illustrated by the sameness/difference debate and its aftermath.388  
As I have suggested in this Article, feminist legal scholars could benefit 
from drawing further on such literature to pursue an approach that sees the 
self as a site or process of interaction among aspects of internalized 
tradition, or habit, and the changing demands of the environment.  I have 
attempted such an analysis in the context of analyzing the agency of one 
                                                          
formation much closer to mine.  See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Fretting in the Force Fields:  
Why the Distribution of Social Power Has Proved So Hard to Change, 71 UMKC L. REV. 
493, 494 (2002) (“[A] description of someone’s social location is inaccurate as a picture of 
her identity.  Identity is profoundly shaped by one’s social power position, but it is also 
shaped by (among other things) one’s personality, psychology, and life experience—
themselves influenced but not determined by social location.”). 
 384. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER:  WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000). 
 385. See Abrams, supra note 154, at 773-77 (criticizing Williams’s use of the concept of 
“domesticity in drag” and stating that “whether the answer to domesticity lies in a radical 
destabilization and denaturalization of gender or in a systematic, substantive challenge to 
institutionalized norms, it is unlikely to be found in ‘domesticity in drag’”). 
 386. Id. at 748 (“I remain unconvinced by the Deweyian aspect of Williams’ 
pragmatism:  the decision to deploy the norms of domesticity against themselves.”). 
 387. See supra Part III.A (discussing the differences between post-structuralist and 
classical pragmatist approaches to individual and collective action). 
 388. See generally CHARLENE HADDOCK SEIGFRIED, PRAGMATISM AND FEMINISM:  
REWEAVING THE SOCIAL FABRIC (1996) (exploring connections between feminism and 
classical pragmatism); KATHRYN PYNE ADDELSON, IMPURE THOUGHTS:  ESSAYS ON 
PHILOSOPHY, FEMINISM, AND ETHICS (1991) (calling on feminists to apply symbolic 
interactionism to resolve the theoretical problem of explaining agency within social 
constraints).  Another well-known pragmatist feminist philosopher is Nancy Fraser, whose 
work draws on contemporary pragmatic discourse theory, which has its roots primarily in 
the work of Habermas rather than the classical pragmatists.  See, e.g., NANCY FRASER, 
JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS:  CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE “POSTSOCIALIST” CONDITION 155, 
160, 214 (1997) (discussing interactionist and pragmatic discourse theories). 
CARLE OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:42:36 PM 
2005] THEORIZING AGENCY 387 
early twentieth century American feminist in other work.389 
3. Future directions 
The refurbished theory of an agenic self I argue for here has many other 
potential applications.  An agenic, interactionist theory of the self could be 
helpful, for example, to the study of the operation of class privilege in the 
legal profession’s construction of ethical rules and practice norms, as I 
have also suggested elsewhere.390  Indeed, such issues concerning the 
operation of class in the legal arena and American society generally stand 
as one of the most important yet submerged areas needing further inquiry 
in legal theory.  Here American legal scholars may want to follow the lead 
of scholars who have pointed to the work on habitus of master continental 
theorist of class, Pierre Bourdieu.391  It remains to be seen whether 
Bourdieu’s theory of habit—a darker post-modern version of the classical 
pragmatists, as a developing literature has started to explore392—fully gets 
us where we need to go in developing a theory that captures both the 
possibilities and the limits of human agency on issues of economic injustice 
and social class.  That fascinating subject points toward a direction for 
future research. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued in this Article for a revival of the classical pragmatists’ 
theory of the self as a starting point for a richer and more helpful 
understanding of the way in which social identity and meanings are 
constructed and changed through human beings’ interactions with their 
social and natural environments.  The underlying questions, about how to 
theorize the self and human agency, might seem largely irrelevant to all but 
a handful of scholars, but I have sought here to persuade that they are not.  
As Dewey’s theory of valuation shows, how we conceive of the process by 
which human beings take on values and act in accordance with them itself 
becomes a value that figures into the system by which values are produced 
and changed.  It deeply matters, in other words, how legal scholars 
conceive of human agency, because those ideas in turn shape their sense of 
the possible. 
                                                          
 389. See Susan D. Carle, Gender in the Construction of the Lawyer’s Persona, 22 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 239, 270-73 (1999) (reviewing KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, FLORENCE KELLY AND 
THE NATION’S WORK:  THE RISE OF WOMEN’S POLITICAL CULTURE, 1830-1900 (1995)). 
 390. See Carle, Class Interests, supra note 377, at 603 (suggesting applications of 
Foucault and Bourdieu in legal ethics scholarship). 
 391. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 71, at 680 (pointing to Bourdieu as a useful source of 
theory for how “meaning” infuses actors’ conduct). 
 392. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing how American legal scholarship has only just 
begun to contend with Bourdieu’s work on social class); see also supra note 319 (defining 
Bourdieu’s habitus and comparing it with Dewey’s habit). 
